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* [PATCH] fs: Validate flags and capabilities before looking up path in ksys_umount
@ 2020-12-23 10:26 Sargun Dhillon
  2021-01-04 19:51 ` Al Viro
  0 siblings, 1 reply; 3+ messages in thread
From: Sargun Dhillon @ 2020-12-23 10:26 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Christoph Hellwig, Al Viro
  Cc: Sargun Dhillon, linux-fsdevel, linux-api, Kyle Anderson, Manas Alekar

ksys_umount was refactored to into split into another function
(path_umount) to enable sharing code. This changed the order that flags and
permissions are validated in, and made it so that user_path_at was called
before validating flags and capabilities.

Unfortunately, libfuse2[1] and libmount[2] rely on the old flag validation
behaviour to determine whether or not the kernel supports UMOUNT_NOFOLLOW.
The other path that this validation is being checked on is
init_umount->path_umount->can_umount. That's all internal to the kernel.

[1]: https://github.com/libfuse/libfuse/blob/9bfbeb576c5901b62a171d35510f0d1a922020b7/util/fusermount.c#L403
[2]: https://github.com/karelzak/util-linux/blob/7ed579523b556b1270f28dbdb7ee07dee310f157/libmount/src/context_umount.c#L813

Signed-off-by: Sargun Dhillon <sargun@sargun.me>
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Fixes: 41525f56e256 ("fs: refactor ksys_umount")
---
 fs/namespace.c | 10 ++++++----
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

diff --git a/fs/namespace.c b/fs/namespace.c
index cebaa3e81794..dc76f1cb89f4 100644
--- a/fs/namespace.c
+++ b/fs/namespace.c
@@ -1710,10 +1710,6 @@ static int can_umount(const struct path *path, int flags)
 {
 	struct mount *mnt = real_mount(path->mnt);
 
-	if (flags & ~(MNT_FORCE | MNT_DETACH | MNT_EXPIRE | UMOUNT_NOFOLLOW))
-		return -EINVAL;
-	if (!may_mount())
-		return -EPERM;
 	if (path->dentry != path->mnt->mnt_root)
 		return -EINVAL;
 	if (!check_mnt(mnt))
@@ -1746,6 +1742,12 @@ static int ksys_umount(char __user *name, int flags)
 	struct path path;
 	int ret;
 
+	if (flags & ~(MNT_FORCE | MNT_DETACH | MNT_EXPIRE | UMOUNT_NOFOLLOW))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (!may_mount())
+		return -EPERM;
+
 	if (!(flags & UMOUNT_NOFOLLOW))
 		lookup_flags |= LOOKUP_FOLLOW;
 	ret = user_path_at(AT_FDCWD, name, lookup_flags, &path);
-- 
2.25.1


^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 3+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCH] fs: Validate flags and capabilities before looking up path in ksys_umount
  2020-12-23 10:26 [PATCH] fs: Validate flags and capabilities before looking up path in ksys_umount Sargun Dhillon
@ 2021-01-04 19:51 ` Al Viro
  2021-01-04 20:33   ` Al Viro
  0 siblings, 1 reply; 3+ messages in thread
From: Al Viro @ 2021-01-04 19:51 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Sargun Dhillon
  Cc: Christoph Hellwig, linux-fsdevel, linux-api, Kyle Anderson, Manas Alekar

On Wed, Dec 23, 2020 at 02:26:04AM -0800, Sargun Dhillon wrote:
> ksys_umount was refactored to into split into another function
> (path_umount) to enable sharing code. This changed the order that flags and
> permissions are validated in, and made it so that user_path_at was called
> before validating flags and capabilities.
> 
> Unfortunately, libfuse2[1] and libmount[2] rely on the old flag validation
> behaviour to determine whether or not the kernel supports UMOUNT_NOFOLLOW.
> The other path that this validation is being checked on is
> init_umount->path_umount->can_umount. That's all internal to the kernel.
> 
> [1]: https://github.com/libfuse/libfuse/blob/9bfbeb576c5901b62a171d35510f0d1a922020b7/util/fusermount.c#L403
> [2]: https://github.com/karelzak/util-linux/blob/7ed579523b556b1270f28dbdb7ee07dee310f157/libmount/src/context_umount.c#L813

Sorry, I don't like that solution.  If nothing else, it turns path_umount() into
a landmine for the future.  Yes, we have a regression, yes, we need to do something
about it, but that's not a good way to do that.

FWIW, I would rather separate the check of flags validity from can_umount()
and lift _that_ into ksys_umount(), with "path_umount() relies upon the
flags being minimally sane" comment slapped at path_umount() definition.
The rest of can_umount() really shouldn't be taken out of there.

