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From: Balbir Singh <bsingharora@gmail.com>
To: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org,
	"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>, "H.J. Lu" <hjl.tools@gmail.com>,
	Vedvyas Shanbhogue <vedvyas.shanbhogue@intel.com>,
	"Ravi V. Shankar" <ravi.v.shankar@intel.com>,
	Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
	Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>,
	Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>, Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>,
	Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>,
	Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 01/10] x86/cet: User-mode shadow stack support
Date: Tue, 12 Jun 2018 21:56:37 +1000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <0e80c181-83b2-457f-a419-01e79f94ca1c@gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20180607143807.3611-2-yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>



On 08/06/18 00:37, Yu-cheng Yu wrote:
> This patch adds basic shadow stack enabling/disabling routines.
> A task's shadow stack is allocated from memory with VM_SHSTK
> flag set and read-only protection.  The shadow stack is
> allocated to a fixed size and that can be changed by the system
> admin.
> 

I presume a read-only permission on the kernel side, but it
can be written by hardware?

> Signed-off-by: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
> ---
>  arch/x86/include/asm/cet.h               |  32 ++++++++
>  arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h |   8 +-
>  arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h         |  14 ++++
>  arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h         |   5 ++
>  arch/x86/kernel/Makefile                 |   2 +
>  arch/x86/kernel/cet.c                    | 123 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
>  arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c             |  24 ++++++
>  arch/x86/kernel/process.c                |   2 +
>  fs/proc/task_mmu.c                       |   3 +
>  9 files changed, 212 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
>  create mode 100644 arch/x86/include/asm/cet.h
>  create mode 100644 arch/x86/kernel/cet.c
> 
> diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/cet.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/cet.h
> new file mode 100644
> index 000000000000..9d5bc1efc9b7
> --- /dev/null
> +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cet.h
> @@ -0,0 +1,32 @@
> +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
> +#ifndef _ASM_X86_CET_H
> +#define _ASM_X86_CET_H
> +
> +#ifndef __ASSEMBLY__
> +#include <linux/types.h>
> +
> +struct task_struct;
> +/*
> + * Per-thread CET status
> + */
> +struct cet_stat {

stat sounds like statistics, just expand out to status please

> +	unsigned long	shstk_base;
> +	unsigned long	shstk_size;
> +	unsigned int	shstk_enabled:1;
> +};
> +
> +#ifdef CONFIG_X86_INTEL_CET
> +unsigned long cet_get_shstk_ptr(void);

For the current task? Why does _ptr routine return an unsigned long?

> +int cet_setup_shstk(void);
> +void cet_disable_shstk(void);
> +void cet_disable_free_shstk(struct task_struct *p);
> +#else
> +static inline unsigned long cet_get_shstk_ptr(void) { return 0; }
> +static inline int cet_setup_shstk(void) { return 0; }
> +static inline void cet_disable_shstk(void) {}
> +static inline void cet_disable_free_shstk(struct task_struct *p) {}
> +#endif
> +
> +#endif /* __ASSEMBLY__ */
> +
> +#endif /* _ASM_X86_CET_H */
> diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h
> index 33833d1909af..3624a11e5ba6 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h
> @@ -56,6 +56,12 @@
>  # define DISABLE_PTI		(1 << (X86_FEATURE_PTI & 31))
>  #endif
>  
> +#ifdef CONFIG_X86_INTEL_SHADOW_STACK_USER
> +#define DISABLE_SHSTK	0
> +#else
> +#define DISABLE_SHSTK	(1<<(X86_FEATURE_SHSTK & 31))
> +#endif
> +
>  /*
>   * Make sure to add features to the correct mask
>   */
> @@ -75,7 +81,7 @@
>  #define DISABLED_MASK13	0
>  #define DISABLED_MASK14	0
>  #define DISABLED_MASK15	0
> -#define DISABLED_MASK16	(DISABLE_PKU|DISABLE_OSPKE|DISABLE_LA57|DISABLE_UMIP)
> +#define DISABLED_MASK16	(DISABLE_PKU|DISABLE_OSPKE|DISABLE_LA57|DISABLE_UMIP|DISABLE_SHSTK)
>  #define DISABLED_MASK17	0
>  #define DISABLED_MASK18	0
>  #define DISABLED_MASK_CHECK BUILD_BUG_ON_ZERO(NCAPINTS != 19)
> diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
> index fda2114197b3..428d13828ba9 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
> @@ -770,4 +770,18 @@
>  #define MSR_VM_IGNNE                    0xc0010115
>  #define MSR_VM_HSAVE_PA                 0xc0010117
>  
> +/* Control-flow Enforcement Technology MSRs */
> +#define MSR_IA32_U_CET		0x6a0
> +#define MSR_IA32_S_CET		0x6a2
> +#define MSR_IA32_PL0_SSP	0x6a4
> +#define MSR_IA32_PL3_SSP	0x6a7
> +#define MSR_IA32_INT_SSP_TAB	0x6a8

