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From: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
To: Lucian Adrian Grijincu <lucian.grijincu@gmail.com>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>,
	Eric Paris <eparis@parisplace.org>,
	"Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH 1/2] security/selinux: fix /proc/sys/ labeling
Date: Tue, 01 Feb 2011 14:04:36 -0500	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <1296587076.12605.29.camel@moss-pluto> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1296578542-5902-1-git-send-email-lucian.grijincu@gmail.com>

On Tue, 2011-02-01 at 18:42 +0200, Lucian Adrian Grijincu wrote:
> This fixes an old (2007) selinux regression: filesystem labeling for
> /proc/sys returned
>      -r--r--r-- unknown                          /proc/sys/fs/file-nr
> instead of
>      -r--r--r-- system_u:object_r:sysctl_fs_t:s0 /proc/sys/fs/file-nr
> 
> Events that lead to breaking of /proc/sys/ selinux labeling:
> 
> 1) sysctl was reimplemented to route all calls through /proc/sys/
> 
>     commit 77b14db502cb85a031fe8fde6c85d52f3e0acb63
>     [PATCH] sysctl: reimplement the sysctl proc support
> 
> 2) proc_dir_entry was removed from ctl_table:
> 
>     commit 3fbfa98112fc3962c416452a0baf2214381030e6
>     [PATCH] sysctl: remove the proc_dir_entry member for the sysctl tables
> 
> 3) selinux still walked the proc_dir_entry tree to apply
>    labeling. Because ctl_tables don't have a proc_dir_entry, we did
>    not label /proc/sys/ inodes any more. To achieve this the /proc/sys/
>    inodes were marked private and private inodes were ignored by
>    selinux.
> 
>     commit bbaca6c2e7ef0f663bc31be4dad7cf530f6c4962
>     [PATCH] selinux: enhance selinux to always ignore private inodes
> 
>     commit 86a71dbd3e81e8870d0f0e56b87875f57e58222b
>     [PATCH] sysctl: hide the sysctl proc inodes from selinux
> 
> Access control checks have been done by means of a special sysctl hook
> that was called for read/write accesses to any /proc/sys/ entry.
> 
> We don't have to do this because, instead of walking the
> proc_dir_entry tree we can walk the dentry tree (as done in this
> patch). With this patch:
> * we don't mark /proc/sys/ inodes as private
> * we don't need the sysclt security hook
> * we walk the dentry tree to find the path to the inode.
> 
> We have to strip the PID in /proc/PID/ entries that have a
> proc_dir_entry because selinux does not know how to label paths like
> '/1/net/rpc/nfsd.fh' (and defaults to 'proc_t' labeling). Selinux does
> know of '/net/rpc/nfsd.fh' (and applies the 'sysctl_rpc_t' label).
> 
> PID stripping from the path was done implicitly in the previous code
> because the proc_dir_entry tree had the root in '/net' in the example
> from above. The dentry tree has the root in '/1'.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
> Signed-off-by: Lucian Adrian Grijincu <lucian.grijincu@gmail.com>