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 3+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCH] fs: Validate flags and capabilities before looking up path in ksys_umount
  2021-01-04 19:51 ` Al Viro
@ 2021-01-04 20:33   ` Al Viro
  0 siblings, 0 replies; 3+ messages in thread
From: Al Viro @ 2021-01-04 20:33 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Sargun Dhillon
  Cc: Christoph Hellwig, linux-fsdevel, linux-api, Kyle Anderson, Manas Alekar

On Mon, Jan 04, 2021 at 07:51:27PM +0000, Al Viro wrote:
> On Wed, Dec 23, 2020 at 02:26:04AM -0800, Sargun Dhillon wrote:
> > ksys_umount was refactored to into split into another function
> > (path_umount) to enable sharing code. This changed the order that flags and
> > permissions are validated in, and made it so that user_path_at was called
> > before validating flags and capabilities.
> > 
> > Unfortunately, libfuse2[1] and libmount[2] rely on the old flag validation
> > behaviour to determine whether or not the kernel supports UMOUNT_NOFOLLOW.
> > The other path that this validation is being checked on is
> > init_umount->path_umount->can_umount. That's all internal to the kernel.
> > 
> > [1]: https://github.com/libfuse/libfuse/blob/9bfbeb576c5901b62a171d35510f0d1a922020b7/util/fusermount.c#L403
> > [2]: https://github.com/karelzak/util-linux/blob/7ed579523b556b1270f28dbdb7ee07dee310f157/libmount/src/context_umount.c#L813
> 
> Sorry, I don't like that solution.  If nothing else, it turns path_umount() into
> a landmine for the future.  Yes, we have a regression, yes, we need to do something
> about it, but that's not a good way to do that.
> 
> FWIW, I would rather separate the check of flags validity from can_umount()
> and lift _that_ into ksys_umount(), with "path_umount() relies upon the
> flags being minimally sane" comment slapped at path_umount() definition.
> The rest of can_umount() really shouldn't be taken out of there.

I mean something like the following; unlike your variant, may_mount() is left
where it is.

commit a0a6df9afcaf439a6b4c88a3b522e3d05fdef46f
Author: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Date:   Mon Jan 4 15:25:34 2021 -0500

    umount(2): move the flag validity checks first
    
    Unfortunately, there's userland code that used to rely upon these
    checks being done before anything else to check for UMOUNT_NOFOLLOW
    support.  That broke in 41525f56e256 ("fs: refactor ksys_umount").
    Separate those from the rest of checks and move them to ksys_umount();
    unlike everything else in there, this can be sanely done there.
    
    Reported-by: Sargun Dhillon <sargun@sargun.me>
    Fixes: 41525f56e256 ("fs: refactor ksys_umount")
    Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>

diff --git a/fs/namespace.c b/fs/namespace.c
index d2db7dfe232b..9d33909d0f9e 100644
--- a/fs/namespace.c
+++ b/fs/namespace.c
@@ -1713,8 +1713,6 @@ static int can_umount(const struct path *path, int flags)
 {
 	struct mount *mnt = real_mount(path->mnt);
 
-	if (flags & ~(MNT_FORCE | MNT_DETACH | MNT_EXPIRE | UMOUNT_NOFOLLOW))
-		return -EINVAL;
 	if (!may_mount())
 		return -EPERM;
 	if (path->dentry != path->mnt->mnt_root)
@@ -1728,6 +1726,7 @@ static int can_umount(const struct path *path, int flags)
 	return 0;
 }
 
+// caller is responsible for flags being sane
 int path_umount(struct path *path, int flags)
 {
 	struct mount *mnt = real_mount(path->mnt);
@@ -1749,6 +1748,10 @@ static int ksys_umount(char __user *name, int flags)
 	struct path path;
 	int ret;
 
+	// basic validity checks done first
+	if (flags & ~(MNT_FORCE | MNT_DETACH | MNT_EXPIRE | UMOUNT_NOFOLLOW))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
 	if (!(flags & UMOUNT_NOFOLLOW))
 		lookup_flags |= LOOKUP_FOLLOW;
 	ret = user_path_at(AT_FDCWD, name, lookup_flags, &path);

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 3+ messages in thread

end of thread, other threads:[~2021-01-04 21:03 UTC | newest]

Thread overview: 3+ messages (download: mbox.gz / follow: Atom feed)
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2020-12-23 10:26 [PATCH] fs: Validate flags and capabilities before looking up path in ksys_umount Sargun Dhillon
2021-01-04 19:51 ` Al Viro
2021-01-04 20:33   ` Al Viro

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