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From: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org> To: linux-fscrypt@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, linux-ext4@vger.kernel.org, linux-f2fs-devel@lists.sourceforge.net Subject: [PATCH 5/5] fs-verity: use smp_load_acquire() for ->i_verity_info Date: Tue, 21 Jul 2020 15:59:20 -0700 [thread overview] Message-ID: <20200721225920.114347-6-ebiggers@kernel.org> (raw) In-Reply-To: <20200721225920.114347-1-ebiggers@kernel.org> From: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Normally smp_store_release() or cmpxchg_release() is paired with smp_load_acquire(). Sometimes smp_load_acquire() can be replaced with the more lightweight READ_ONCE(). However, for this to be safe, all the published memory must only be accessed in a way that involves the pointer itself. This may not be the case if allocating the object also involves initializing a static or global variable, for example. fsverity_info::tree_params.hash_alg->tfm is a crypto_ahash object that's internal to and is allocated by the crypto subsystem. So by using READ_ONCE() for ->i_verity_info, we're relying on internal implementation details of the crypto subsystem. Remove this fragile assumption by using smp_load_acquire() instead. Also fix the cmpxchg logic to correctly execute an ACQUIRE barrier when losing the cmpxchg race, since cmpxchg doesn't guarantee a memory barrier on failure. (Note: I haven't seen any real-world problems here. This change is just fixing the code to be guaranteed correct and less fragile.) Fixes: fd2d1acfcadf ("fs-verity: add the hook for file ->open()") Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> --- fs/verity/open.c | 15 ++++++++++++--- include/linux/fsverity.h | 9 +++++++-- 2 files changed, 19 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/verity/open.c b/fs/verity/open.c index d007db0c9304..bfe0280c14e4 100644 --- a/fs/verity/open.c +++ b/fs/verity/open.c @@ -221,11 +221,20 @@ struct fsverity_info *fsverity_create_info(const struct inode *inode, void fsverity_set_info(struct inode *inode, struct fsverity_info *vi) { /* - * Multiple processes may race to set ->i_verity_info, so use cmpxchg. - * This pairs with the READ_ONCE() in fsverity_get_info(). + * Multiple tasks may race to set ->i_verity_info, so use + * cmpxchg_release(). This pairs with the smp_load_acquire() in + * fsverity_get_info(). I.e., here we publish ->i_verity_info with a + * RELEASE barrier so that other tasks can ACQUIRE it. */ - if (cmpxchg(&inode->i_verity_info, NULL, vi) != NULL) + if (cmpxchg_release(&inode->i_verity_info, NULL, vi) != NULL) { + /* Lost the race, so free the fsverity_info we allocated. */ fsverity_free_info(vi); + /* + * Afterwards, the caller may access ->i_verity_info directly, + * so make sure to ACQUIRE the winning fsverity_info. + */ + (void)fsverity_get_info(inode); + } } void fsverity_free_info(struct fsverity_info *vi) diff --git a/include/linux/fsverity.h b/include/linux/fsverity.h index 78201a6d35f6..c1144a450392 100644 --- a/include/linux/fsverity.h +++ b/include/linux/fsverity.h @@ -115,8 +115,13 @@ struct fsverity_operations { static inline struct fsverity_info *fsverity_get_info(const struct inode *inode) { - /* pairs with the cmpxchg() in fsverity_set_info() */ - return READ_ONCE(inode->i_verity_info); + /* + * Pairs with the cmpxchg_release() in fsverity_set_info(). + * I.e., another task may publish ->i_verity_info concurrently, + * executing a RELEASE barrier. We need to use smp_load_acquire() here + * to safely ACQUIRE the memory the other task published. + */ + return smp_load_acquire(&inode->i_verity_info); } /* enable.c */ -- 2.27.0
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2020-07-21 23:01 UTC|newest] Thread overview: 7+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top 2020-07-21 22:59 [PATCH 0/5] fscrypt, fs-verity: one-time init fixes Eric Biggers 2020-07-21 22:59 ` [PATCH 1/5] fscrypt: switch fscrypt_do_sha256() to use the SHA-256 library Eric Biggers 2020-07-21 22:59 ` [PATCH 2/5] fscrypt: use smp_load_acquire() for fscrypt_prepared_key Eric Biggers 2020-07-21 22:59 ` [PATCH 3/5] fscrypt: use smp_load_acquire() for ->s_master_keys Eric Biggers 2020-07-21 22:59 ` [PATCH 4/5] fscrypt: use smp_load_acquire() for ->i_crypt_info Eric Biggers 2020-07-21 22:59 ` Eric Biggers [this message] 2020-07-27 16:38 ` [PATCH 0/5] fscrypt, fs-verity: one-time init fixes Eric Biggers
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