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From: Deven Bowers <email@example.com> To: firstname.lastname@example.org, email@example.com, firstname.lastname@example.org, email@example.com, firstname.lastname@example.org, email@example.com, firstname.lastname@example.org, email@example.com, firstname.lastname@example.org, email@example.com, firstname.lastname@example.org, email@example.com, firstname.lastname@example.org, email@example.com, firstname.lastname@example.org, email@example.com Cc: firstname.lastname@example.org, email@example.com, firstname.lastname@example.org, email@example.com, firstname.lastname@example.org, email@example.com, firstname.lastname@example.org, email@example.com Subject: [RFC PATCH v4 11/12] documentation: add ipe documentation Date: Fri, 17 Jul 2020 16:09:40 -0700 [thread overview] Message-ID: <firstname.lastname@example.org> (raw) In-Reply-To: <email@example.com> Add IPE's documentation to the kernel tree. Signed-off-by: Deven Bowers <firstname.lastname@example.org> Acked-by: Jonathan Corbet <email@example.com> --- Documentation/admin-guide/LSM/index.rst | 1 + Documentation/admin-guide/LSM/ipe.rst | 508 ++++++++++++++++++++++++ MAINTAINERS | 1 + 3 files changed, 510 insertions(+) create mode 100644 Documentation/admin-guide/LSM/ipe.rst diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/LSM/index.rst b/Documentation/admin-guide/LSM/index.rst index a6ba95fbaa9f..ce63be6d64ad 100644 --- a/Documentation/admin-guide/LSM/index.rst +++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/LSM/index.rst @@ -47,3 +47,4 @@ subdirectories. tomoyo Yama SafeSetID + ipe diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/LSM/ipe.rst b/Documentation/admin-guide/LSM/ipe.rst new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..2e6610c4a134 --- /dev/null +++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/LSM/ipe.rst @@ -0,0 +1,508 @@ +.. SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 + +Integrity Policy Enforcement (IPE) +================================== + +Overview +-------- + +IPE is a Linux Security Module which allows for a configurable policy +to enforce integrity requirements on the whole system. It attempts to +solve the issue of Code Integrity: that any code being executed (or +files being read), are identical to the version that was built by a +trusted source. + +There are multiple implementations within the Linux kernel that solve +some measure of integrity verification. For instance, device-mapper +verity, which ensures integrity for a block device, and fs-verity which +is a system that ensures integrity for a filesystem. What these +implementations lack is a measure of run-time verification that binaries +are sourced from these locations. IPE aims to address this gap. + +IPE is separated between two major components: A configurable policy, +provided by the LSM ("IPE Core"), and deterministic attributes provided +by the kernel to evaluate files against, ("IPE Properties"). + +Use Cases +--------- + +IPE is designed for use is an embedded device with a specific purpose +(e.g. network firewall device in a data center), where all software and +configuration is built and provisioned by the owner. + +Ideally, a system which leverages IPE is not intended for general +purpose computing and does not utilize any software or configuration +built by a third party. An ideal system to leverage IPE has both mutable +and immutable components, however, all binary executable code is +immutable. + +For the highest level of security, platform firmware should verify the +the kernel and optionally the root filesystem (e.g. via U-Boot verified +boot). This allows the entire system to be integrity verified. + +Known Gaps +---------- + +IPE cannot verify the integrity of anonymous executable memory, such as +the trampolines created by gcc closures and libffi, or JIT'd code. +Unfortunately, as this is dynamically generated code, there is no way +for IPE to detect that this code has not been tampered with in +transition from where it was built, to where it is running. As a result, +IPE is incapable of tackling this problem for dynamically generated +code. + +IPE cannot verify the integrity of interpreted languages' programs when +these scripts invoked via ``<interpreter> <file>``. This is because the +way interpreters execute these files, the scripts themselves are not +evaluated as executable code through one of IPE's hooks. Interpreters +can be enlightened to the usage of IPE by trying to mmap a file into +executable memory (+X), after opening the file and responding to the +error code appropriately. This also applies to included files, or high +value files, such as configuration files of critical system components. +This specific gap is planned on being addressed within IPE. + +Threat Model +------------ + +The threat type addressed by IPE is tampering of executable user-land +code beyond the initially booted kernel, and the initial verification of +kernel modules that are loaded in userland through ``modprobe`` or +``insmod``. + +Tampering violates the property of integrity. IPE's role in mitigating +this threat is to verify the integrity (and authenticity) of all +executable code and to deny their use if integrity verification fails. +IPE generates audit logs which may be utilized to detect integrity +verification failures. + +Tampering threat scenarios include modification or replacement of +executable code by a range of actors including: + +- Insiders with physical access to the hardware +- Insiders with local network access to the system +- Insiders with access to the deployment system +- Compromised internal systems under external control +- Malicious end users of the system +- Compromised end users of the system +- Remote (external) compromise of the system + +IPE does not mitigate threats arising from malicious authorized +developers, or compromised developer tools used by authorized +developers. Additionally, IPE draws hard security boundary between user +mode and kernel mode. As a result, IPE does not provide any protections +against a kernel level exploit, and a kernel-level exploit can disable +or tamper with IPE's protections. + +The root of trust for all of IPE's verifications is the +``SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYRING``. + +IPE Core +-------- + +IPE Policy +~~~~~~~~~~ + +IPE policy is designed to be both forward compatible and backwards +compatible. There is one required line, at the top of the policy, +indicating the policy name, and the policy version, for instance:: + + policy_name="Ex Policy" policy_version=0.0.0 + +The policy name is a unique key identifying this policy in a human +readable name. This is used to create nodes under securityfs as well as +uniquely identify policies to deploy new policies vs update existing +policies. + +The policy version indicates the current version of the policy (NOT the +policy syntax version). This is used to prevent roll-back of policy to +potentially insecure previous versions of the policy. + +The next portion of IPE policy, are rules. Rules are formed by key=value +pairs, known as properties. IPE rules require two properties: "action", +which determines what IPE does when it encounters a match against the +rule, and "op", which determines when that rule should be evaluated. +Thus, a minimal rule is:: + + op=EXECUTE action=ALLOW + +This example will allow any execution. Additional properties are used to +restrict attributes about the files being evaluated. These properties +are intended to be deterministic attributes that are resident in the +kernel. + +Order does not matter for the rule's properties - they can be listed in +any order, however it is encouraged to have the "op" property be first, +and the "action" property be last for readability. Rules are evaluated +top-to-bottom. As a result, any revocation rules, or denies should be +placed early in the file to ensure that these rules are evaluated before +as rule with "action=ALLOW" is hit. + +IPE policy is designed to be forward compatible and backwards +compatible, thus any failure to parse a rule will result in the line +being ignored, and a warning being emitted. If backwards compatibility +is not required, the kernel command line parameter and sysctl, +``ipe.strict_parse`` can be enabled, which will cause these warnings to +be fatal. + +IPE policy supports comments. The character '#' will function as a +comment, ignoring all characters to the right of '#' until the newline. + +The default behavior of IPE evaluations can also be expressed in policy, +through the ``DEFAULT`` statement. This can be done at a global level, +or a per-operation level:: + + # Global + DEFAULT action=ALLOW + + # Operation Specific + DEFAULT op=EXECUTE action=ALLOW + +A default must be set for all known operations in IPE. If you want to +preserve older policies being compatible with newer kernels that can introduce +new operations, please set a global default of 'ALLOW', and override the +defaults on a per-operation basis. + +With configurable policy-based