Acked-by:  Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>

> ---
>  fs/proc/proc_sysctl.c    |    1 -
>  security/selinux/hooks.c |  120 +++++++---------------------------------------
>  2 files changed, 18 insertions(+), 103 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/fs/proc/proc_sysctl.c b/fs/proc/proc_sysctl.c
> index 09a1f92..fb707e0 100644
> --- a/fs/proc/proc_sysctl.c
> +++ b/fs/proc/proc_sysctl.c
> @@ -32,7 +32,6 @@ static struct inode *proc_sys_make_inode(struct super_block *sb,
>  	ei->sysctl_entry = table;
>  
>  	inode->i_mtime = inode->i_atime = inode->i_ctime = CURRENT_TIME;
> -	inode->i_flags |= S_PRIVATE; /* tell selinux to ignore this inode */
>  	inode->i_mode = table->mode;
>  	if (!table->child) {
>  		inode->i_mode |= S_IFREG;
> diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
> index e276eb4..5231b95 100644
> --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
> +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
> @@ -43,7 +43,6 @@
>  #include <linux/fdtable.h>
>  #include <linux/namei.h>
>  #include <linux/mount.h>
> -#include <linux/proc_fs.h>
>  #include <linux/netfilter_ipv4.h>
>  #include <linux/netfilter_ipv6.h>
>  #include <linux/tty.h>
> @@ -70,7 +69,6 @@
>  #include <net/ipv6.h>
>  #include <linux/hugetlb.h>
>  #include <linux/personality.h>
> -#include <linux/sysctl.h>
>  #include <linux/audit.h>
>  #include <linux/string.h>
>  #include <linux/selinux.h>
> @@ -1120,39 +1118,35 @@ static inline u16 socket_type_to_security_class(int family, int type, int protoc
>  }
>  
>  #ifdef CONFIG_PROC_FS
> -static int selinux_proc_get_sid(struct proc_dir_entry *de,
> +static int selinux_proc_get_sid(struct dentry *dentry,
>  				u16 tclass,
>  				u32 *sid)
>  {
> -	int buflen, rc;
> -	char *buffer, *path, *end;
> +	int rc;
> +	char *buffer, *path;
>  
>  	buffer = (char *)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL);
>  	if (!buffer)
>  		return -ENOMEM;
>  
> -	buflen = PAGE_SIZE;
> -	end = buffer+buflen;
> -	*--end = '\0';
> -	buflen--;
> -	path = end-1;
> -	*path = '/';
> -	while (de && de != de->parent) {
> -		buflen -= de->namelen + 1;
> -		if (buflen < 0)
> -			break;
> -		end -= de->namelen;
> -		memcpy(end, de->name, de->namelen);
> -		*--end = '/';
> -		path = end;
> -		de = de->parent;
> +	path = dentry_path_raw(dentry, buffer, PAGE_SIZE);
> +	if (IS_ERR(path))
> +		rc = PTR_ERR(path);
> +	else {
> +		/* each process gets a /proc/PID/ entry. Strip off the
> +		 * PID part to get a valid selinux labeling.
> +		 * e.g. /proc/1/net/rpc/nfs -> /net/rpc/nfs */
> +		while (path[1] >= '0' && path[1] <= '9') {
> +			path[1] = '/';
> +			path++;
> +		}
> +		rc = security_genfs_sid("proc", path, tclass, sid);
>  	}
> -	rc = security_genfs_sid("proc", path, tclass, sid);
>  	free_page((unsigned long)buffer);
>  	return rc;
>  }
>  #else
> -static int selinux_proc_get_sid(struct proc_dir_entry *de,
> +static int selinux_proc_get_sid(struct dentry *dentry,
>  				u16 tclass,
>  				u32 *sid)
>  {
> @@ -1316,10 +1310,9 @@ static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dent
>  		isec->sid = sbsec->sid;
>  
>  		if ((sbsec->flags & SE_SBPROC) && !S_ISLNK(inode->i_mode)) {
> -			struct proc_inode *proci = PROC_I(inode);
> -			if (proci->pde) {
> +			if (opt_dentry) {
>  				isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
> -				rc = selinux_proc_get_sid(proci->pde,
> +				rc = selinux_proc_get_sid(opt_dentry,
>  							  isec->sclass,
>  							  &sid);
>  				if (rc)
> @@ -1862,82 +1855,6 @@ static int selinux_capable(struct task_struct *tsk, const struct cred *cred,
>  	return task_has_capability(tsk, cred, cap, audit);
>  }
>  
> -static int selinux_sysctl_get_sid(ctl_table *table, u16 tclass, u32 *sid)
> -{
> -	int buflen, rc;
> -	char *buffer, *path, *end;
> -
> -	rc = -ENOMEM;
> -	buffer = (char *)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL);
> -	if (!buffer)
> -		goto out;
> -
> -	buflen = PAGE_SIZE;
> -	end = buffer+buflen;
> -	*--end = '\0';
> -	buflen--;
> -	path = end-1;
> -	*path = '/';
> -	while (table) {
> -		const char *name = table->procname;
> -		size_t namelen = strlen(name);
> -		buflen -= namelen + 1;
> -		if (buflen < 0)
> -			goto out_free;
> -		end -= namelen;
> -		memcpy(end, name, namelen);
> -		*--end = '/';
> -		path = end;
> -		table = table->parent;
> -	}
> -	buflen -= 4;
> -	if (buflen < 0)
> -		goto out_free;
> -	end -= 4;
> -	memcpy(end, "/sys", 4);
> -	path = end;
> -	rc = security_genfs_sid("proc", path, tclass, sid);
> -out_free:
> -	free_page((unsigned long)buffer);
> -out:
> -	return rc;
> -}
> -
> -static int selinux_sysctl(ctl_table *table, int op)
> -{
> -	int error = 0;
> -	u32 av;
> -	u32 tsid, sid;
> -	int rc;
> -
> -	sid = current_sid();
> -
> -	rc = selinux_sysctl_get_sid(table, (op == 0001) ?
> -				    SECCLASS_DIR : SECCLASS_FILE, &tsid);
> -	if (rc) {
> -		/* Default to the well-defined sysctl SID. */
> -		tsid = SECINITSID_SYSCTL;
> -	}
> -
> -	/* The op values are "defined" in sysctl.c, thereby creating
> -	 * a bad coupling between this module and sysctl.c */
> -	if (op == 001) {
> -		error = avc_has_perm(sid, tsid,
> -				     SECCLASS_DIR, DIR__SEARCH, NULL);
> -	} else {
> -		av = 0;
> -		if (op & 004)
> -			av |= FILE__READ;
> -		if (op & 002)
> -			av |= FILE__WRITE;
> -		if (av)
> -			error = avc_has_perm(sid, tsid,
> -					     SECCLASS_FILE, av, NULL);
> -	}
> -
> -	return error;
> -}
> -
>  static int selinux_quotactl(int cmds, int type, int id, struct super_block *sb)
>  {
>  	const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
> @@ -5398,7 +5315,6 @@ static struct security_operations selinux_ops = {
>  	.ptrace_traceme =		selinux_ptrace_traceme,
>  	.capget =			selinux_capget,
>  	.capset =			selinux_capset,
> -	.sysctl =			selinux_sysctl,
>  	.capable =			selinux_capable,
>  	.quotactl =			selinux_quotactl,
>  	.quota_on =			selinux_quota_on,