some comments on the purpose of the MSR would be nice

> +
> +/* MSR_IA32_U_CET and MSR_IA32_S_CET bits */
> +#define MSR_IA32_CET_SHSTK_EN		0x0000000000000001
> +#define MSR_IA32_CET_WRSS_EN		0x0000000000000002
> +#define MSR_IA32_CET_ENDBR_EN		0x0000000000000004
> +#define MSR_IA32_CET_LEG_IW_EN		0x0000000000000008
> +#define MSR_IA32_CET_NO_TRACK_EN	0x0000000000000010
> +

Same as above

>  #endif /* _ASM_X86_MSR_INDEX_H */
> diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h
> index 21a114914ba4..e632dd7adaac 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h
> @@ -24,6 +24,7 @@ struct vm86;
>  #include <asm/special_insns.h>
>  #include <asm/fpu/types.h>
>  #include <asm/unwind_hints.h>
> +#include <asm/cet.h>
>  
>  #include <linux/personality.h>
>  #include <linux/cache.h>
> @@ -507,6 +508,10 @@ struct thread_struct {
>  	unsigned int		sig_on_uaccess_err:1;
>  	unsigned int		uaccess_err:1;	/* uaccess failed */
>  
> +#ifdef CONFIG_X86_INTEL_CET
> +	struct cet_stat		cet;
> +#endif
> +
>  	/* Floating point and extended processor state */
>  	struct fpu		fpu;
>  	/*
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/Makefile b/arch/x86/kernel/Makefile
> index 02d6f5cf4e70..7ea5e099d558 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kernel/Makefile
> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/Makefile
> @@ -138,6 +138,8 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_UNWINDER_ORC)		+= unwind_orc.o
>  obj-$(CONFIG_UNWINDER_FRAME_POINTER)	+= unwind_frame.o
>  obj-$(CONFIG_UNWINDER_GUESS)		+= unwind_guess.o
>  
> +obj-$(CONFIG_X86_INTEL_CET)		+= cet.o
> +
>  ###
>  # 64 bit specific files
>  ifeq ($(CONFIG_X86_64),y)
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cet.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cet.c
> new file mode 100644
> index 000000000000..8abbfd44322a
> --- /dev/null
> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cet.c
> @@ -0,0 +1,123 @@
> +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
> +/*
> + * cet.c - Control Flow Enforcement (CET)
> + *
> + * Copyright (c) 2018, Intel Corporation.
> + * Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
> + */
> +
> +#include <linux/types.h>
> +#include <linux/mm.h>
> +#include <linux/mman.h>
> +#include <linux/slab.h>
> +#include <linux/uaccess.h>
> +#include <linux/sched/signal.h>
> +#include <asm/msr.h>
> +#include <asm/user.h>
> +#include <asm/fpu/xstate.h>
> +#include <asm/fpu/types.h>
> +#include <asm/cet.h>
> +
> +#define SHSTK_SIZE (0x8000 * (test_thread_flag(TIF_IA32) ? 4 : 8))
> +
> +static inline int cet_set_shstk_ptr(unsigned long addr)
> +{
> +	u64 r;
> +
> +	if (!cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_SHSTK))
> +		return -1;
> +
> +	if ((addr >= TASK_SIZE) || (!IS_ALIGNED(addr, 4)))
> +		return -1;

