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From: Stefano Garzarella <email@example.com>
To: Kees Cook <firstname.lastname@example.org>
Cc: Pavel Begunkov <email@example.com>,
Miklos Szeredi <firstname.lastname@example.org>,
Matthew Wilcox <email@example.com>,
Andy Lutomirski <firstname.lastname@example.org>,
Jann Horn <email@example.com>,
Christian Brauner <firstname.lastname@example.org>,
Linux API <email@example.com>,
Michael Kerrisk <firstname.lastname@example.org>,
Stefan Hajnoczi <email@example.com>
Subject: Re: strace of io_uring events?
Date: Thu, 16 Jul 2020 15:14:04 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20200716131404.bnzsaarooumrp3kx@steredhat> (raw)
+Cc Stefan Hajnoczi
On Wed, Jul 15, 2020 at 04:07:00PM -0700, Kees Cook wrote:
> Earlier Andy Lutomirski wrote:
> > Let’s add some seccomp folks. We probably also want to be able to run
> > seccomp-like filters on io_uring requests. So maybe io_uring should call into
> > seccomp-and-tracing code for each action.
> Okay, I'm finally able to spend time looking at this. And thank you to
> the many people that CCed me into this and earlier discussions (at least
> Jann, Christian, and Andy).
> Speaking to Stefano's proposal:
> - There appear to be three classes of desired restrictions:
> - opcodes for io_uring_register() (which can be enforced entirely with
> seccomp right now).
> - opcodes from SQEs (this _could_ be intercepted by seccomp, but is
> not currently written)
> - opcodes of the types of restrictions to restrict... for making sure
> things can't be changed after being set? seccomp already enforces
> that kind of "can only be made stricter"
In addition we want to limit the SQEs to use only the registered fd and buffers.
> - Credentials vs no_new_privs needs examination (more on this later)
> So, I think, at least for restrictions, seccomp should absolutely be
> the place to get this work done. It already covers 2 of the 3 points in
> the proposal.
Thanks for your feedback, I just sent v2 before I read this e-mail.
Do you think it's better to have everything in seccomp instead of adding
the restrictions in io_uring (the patch isn't very big)?
With seccomp, would it be possible to have different restrictions for two
instances of io_uring in the same process?
I suppose it should be possible using BPF filters.
> Solving the mapping of seccomp interception types into CQEs (or anything
> more severe) will likely inform what it would mean to map ptrace events
> to CQEs. So, I think they're related, and we should get seccomp hooked
> up right away, and that might help us see how (if) ptrace should be
> Specifically for seccomp, I see at least the following design questions:
> - How does no_new_privs play a role in the existing io_uring credential
> management? Using _any_ kind of syscall-effective filtering, whether
> it's seccomp or Stefano's existing proposal, needs to address the
> potential inheritable restrictions across privilege boundaries (which is
> what no_new_privs tries to eliminate). In regular syscall land, this is
> an issue when a filter follows a process through setuid via execve()
> and it gains privileges that now the filter-creator can trick into
> doing weird stuff -- io_uring has a concept of alternative credentials
> so I have to ask about it. (I don't *think* there would be a path to
> install a filter before gaining privilege, but I likely just
> need to do my homework on the io_uring internals. Regardless,
> use of seccomp by io_uring would need to have this issue "solved"
> in the sense that it must be "safe" to filter io_uring OPs, from a
> privilege-boundary-crossing perspective.
> - From which task perspective should filters be applied? It seems like it
> needs to follow the io_uring personalities, as that contains the
> credentials. (This email is a brain-dump so far -- I haven't gone to
> look to see if that means io_uring is literally getting a reference to
> struct cred; I assume so.) Seccomp filters are attached to task_struct.
> However, for v5.9, seccomp will gain a more generalized get/put system
> for having filters attached to the SECCOMP_RET_USER_NOTIF fd. Adding
> more get/put-ers for some part of the io_uring context shouldn't
> be hard.
> - How should seccomp return values be applied? Three seem okay:
> SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW: do SQE action normally
> SECCOMP_RET_LOG: do SQE action, log via seccomp
> SECCOMP_RET_ERRNO: skip actions in SQE and pass errno to CQE
> The rest not so much:
> SECCOMP_RET_TRAP: can't send SIGSYS anywhere sane?
> SECCOMP_RET_TRACE: no tracer, can't send SIGSYS?
> SECCOMP_RET_USER_NOTIF: can't do user_notif rewrites?
> SECCOMP_RET_KILL_THREAD: kill which thread?
> SECCOMP_RET_KILL_PROCESS: kill which thread group?
> If TRAP, TRACE, and USER_NOTIF need to be "upgraded" to KILL_THREAD,
> what does KILL_THREAD mean? Does it really mean "shut down the entire
> SQ?" Does it mean kill the worker thread? Does KILL_PROCESS mean kill
> all the tasks with an open mapping for the SQ?
> Anyway, I'd love to hear what folks think, but given the very direct
> mapping from SQE OPs to syscalls, I really think seccomp needs to be
> inserted in here somewhere to maintain any kind of sensible reasoning
> about syscall filtering.
>  https://firstname.lastname@example.org/
> Kees Cook
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2020-07-16 13:14 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 29+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2020-07-15 11:12 Miklos Szeredi
2020-07-15 14:35 ` Andy Lutomirski
2020-07-15 17:11 ` Matthew Wilcox
2020-07-15 19:42 ` Pavel Begunkov
2020-07-15 20:09 ` Miklos Szeredi
2020-07-15 20:20 ` Pavel Begunkov
2020-07-15 23:07 ` Kees Cook
2020-07-16 13:14 ` Stefano Garzarella [this message]
2020-07-16 15:12 ` Kees Cook
2020-07-17 8:01 ` Stefano Garzarella
2020-07-21 15:27 ` Andy Lutomirski
2020-07-21 15:31 ` Jens Axboe
2020-07-21 17:23 ` Andy Lutomirski
2020-07-21 17:30 ` Jens Axboe
2020-07-21 17:44 ` Andy Lutomirski
2020-07-21 18:39 ` Jens Axboe
2020-07-21 19:44 ` Andy Lutomirski
2020-07-21 19:48 ` Jens Axboe
2020-07-21 19:56 ` Andres Freund
2020-07-21 19:37 ` Andres Freund
2020-07-21 15:58 ` Stefano Garzarella
2020-07-23 10:39 ` Stefan Hajnoczi
2020-07-23 13:37 ` Colin Walters
2020-07-24 7:25 ` Stefano Garzarella
2020-07-16 13:17 ` Aleksa Sarai
2020-07-16 15:19 ` Kees Cook
2020-07-17 8:17 ` Cyril Hrubis
2020-07-16 16:24 ` Andy Lutomirski
2020-07-16 0:12 ` tytso
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