LSMs, there's several issues with +enforcing the configurable policies at startup, around reading and +parsing the policy: + +1. The kernel *should* not read files from userland, so directly reading + the policy file is prohibited. +2. The kernel command line has a character limit, and one kernel module + should not reserve the entire character limit for its own + configuration. +3. There are various boot loaders in the kernel ecosystem, so handing + off a memory block would be costly to maintain. + +As a result, IPE has addressed this problem through a concept of a "boot +policy". A boot policy is a minimal policy, compiled into the kernel. +This policy is intended to get the system to a state where userland is +setup and ready to receive commands, at which point a more complex +policy ("user policies") can be deployed via securityfs. The boot policy +can be specified via the Kconfig, ``SECURITY_IPE_BOOT_POLICY``, which +accepts a path to a plain-text version of the IPE policy to apply. This +policy will be compiled into the kernel. If not specified, IPE will be +disabled until a policy is deployed through securityfs, and activated +through sysfs. + +Deploying Policies +^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ + +User policies as explained above, are policies that are deployed from +userland, through securityfs. These policies are signed to enforce some +level of authorization of the policies (prohibiting an attacker from +gaining root, and deploying an "allow all" policy), through the PKCS#7 +enveloped data format. These policies must be signed by a certificate +that chains to the ``SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYRING``. Through openssl, the +signing can be done via:: + + openssl smime -sign -in "$MY_POLICY" -signer "$MY_CERTIFICATE" \ + -inkey "$MY_PRIVATE_KEY" -binary -outform der -noattr -nodetach \ + -out "$MY_POLICY.p7s" + +Deploying the policies is done through securityfs, through the +``new_policy`` node. To deploy a policy, simply cat the file into the +securityfs node:: + + cat "$MY_POLICY.p7s" > /sys/kernel/security/ipe/new_policy + +Upon success, this will create one subdirectory under +``/sys/kernel/security/ipe/policies/``. The subdirectory will be the +``policy_name`` field of the policy deployed, so for the example above, +the directory will be ``/sys/kernel/security/ipe/policies/Ex\ Policy``. +Within this directory, there will be four files: ``raw``, ``content``, +``active``, and ``delete``. + +The ``raw`` file is rw, reading will provide the raw PKCS#7 data that +was provided to the kernel, representing the policy. Writing, will +deploy an in-place policy update - if this policy is the currently +running policy, the new updated policy will replace it immediately upon +success. + +The ``content`` file is read only. Reading will provide the PKCS#7 inner +content of the policy, which will be the plain text policy. + +The ``active`` file is used to set a policy as the currently active policy. +This file is rw, and accepts a value of ``"1"`` to set the policy as active. +Since only a single policy can be active at one time, all other policies +will be marked inactive. + +Similarly, the ``cat`` command above will result in an error upon +syntactically invalid or untrusted policies. It will also error if a +policy already exists with the same ``policy_name``. The write to the +``raw`` node will error upon syntactically invalid, untrusted policies, +or if the payload fails the version check. The write will also fail if +the ``policy_name`` in the payload does not match the existing policy. + +Deploying these policies will *not* cause IPE to start enforcing this +policy. Once deployment is successful, a policy can be marked as active, +via ``/sys/kernel/security/ipe/$policy_name/active``. IPE will enforce +whatever policy is marked as active. For our example, we can activate +the ``Ex Policy`` via:: + + echo -n 1 > "/sys/kernel/security/ipe/Ex Policy/active" + +At which point, ``Ex Policy`` will now be the enforced policy on the +system. + +.. NOTE:: + + The -n parameter is important, as it strips an additional newline. + +IPE also provides a way to delete policies. This can be done via the +``delete`` securityfs node, ``/sys/kernel/security/ipe/$policy_name/delete``. +Writing ``1`` to that file will delete that node:: + + echo -n 1 > "/sys/kernel/security/ipe/$policy_name/delete" + +There are two requirements to delete policies: + +1. The policy being deleted must not be the active policy. +2. The policy being deleted