I think there was a comment about this being TASK_SIZE_MAX

> +
> +	rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_U_CET, r);
> +	wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_U_CET, r | MSR_IA32_CET_SHSTK_EN);
> +	wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_PL3_SSP, addr);

Should the enable happen before setting addr? I would expect to do this in the opposite order.

> +	return 0;
> +}
> +
> +unsigned long cet_get_shstk_ptr(void)
> +{
> +	unsigned long ptr;
> +
> +	if (!current->thread.cet.shstk_enabled)
> +		return 0;
> +
> +	rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_PL3_SSP, ptr);
> +	return ptr;
> +}
> +
> +static unsigned long shstk_mmap(unsigned long addr, unsigned long len)
> +{
> +	struct mm_struct *mm = current->mm;
> +	unsigned long populate;
> +
> +	down_write(&mm->mmap_sem);
> +	addr = do_mmap(NULL, addr, len, PROT_READ,
> +		       MAP_ANONYMOUS | MAP_PRIVATE, VM_SHSTK,
> +		       0, &populate, NULL);
> +	up_write(&mm->mmap_sem);

What happens if the mmap fails for any reason? I presume the caller disables shadow stack on this process?

> +
> +	if (populate)
> +		mm_populate(addr, populate);
> +
> +	return addr;
> +}
> +
> +int cet_setup_shstk(void)
> +{
> +	unsigned long addr, size;
> +
> +	if (!cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_SHSTK))
> +		return -EOPNOTSUPP;
> +
> +	size = SHSTK_SIZE;
> +	addr = shstk_mmap(0, size);
> +
> +	if (addr >= TASK_SIZE)
> +		return -ENOMEM;
> +

TASK_SIZE_MAX?

> +	cet_set_shstk_ptr(addr + size - sizeof(void *));
> +	current->thread.cet.shstk_base = addr;
> +	current->thread.cet.shstk_size = size;
> +	current->thread.cet.shstk_enabled = 1;
> +	return 0;
> +}
> +
> +void cet_disable_shstk(void)
> +{
> +	u64 r;
> +
> +	if (!cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_SHSTK))
> +		return;
> +
> +	rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_U_CET, r);
> +	r &= ~(MSR_IA32_CET_SHSTK_EN);
> +	wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_U_CET, r);
> +	wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_PL3_SSP, 0);

Again, I'd expect the order to be the reverse

> +	current->thread.cet.shstk_enabled = 0;
> +}
> +
> +void cet_disable_free_shstk(struct task_struct *tsk)
> +{
> +	if (!cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_SHSTK) ||
> +	    !tsk->thread.cet.shstk_enabled)
> +		return;
> +
> +	if (tsk == current)
> +		cet_disable_shstk();
> +
> +	/*
> +	 * Free only when tsk is current or shares mm
> +	 * with current but has its own shstk.
> +	 */
> +	if (tsk->mm && (tsk->mm == current->mm) &&
> +	    (tsk->thread.cet.shstk_base)) {

Does the caller hold a reference to tsk->mm?

