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From: Yann Droneaud <ydroneaud@opteya.com>
To: Shachar Raindel <raindel@mellanox.com>
Cc: "oss-security@lists.openwall.com"
	<oss-security@lists.openwall.com>,
	"<linux-rdma@vger.kernel.org> (linux-rdma@vger.kernel.org)" 
	<linux-rdma@vger.kernel.org>,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	"stable@vger.kernel.org" <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: CVE-2014-8159 kernel: infiniband: uverbs: unprotected physical memory access
Date: Thu, 02 Apr 2015 12:04:45 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <1427969085.17020.5.camel@opteya.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <AM3PR05MB0935AABF569F15EA846B8E72DC000@AM3PR05MB0935.eurprd05.prod.outlook.com>

Hi,

Le mercredi 18 mars 2015 à 17:39 +0000, Shachar Raindel a écrit :
> Hi,
> 
> It was found that the Linux kernel's InfiniBand/RDMA subsystem did not
> properly sanitize input parameters while registering memory regions
> from user space via the (u)verbs API. A local user with access to
> a /dev/infiniband/uverbsX device could use this flaw to crash the
> system or, potentially, escalate their privileges on the system.
> 
> The issue has been assigned CVE-2014-8159.
> 
> The issue exists in the InfiniBand/RDMA/iWARP drivers since Linux
> Kernel version 2.6.13.
> 
> Mellanox OFED 2.4-1.0.4 fixes the issue. Available from:
> http://www.mellanox.com/page/products_dyn?product_family=26&mtag=linux_sw_drivers 
> 
> RedHat errata: https://access.redhat.com/security/cve/CVE-2014-8159
> Canonical errata: http://people.canonical.com/~ubuntu-security/cve/2014/CVE-2014-8159.html
> Novell (Suse) bug tracking: https://bugzilla.novell.com/show_bug.cgi?id=914742
> 
> 
> The following patch fixes the issue:
> 
> --------------- 8< ------------------------------
> 
> From d4d68430d4a12c569e28b4f4468284ea22111186 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
> From: Shachar Raindel <raindel@mellanox.com>
> Date: Sun, 04 Jan 2015 18:30:32 +0200
> Subject: [PATCH] IB/core: Prevent integer overflow in ib_umem_get address arithmetic
> 
> Properly verify that the resulting page aligned end address is larger
> than both the start address and the length of the memory area
> requested.
> 
> Both the start and length arguments for ib_umem_get are controlled by
> the user. A misbehaving user can provide values which will cause an
> integer overflow when calculating the page aligned end address.
> 
> This overflow can cause also miscalculation of the number of pages
> mapped, and additional logic issues.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Shachar Raindel <raindel@mellanox.com>
> Signed-off-by: Jack Morgenstein <jackm@mellanox.com>
> Signed-off-by: Or Gerlitz <ogerlitz@mellanox.com>
> ---
> 
> diff --git a/drivers/infiniband/core/umem.c b/drivers/infiniband/core/umem.c
> index aec7a6a..8c014b5 100644
> --- a/drivers/infiniband/core/umem.c
> +++ b/drivers/infiniband/core/umem.c
> @@ -99,6 +99,14 @@
>  	if (dmasync)
>  		dma_set_attr(DMA_ATTR_WRITE_BARRIER, &attrs);
>  
> +	/*
> +	 * If the combination of the addr and size requested for this memory
> +	 * region causes an integer overflow, return error.
> +	 */
> +	if ((PAGE_ALIGN(addr + size) <= size) ||
> +	    (PAGE_ALIGN(addr + size) <= addr))
> +		return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
> +

Can access_ok() be used here ?

         if (!access_ok(writable ? VERIFY_WRITE : VERIFY_READ,
                        addr, size))
                  return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);


>  	if (!can_do_mlock())
>  		return ERR_PTR(-EPERM);
> 

Regards.

-- 
Yann Droneaud
OPTEYA



       reply	other threads:[~2015-04-02 10:05 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 16+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
     [not found] <AM3PR05MB0935AABF569F15EA846B8E72DC000@AM3PR05MB0935.eurprd05.prod.outlook.com>
2015-04-02 10:04 ` Yann Droneaud [this message]
2015-04-02 10:52   ` Shachar Raindel
2015-04-02 13:30     ` Yann Droneaud
2015-04-02 15:18       ` Haggai Eran
2015-04-02 16:35         ` Yann Droneaud
2015-04-02 16:44           ` Shachar Raindel
2015-04-02 18:12             ` Haggai Eran
2015-04-13 13:29               ` Yann Droneaud
2015-04-14  8:11                 ` Haggai Eran
2015-04-02 20:40             ` Yann Droneaud
2015-04-03  8:39               ` Haggai Eran
2015-04-03 11:49                 ` Yann Droneaud
2015-04-02 15:15     ` Yann Droneaud
2015-04-02 16:34       ` Shachar Raindel
2015-04-08 12:19         ` Yann Droneaud
2015-04-08 12:44           ` Yann Droneaud

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