must not be the boot policy. + +.. NOTE:: + + If a MAC system is enabled, all writes to ipe's securityfs nodes require + ``CAP_MAC_ADMIN``. + +Modes +~~~~~ + +IPE supports two modes of operation: permissive (similar to SELinux's +permissive mode) and enforce. Permissive mode performs the same checks +as enforce mode, and logs policy violations, but will not enforce the +policy. This allows users to test policies before enforcing them. + +The default mode is enforce, and can be changed via the kernel command +line parameter ``ipe.enforce=(0|1)``, or the securityfs node +``/sys/kernel/security/ipe/enforce``. The ability to switch modes can +be compiled out of the LSM via setting the Kconfig +``CONFIG_SECURITY_IPE_PERMISSIVE_SWITCH`` to N. + +.. NOTE:: + + If a MAC system is enabled, all writes to ipe's securityfs nodes require + ``CAP_MAC_ADMIN``. + +Audit Events +~~~~~~~~~~~~ + +Success Auditing +^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ + +IPE supports success auditing. When enabled, all events that pass IPE +policy and are not blocked will emit an audit event. This is disabled by +default, and can be enabled via the kernel command line +``ipe.success_audit=(0|1)`` or the securityfs node, +``/sys/kernel/security/ipe/success_audit``. + +This is very noisy, as IPE will check every user-mode binary on the +system, but is useful for debugging policies. + +.. NOTE:: + + If a MAC system is enabled, all writes to ipe's securityfs nodes require + ``CAP_MAC_ADMIN``. + +IPE Properties +-------------- + +As explained above, IPE properties are ``key=value`` pairs expressed in +IPE policy. Two properties are built-into the policy parser: 'op' and +'action'. The other properties are determinstic attributes to express +across files. Currently those properties are: 'boot_verified', +'dmverity_signature', 'dmverity_roothash'. A description of all +properties supported by IPE are listed below: + +op +~~ + +Indicates the operation for a rule to apply to. Must be in every rule. +IPE supports the following operations: + +Version 1 +^^^^^^^^^ + +``EXECUTE`` + + Pertains to any file attempting to be executed, or loaded as an + executable. + +``FIRMWARE``: + + Pertains to firmware being loaded via the firmware_class interface. + This covers both the preallocated buffer and the firmware file + itself. + +``KMODULE``: + + Pertains to loading kernel modules via ``modprobe`` or ``insmod``. + +``KEXEC_IMAGE``: + + Pertains to kernel images loading via ``kexec``. + +``KEXEC_INITRAMFS`` + + Pertains to initrd images loading via ``kexec --initrd``. + +``POLICY``: + + Controls loading IMA policies through the + ``/sys/kernel/security/ima/policy`` securityfs entry. + +``X509_CERT``: + + Controls loading IMA certificates through the Kconfigs, + ``CONFIG_IMA_X509_PATH`` and ``CONFIG_EVM_X509_PATH``. + +``KERNEL_READ``: + + Short hand for all of the following: ``FIRMWARE``, ``KMODULE``, + ``KEXEC_IMAGE``, ``KEXEC_INITRAMFS``, ``POLICY``, and ``X509_CERT``. + +action +~~~~~~ + +Version 1 +^^^^^^^^^ + +Determines what IPE should do when a rule matches. Must be in every +rule. Can be one of: + +``ALLOW``: + + If the rule matches, explicitly allow the call to proceed without + executing any more rules. + +``DENY``: + + If the rule matches, explicitly prohibit the call from proceeding + without executing any more rules. + +boot_verified +~~~~~~~~~~~~~ + +Version 1 +^^^^^^^^^ + +This property can be utilized for authorization of the first super-block +that executes a file. This is almost always init. Typically this is used +for systems with an initramfs or other initial disk, where this is unmounted +before the system becomes available, and is not covered by any other property. +This property is controlled by the Kconfig, ``CONFIG_IPE_BOOT_PROP``. The +format of this property is:: + + boot_verified=(TRUE|FALSE) + + +.. WARNING:: + + This property will trust any disk where the first execution occurs + evaluation occurs. If you do not have a startup disk that is + unpacked and unmounted (like initramfs), then it will automatically + trust the root filesystem and potentially overauthorize the entire + disk. + +dmverity_roothash +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ + +Version 1 +^^^^^^^^^ + +This property can be utilized for authorization or revocation of +specific dm-verity volumes, identified via root hash. It has a +dependency on the DM_VERITY module. This property is controlled by the +property: ``CONFIG_IPE_DM_VERITY_ROOTHASH``. The format of this property +is:: + + dmverity_roothash=HashHexDigest + +dmverity_signature +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ + +Version 1 +^^^^^^^^^ + +This property can be utilized for authorization of all dm-verity volumes +that have a signed roothash that chains to the system trusted keyring. +It has a dependency on the ``DM_VERITY_VERIFY_ROOTHASH_SIG`` Kconfig. +This property is controlled by the Kconfig: +``CONFIG_IPE_DM_VERITY_SIGNATURE``. The format of this property is:: + + dmverity_signature=(TRUE|FALSE) + +Policy Examples +--------------- + +Allow all +~~~~~~~~~ + +:: + + policy_name="Allow All" policy_version=0.0.0 + DEFAULT action=ALLOW + +Allow only initial superblock +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ + +:: + + policy_name="Allow All Initial SB" policy_version=0.0.0 + DEFAULT action=DENY + + op=EXECUTE boot_verified=TRUE action=ALLOW + +Allow any signed dm-verity volume and the initial superblock +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ + +:: + + policy_name="AllowSignedAndInitial" policy_version=0.0.0 + DEFAULT action=DENY + + op=EXECUTE boot_verified=TRUE action=ALLOW + op=EXECUTE dmverity_signature=TRUE action=ALLOW + +Prohibit execution from a specific dm-verity volume +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ + +:: + + policy_name="AllowSignedAndInitial" policy_version=0.0.0 + DEFAULT action=DENY + + op=EXECUTE dmverity_roothash=401fcec5944823ae12f62726e8184407a5fa9599783f030dec146938 action=DENY + op=EXECUTE boot_verified=TRUE action=ALLOW + op=EXECUTE dmverity_signature=TRUE action=ALLOW + +Allow only a specific dm-verity volume +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ + +:: + + policy_name="AllowSignedAndInitial" policy_version=0.0.0 + DEFAULT action=DENY + + op=EXECUTE dmverity_roothash=401fcec5944823ae12f62726e8184407a5fa9599783f030dec146938 action=ALLOW + +External Information +-------------------- + +Please see the github repository at: https://github.com/microsoft/ipe + +FAQ +--- + +Q: What's the difference between other LSMs which provide integrity +verification (i.e. IMA)? + +A: IPE differs from other LSMs which provide integrity checking, as it +has no dependency on the filesystem metadata itself. The attributes that +IPE checks are deterministic properties that exist solely in the kernel. +Additionally, IPE provides no additional mechanisms of verifying these +files (e.g. IMA Signatures) - all of the attributes of verifying files +are existing features within the kernel. + +Additionally, IPE is completely restricted to integrity. It offers no +measurement or attestation features, which IMA addresses. diff --git a/MAINTAINERS b/MAINTAINERS index 2876c69435d5..492de7bda6b9 100644 --- a/MAINTAINERS +++ b/MAINTAINERS @@ -8584,6 +8584,7 @@ INTEGRITY POLICY ENFORCEMENT (IPE) M: Deven Bowers <firstname.lastname@example.org> L: email@example.com S: Supported +F: Documentation/admin-guide/LSM/ipe.rst F: scripts/ipe/ F: security/ipe/ -- 2.27.0
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2020-07-17 23:10 UTC|newest] Thread overview: 17+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top 2020-07-17 23:09 [RFC PATCH v4 00/12] Integrity Policy Enforcement LSM (IPE) Deven Bowers 2020-07-17 23:09 ` [RFC PATCH v4 01/12] scripts: add ipe tooling to generate boot policy Deven Bowers 2020-07-17 23:09 ` [RFC PATCH v4 02/12] security: add ipe lsm evaluation loop and audit system Deven Bowers 2020-07-17 23:16 ` Randy Dunlap 2020-07-20 16:44 ` Deven Bowers 2020-07-17 23:09 ` [RFC PATCH v4 03/12] security: add ipe lsm policy parser and policy loading Deven Bowers 2020-07-17 23:09 ` [RFC PATCH v4 04/12] ipe: add property for trust of boot volume Deven Bowers 2020-07-17 23:09 ` [RFC PATCH v4 05/12] fs: add security blob and hooks for block_device Deven Bowers 2020-07-18 0:14 ` Casey Schaufler 2020-07-20 16:42 ` Deven Bowers 2020-07-17 23:09 ` [RFC PATCH v4 06/12] dm-verity: move signature check after tree validation Deven Bowers 2020-07-17 23:09 ` [RFC PATCH v4 07/12] dm-verity: add bdev_setsecurity hook for dm-verity signature Deven Bowers 2020-07-17 23:09 ` [RFC PATCH v4 08/12] ipe: add property for signed dmverity volumes Deven Bowers 2020-07-17 23:09 ` [RFC PATCH v4 09/12] dm-verity: add bdev_setsecurity hook for root-hash Deven Bowers 2020-07-17 23:09 ` [RFC PATCH v4 10/12] ipe: add property for dmverity roothash Deven Bowers 2020-07-17 23:09 ` Deven Bowers [this message] 2020-07-17 23:09 ` [RFC PATCH v4 12/12] cleanup: uapi/linux/audit.h Deven Bowers
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