> +		vm_munmap(tsk->thread.cet.shstk_base,
> +			  tsk->thread.cet.shstk_size);
> +		tsk->thread.cet.shstk_base = 0;
> +		tsk->thread.cet.shstk_size = 0;
> +	}
> +
> +	tsk->thread.cet.shstk_enabled = 0;
> +}
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
> index 38276f58d3bf..f54fabdaef60 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
> @@ -401,6 +401,29 @@ static __init int setup_disable_pku(char *arg)
>  __setup("nopku", setup_disable_pku);
>  #endif /* CONFIG_X86_64 */
>  
> +static __always_inline void setup_cet(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
> +{
> +	if (cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_SHSTK))
> +		cr4_set_bits(X86_CR4_CET);
> +}
> +
> +#ifdef CONFIG_X86_INTEL_SHADOW_STACK_USER
> +static __init int setup_disable_shstk(char *s)
> +{
> +	/* require an exact match without trailing characters */
> +	if (strlen(s))
> +		return 0;
> +
> +	if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SHSTK))
> +		return 1;
> +
> +	setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_SHSTK);
> +	pr_info("x86: 'noshstk' specified, disabling Shadow Stack\n");
> +	return 1;
> +}
> +__setup("noshstk", setup_disable_shstk);
> +#endif
> +
>  /*
>   * Some CPU features depend on higher CPUID levels, which may not always
>   * be available due to CPUID level capping or broken virtualization
> @@ -1313,6 +1336,7 @@ static void identify_cpu(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
>  	x86_init_rdrand(c);
>  	x86_init_cache_qos(c);
>  	setup_pku(c);
> +	setup_cet(c);
>  
>  	/*
>  	 * Clear/Set all flags overridden by options, need do it
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/process.c b/arch/x86/kernel/process.c
> index 30ca2d1a9231..b3b0b482983a 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kernel/process.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/process.c
> @@ -39,6 +39,7 @@
>  #include <asm/desc.h>
>  #include <asm/prctl.h>
>  #include <asm/spec-ctrl.h>
> +#include <asm/cet.h>
>  
>  /*
>   * per-CPU TSS segments. Threads are completely 'soft' on Linux,
> @@ -136,6 +137,7 @@ void flush_thread(void)
>  	flush_ptrace_hw_breakpoint(tsk);
>  	memset(tsk->thread.tls_array, 0, sizeof(tsk->thread.tls_array));
>  
> +	cet_disable_shstk();
>  	fpu__clear(&tsk->thread.fpu);
>  }
>  
> diff --git a/fs/proc/task_mmu.c b/fs/proc/task_mmu.c
> index c486ad4b43f0..6aca93ecec0e 100644
> --- a/fs/proc/task_mmu.c
> +++ b/fs/proc/task_mmu.c
> @@ -679,6 +679,9 @@ static void show_smap_vma_flags(struct seq_file *m, struct vm_area_struct *vma)
>  		[ilog2(VM_PKEY_BIT1)]	= "",
>  		[ilog2(VM_PKEY_BIT2)]	= "",
>  		[ilog2(VM_PKEY_BIT3)]	= "",
> +#endif
> +#ifdef CONFIG_X86_INTEL_SHADOW_STACK_USER
> +		[ilog2(VM_SHSTK)]	= "ss"
>  #endif
>  	};
>  	size_t i;
> 

Balbir Singh.