-- 
Stephen Smalley
National Security Agency


  parent reply	other threads:[~2011-02-01 19:04 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 20+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2011-02-01  0:17 [PATCH] " Lucian Adrian Grijincu
2011-02-01  1:32 ` [PATCH] security: remove unused security_sysctl hook Lucian Adrian Grijincu
2011-02-01 15:02 ` [PATCH] security/selinux: fix /proc/sys/ labeling Stephen Smalley
2011-02-01 15:53   ` Lucian Adrian Grijincu
2011-02-01 15:59     ` Stephen Smalley
2011-02-01 16:32       ` Lucian Adrian Grijincu
2011-02-01 16:37         ` Stephen Smalley
2011-02-01 16:42           ` [PATCH 1/2] " Lucian Adrian Grijincu
2011-02-01 16:44             ` [PATCH 2/2] security: remove unused security_sysctl hook Lucian Adrian Grijincu
2011-02-01 19:05               ` Stephen Smalley
2011-02-01 20:06                 ` Eric Paris
2011-02-14 19:33                   ` Lucian Adrian Grijincu
2011-02-14 19:53                     ` Eric Paris
2011-02-14 20:06                       ` Lucian Adrian Grijincu
2011-02-14 22:06                         ` James Morris
2011-02-01 19:04             ` Stephen Smalley [this message]
2011-02-01 19:33             ` [PATCH 1/2] security/selinux: fix /proc/sys/ labeling Eric W. Biederman
2011-02-01 19:33             ` Eric W. Biederman
2011-02-01 19:46               ` Lucian Adrian Grijincu
2011-02-01 20:14                 ` Eric W. Biederman

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