Linux-Fsdevel Archive on lore.kernel.org
help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: Adrian Reber <areber@redhat.com>
To: "Christian Brauner" <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>,
"Eric Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>,
"Pavel Emelyanov" <ovzxemul@gmail.com>,
"Oleg Nesterov" <oleg@redhat.com>,
"Dmitry Safonov" <0x7f454c46@gmail.com>,
"Andrei Vagin" <avagin@gmail.com>,
"Nicolas Viennot" <Nicolas.Viennot@twosigma.com>,
"Michał Cłapiński" <mclapinski@google.com>,
"Kamil Yurtsever" <kyurtsever@google.com>,
"Dirk Petersen" <dipeit@gmail.com>,
"Christine Flood" <chf@redhat.com>,
"Casey Schaufler" <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Cc: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.ibm.com>,
Radostin Stoyanov <rstoyanov1@gmail.com>,
Adrian Reber <areber@redhat.com>,
Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@openvz.org>,
Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>,
Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>,
Sargun Dhillon <sargun@sargun.me>, Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, selinux@vger.kernel.org,
Eric Paris <eparis@parisplace.org>, Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>,
linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH v5 4/6] proc: allow access in init userns for map_files with CAP_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE
Date: Wed, 15 Jul 2020 16:49:52 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20200715144954.1387760-5-areber@redhat.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20200715144954.1387760-1-areber@redhat.com>
Opening files in /proc/pid/map_files when the current user is
CAP_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE capable in the root namespace is useful for
checkpointing and restoring to recover files that are unreachable via
the file system such as deleted files, or memfd files.
Signed-off-by: Adrian Reber <areber@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Nicolas Viennot <Nicolas.Viennot@twosigma.com>
---
fs/proc/base.c | 8 ++++----
1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/fs/proc/base.c b/fs/proc/base.c
index 65893686d1f1..cada783f229e 100644
--- a/fs/proc/base.c
+++ b/fs/proc/base.c
@@ -2194,16 +2194,16 @@ struct map_files_info {
};
/*
- * Only allow CAP_SYS_ADMIN to follow the links, due to concerns about how the
- * symlinks may be used to bypass permissions on ancestor directories in the
- * path to the file in question.
+ * Only allow CAP_SYS_ADMIN and CAP_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE to follow the links, due
+ * to concerns about how the symlinks may be used to bypass permissions on
+ * ancestor directories in the path to the file in question.
*/
static const char *
proc_map_files_get_link(struct dentry *dentry,
struct inode *inode,
struct delayed_call *done)
{
- if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
+ if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN) || !capable(CAP_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE))
return ERR_PTR(-EPERM);
return proc_pid_get_link(dentry, inode, done);
--
2.26.2
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2020-07-15 14:53 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 17+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2020-07-15 14:49 [PATCH v5 0/6] capabilities: Introduce CAP_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE Adrian Reber
2020-07-15 14:49 ` [PATCH v5 1/6] " Adrian Reber
2020-07-15 15:06 ` Christian Brauner
2020-07-15 14:49 ` [PATCH v5 2/6] pid: use checkpoint_restore_ns_capable() for set_tid Adrian Reber
2020-07-15 15:08 ` Christian Brauner
2020-07-15 14:49 ` [PATCH v5 3/6] pid_namespace: use checkpoint_restore_ns_capable() for ns_last_pid Adrian Reber
2020-07-15 15:08 ` Christian Brauner
2020-07-15 14:49 ` Adrian Reber [this message]
2020-07-15 21:17 ` [PATCH v5 4/6] proc: allow access in init userns for map_files with CAP_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE Cyrill Gorcunov
2020-07-16 8:51 ` Christian Brauner
2020-07-15 14:49 ` [PATCH v5 5/6] prctl: Allow checkpoint/restore capable processes to change exe link Adrian Reber
2020-07-15 15:20 ` Christian Brauner
2020-07-15 15:49 ` Nicolas Viennot
2020-07-15 14:49 ` [PATCH v5 6/6] selftests: add clone3() CAP_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE test Adrian Reber
2020-07-15 15:24 ` Christian Brauner
2020-07-18 3:24 ` [PATCH v5 0/6] capabilities: Introduce CAP_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE Serge E. Hallyn
2020-07-18 17:47 ` Christian Brauner
Reply instructions:
You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:
* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
and reply-to-all from there: mbox
Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style
* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
switches of git-send-email(1):
git send-email \
--in-reply-to=20200715144954.1387760-5-areber@redhat.com \
--to=areber@redhat.com \
--cc=0x7f454c46@gmail.com \
--cc=Nicolas.Viennot@twosigma.com \
--cc=arnd@arndb.de \
--cc=avagin@gmail.com \
--cc=casey@schaufler-ca.com \
--cc=chf@redhat.com \
--cc=christian.brauner@ubuntu.com \
--cc=dipeit@gmail.com \
--cc=ebiederm@xmission.com \
--cc=eparis@parisplace.org \
--cc=gorcunov@openvz.org \
--cc=jannh@google.com \
--cc=kyurtsever@google.com \
--cc=linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=mclapinski@google.com \
--cc=oleg@redhat.com \
--cc=ovzxemul@gmail.com \
--cc=rppt@linux.ibm.com \
--cc=rstoyanov1@gmail.com \
--cc=sargun@sargun.me \
--cc=selinux@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=serge@hallyn.com \
--cc=stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com \
--subject='Re: [PATCH v5 4/6] proc: allow access in init userns for map_files with CAP_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE' \
/path/to/YOUR_REPLY
https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html
* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox;
as well as URLs for NNTP newsgroup(s).