  parent reply	other threads:[~2018-06-12 11:56 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 98+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2018-06-07 14:37 [PATCH 00/10] Control Flow Enforcement - Part (3) Yu-cheng Yu
2018-06-07 14:37 ` [PATCH 01/10] x86/cet: User-mode shadow stack support Yu-cheng Yu
2018-06-07 16:37   ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-06-07 17:46     ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-06-07 17:55       ` Dave Hansen
2018-06-07 18:23       ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-06-12 11:56   ` Balbir Singh [this message]
2018-06-12 15:03     ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-06-07 14:37 ` [PATCH 02/10] x86/cet: Introduce WRUSS instruction Yu-cheng Yu
2018-06-07 16:40   ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-06-07 16:51     ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-06-07 18:41     ` Peter Zijlstra
2018-06-07 20:31       ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-06-11  8:17     ` Peter Zijlstra
2018-06-11 15:02       ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-06-14  1:30   ` Balbir Singh
2018-06-14 14:43     ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-06-07 14:38 ` [PATCH 03/10] x86/cet: Signal handling for shadow stack Yu-cheng Yu
2018-06-07 18:30   ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-06-07 18:58     ` Florian Weimer
2018-06-07 19:51       ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-06-07 20:07     ` Cyrill Gorcunov
2018-06-07 20:57       ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-06-08 12:07         ` Cyrill Gorcunov
2018-06-07 20:12     ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-06-07 20:17       ` Dave Hansen
2018-06-07 14:38 ` [PATCH 04/10] x86/cet: Handle thread " Yu-cheng Yu
2018-06-07 18:21   ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-06-07 19:47     ` Florian Weimer
2018-06-07 20:53       ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-06-08 14:53         ` Florian Weimer
2018-06-08 15:01           ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-06-08 15:50             ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-06-07 14:38 ` [PATCH 05/10] x86/cet: ELF header parsing of Control Flow Enforcement Yu-cheng Yu
2018-06-07 18:38   ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-06-07 20:40     ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-06-07 14:38 ` [PATCH 06/10] x86/cet: Add arch_prctl functions for shadow stack Yu-cheng Yu
2018-06-07 18:48   ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-06-07 20:30     ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-06-07 21:01       ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-06-07 22:02         ` H.J. Lu
2018-06-07 23:01           ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-06-08  4:09             ` H.J. Lu
2018-06-08  4:38               ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-06-08 12:24                 ` H.J. Lu
2018-06-08 14:57                   ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-06-08 15:52                     ` Cyrill Gorcunov
2018-06-08  4:22           ` H.J. Lu
2018-06-08  4:35             ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-06-08 12:17               ` H.J. Lu
2018-06-12 10:03           ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-06-12 11:43             ` H.J. Lu
2018-06-12 16:01               ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-06-12 16:05                 ` H.J. Lu
2018-06-12 16:34                   ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-06-12 16:51                     ` H.J. Lu
2018-06-12 18:59                       ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-06-12 19:34                         ` H.J. Lu
2018-06-18 22:03                           ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-06-19  0:52                             ` Kees Cook
2018-06-19  6:40                               ` Florian Weimer
2018-06-19 14:50                               ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-06-19 16:44                                 ` Kees Cook
2018-06-19 16:59                                   ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-06-19 17:07                                     ` Kees Cook
2018-06-19 17:20                                       ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-06-19 20:12                                         ` Kees Cook
2018-06-19 20:47                                           ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-06-19 22:38                                             ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-06-20  0:50                                               ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-06-21 23:07                                                 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-06-07 14:38 ` [PATCH 07/10] mm: Prevent mprotect from changing " Yu-cheng Yu
2018-06-07 14:38 ` [PATCH 08/10] mm: Prevent mremap of " Yu-cheng Yu
2018-06-07 18:48   ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-06-07 20:18     ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-06-07 14:38 ` [PATCH 09/10] mm: Prevent madvise from changing " Yu-cheng Yu
2018-06-07 20:54   ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-06-07 21:09   ` Nadav Amit
2018-06-07 21:18     ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-06-07 14:38 ` [PATCH 10/10] mm: Prevent munmap and remap_file_pages of " Yu-cheng Yu
2018-06-07 18:50   ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-06-07 20:15     ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-06-12 10:56 ` [PATCH 00/10] Control Flow Enforcement - Part (3) Balbir Singh
2018-06-12 15:03   ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-06-12 16:00     ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-06-12 16:21       ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-06-12 16:31         ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-06-12 17:24           ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-06-12 20:15             ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-06-14  1:07     ` Balbir Singh
2018-06-14 14:56       ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-06-17  3:16         ` Balbir Singh
2018-06-18 21:44           ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-06-19  8:52             ` Balbir Singh
2018-06-26  2:46 ` Jann Horn
2018-06-26 14:56   ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-06-26  5:26 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-06-26 14:56   ` Yu-cheng Yu

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