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From: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
To: Eric Snowberg <eric.snowberg@oracle.com>
Cc: keyrings@vger.kernel.org,
linux-integrity <linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org>,
David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>,
David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>,
Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>,
"David S . Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>,
Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>,
James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>,
"Serge E . Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>,
keescook@chromium.org, gregkh@linuxfoundation.org,
torvalds@linux-foundation.org, scott.branden@broadcom.com,
weiyongjun1@huawei.com, nayna@linux.ibm.com, ebiggers@google.com,
ardb@kernel.org, nramas@linux.microsoft.com, lszubowi@redhat.com,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com, pjones@redhat.com,
glin@suse.com, "konrad.wilk@oracle.com" <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v3 10/14] KEYS: change link restriction for secondary to also trust mok
Date: Thu, 12 Aug 2021 18:14:49 -0400 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <0b178f91b33d1aed7ab90669ef059185e3b38bcc.camel@linux.ibm.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <F792F96B-C482-4F28-A984-A6B5F49C3A56@oracle.com>
On Thu, 2021-08-12 at 16:10 -0600, Eric Snowberg wrote:
> > On Aug 12, 2021, at 1:46 PM, Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> wrote:
> >
> > On Wed, 2021-08-11 at 22:18 -0400, Eric Snowberg wrote:
> >> With the introduction of the mok keyring, the end-user may choose to
> >> trust Machine Owner Keys (MOK) within the kernel. If they have chosen to
> >> trust them, the .mok keyring will contain these keys. If not, the mok
> >> keyring will always be empty. Update the restriction check to allow the
> >> secondary trusted keyring to also trust mok keys.
> >>
> >> Signed-off-by: Eric Snowberg <eric.snowberg@oracle.com>
> >> ---
> >> v3: Initial version
> >> ---
> >> certs/system_keyring.c | 2 +-
> >> 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
> >>
> >> diff --git a/certs/system_keyring.c b/certs/system_keyring.c
> >> index cb773e09ea67..8cc19a1ff051 100644
> >> --- a/certs/system_keyring.c
> >> +++ b/certs/system_keyring.c
> >> @@ -110,7 +110,7 @@ static __init struct key_restriction *get_builtin_and_secondary_restriction(void
> >> if (!restriction)
> >> panic("Can't allocate secondary trusted keyring restriction\n");
> >>
> >> - restriction->check = restrict_link_by_builtin_and_secondary_trusted;
> >> + restriction->check = restrict_link_by_builtin_secondary_and_ca_trusted;
> >>
> >> return restriction;
> >> }
> >
> > Not everyone needs to build a generic kernel, like the distros. As
> > previously discussed, not everyone is willing to trust the new MOK
> > keyring nor the UEFI variable for enabling it. For those environments,
> > they should be able to totally disable the MOK keyring.
> >
> > Please define a Kconfig similar to "CONFIG_SECONDARY_TRUSTED_KEYRING"
> > for MOK. The "restriction" would be based on the new Kconfig being
> > enabled.
>
> Yes, I can add that. Currently there is a Kconfig to enable the secondary
> and another for IMA to trust the secondary. Would you like to see two new
> Kconfig options added? One that allows the secondary to use the mok as a new
> trust source and another for IMA to trust the mok keyring. Or a single Kconfig
> that handles both? Thanks.
A single Kconfig option for enabling the new keyring should be fine.
thanks,
Mimi
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2021-08-12 22:15 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 26+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2021-08-12 2:18 [PATCH v3 00/14] Enroll kernel keys thru MOK Eric Snowberg
2021-08-12 2:18 ` [PATCH v3 01/14] integrity: Introduce a Linux keyring for the Machine Owner Key (MOK) Eric Snowberg
2021-08-12 18:58 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2021-08-12 22:16 ` Eric Snowberg
2021-08-13 18:26 ` Nayna
2021-08-12 21:31 ` Mimi Zohar
2021-08-12 22:36 ` Eric Snowberg
2021-08-13 0:35 ` Mimi Zohar
2021-08-12 2:18 ` [PATCH v3 02/14] KEYS: CA link restriction Eric Snowberg
2021-08-12 2:18 ` [PATCH v3 03/14] integrity: Trust MOK keys if MokListTrustedRT found Eric Snowberg
2021-08-12 2:18 ` [PATCH v3 04/14] integrity: add add_to_mok_keyring Eric Snowberg
2021-08-12 19:32 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2021-08-12 22:04 ` Eric Snowberg
2021-08-12 2:18 ` [PATCH v3 05/14] integrity: restrict INTEGRITY_KEYRING_MOK to restrict_link_by_ca Eric Snowberg
2021-08-12 2:18 ` [PATCH v3 06/14] integrity: accessor function to get trust_moklist Eric Snowberg
2021-08-12 2:18 ` [PATCH v3 07/14] integrity: add new keyring handler for mok keys Eric Snowberg
2021-08-12 2:18 ` [PATCH v3 08/14] KEYS: add a reference to mok keyring Eric Snowberg
2021-08-12 2:18 ` [PATCH v3 09/14] KEYS: Introduce link restriction to include builtin, secondary and mok keys Eric Snowberg
2021-08-12 2:18 ` [PATCH v3 10/14] KEYS: change link restriction for secondary to also trust mok Eric Snowberg
2021-08-12 19:46 ` Mimi Zohar
2021-08-12 22:10 ` Eric Snowberg
2021-08-12 22:14 ` Mimi Zohar [this message]
2021-08-12 2:18 ` [PATCH v3 11/14] KEYS: link secondary_trusted_keys to mok trusted keys Eric Snowberg
2021-08-12 2:18 ` [PATCH v3 12/14] integrity: Do not allow mok keyring updates following init Eric Snowberg
2021-08-12 2:18 ` [PATCH v3 13/14] integrity: store reference to mok keyring Eric Snowberg
2021-08-12 2:18 ` [PATCH v3 14/14] integrity: change ima link restriction to include mok keys Eric Snowberg
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