LKML Archive on lore.kernel.org
help / color / mirror / Atom feed
* [PATCH v2 0/4] enable early printing of hashed pointers
@ 2018-05-02 22:50 Tobin C. Harding
  2018-05-02 22:50 ` [PATCH v2 1/4] random: Fix whitespace pre random-bytes work Tobin C. Harding
                   ` (3 more replies)
  0 siblings, 4 replies; 7+ messages in thread
From: Tobin C. Harding @ 2018-05-02 22:50 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-kernel
  Cc: Tobin C. Harding, Linus Torvalds, Randy Dunlap, Steven Rostedt,
	Kees Cook, Anna-Maria Gleixner, Andrew Morton, Theodore Ts'o,
	Greg Kroah-Hartman, Arnd Bergmann

Currently if an attempt is made to print a pointer before there is
enough entropy then '(____ptrval____)' is printed.  This makes debugging
stack traces during early boot difficult.

It was observed that we can relax the requirement for cryptographically
secure hashing when debugging while still maintaining pointer hashing
behaviour.  This allows kernels to be debugged without developers
relying on different pointer printing behavior.

Using the hw RNG if available solves this problem for those machines
that have a hardware RNG, we would like to solve it for _all_ machines.

Patch 1 - Whitespace fixes.
Patch 2 - Fix get_random_bytes_arch()
Patch 3 - Use hw RNG for pointer hashing if available (by default).
Patch 4 - Use insecure hashing with command line option 'debug_early_boot'

Ted,

I retained your ack for patch 1 and patch 2 even though this version
changes patch 2.  Specifically, uses min_t() instead of min() and adds
__must_check function declaration in header file.

Changes since v1

 - Use min_t() instead of min() (thanks checkpatch).
 - Add __must_check to function declaration (thanks Steve).
 - Use hw RNG by default if available (as originally suggested by Kees).
 - Add command line option to use cryptographically insecure hashing.
   If debug_early_boot is enabled use hash_long() instead of siphash
   (as requested by Steve, and solves original problem for Anna-Maria).



thanks,
Tobin.


Tobin C. Harding (4):
  random: Fix whitespace pre random-bytes work
  random: Return nbytes filled from hw RNG
  vsprintf: Use hw RNG for ptr_key
  vsprintf: Add command line option debug_early_boot

 Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt |  8 ++++++
 drivers/char/random.c                           | 19 +++++++------
 include/linux/random.h                          |  2 +-
 lib/vsprintf.c                                  | 37 +++++++++++++++++++++++--
 4 files changed, 53 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)

-- 
2.7.4

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 7+ messages in thread

* [PATCH v2 1/4] random: Fix whitespace pre random-bytes work
  2018-05-02 22:50 [PATCH v2 0/4] enable early printing of hashed pointers Tobin C. Harding
@ 2018-05-02 22:50 ` Tobin C. Harding
  2018-05-02 22:50 ` [PATCH v2 2/4] random: Return nbytes filled from hw RNG Tobin C. Harding
                   ` (2 subsequent siblings)
  3 siblings, 0 replies; 7+ messages in thread
From: Tobin C. Harding @ 2018-05-02 22:50 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-kernel
  Cc: Tobin C. Harding, Linus Torvalds, Randy Dunlap, Steven Rostedt,
	Kees Cook, Anna-Maria Gleixner, Andrew Morton, Theodore Ts'o,
	Greg Kroah-Hartman, Arnd Bergmann

There are a couple of whitespace issues around the function
get_random_bytes_arch().  In preparation for patching this function
let's clean them up.

Signed-off-by: Tobin C. Harding <me@tobin.cc>
Acked-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
---
 drivers/char/random.c | 3 +--
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/drivers/char/random.c b/drivers/char/random.c
index cd888d4ee605..031d18b31e0f 100644
--- a/drivers/char/random.c
+++ b/drivers/char/random.c
@@ -1737,7 +1737,7 @@ void get_random_bytes_arch(void *buf, int nbytes)
 
 		if (!arch_get_random_long(&v))
 			break;
-		
+
 		memcpy(p, &v, chunk);
 		p += chunk;
 		nbytes -= chunk;
@@ -1748,7 +1748,6 @@ void get_random_bytes_arch(void *buf, int nbytes)
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(get_random_bytes_arch);
 
-
 /*
  * init_std_data - initialize pool with system data
  *
-- 
2.7.4

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 7+ messages in thread

* [PATCH v2 2/4] random: Return nbytes filled from hw RNG
  2018-05-02 22:50 [PATCH v2 0/4] enable early printing of hashed pointers Tobin C. Harding
  2018-05-02 22:50 ` [PATCH v2 1/4] random: Fix whitespace pre random-bytes work Tobin C. Harding
@ 2018-05-02 22:50 ` Tobin C. Harding
  2018-05-02 22:50 ` [PATCH v2 3/4] vsprintf: Use hw RNG for ptr_key Tobin C. Harding
  2018-05-02 22:50 ` [PATCH v2 4/4] vsprintf: Add command line option debug_early_boot Tobin C. Harding
  3 siblings, 0 replies; 7+ messages in thread
From: Tobin C. Harding @ 2018-05-02 22:50 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-kernel
  Cc: Tobin C. Harding, Linus Torvalds, Randy Dunlap, Steven Rostedt,
	Kees Cook, Anna-Maria Gleixner, Andrew Morton, Theodore Ts'o,
	Greg Kroah-Hartman, Arnd Bergmann

Currently the function get_random_bytes_arch() has return value 'void'.
If the hw RNG fails we currently fall back to using get_random_bytes().
This defeats the purpose of requesting random material from the hw RNG
in the first place.

There are currently no intree users of get_random_bytes_arch().

Only get random bytes from the hw RNG, make function return the number
of bytes retrieved from the hw RNG.

Signed-off-by: Tobin C. Harding <me@tobin.cc>
Acked-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
---
 drivers/char/random.c  | 16 +++++++++-------
 include/linux/random.h |  2 +-
 2 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)

diff --git a/drivers/char/random.c b/drivers/char/random.c
index 031d18b31e0f..4b0ec597e783 100644
--- a/drivers/char/random.c
+++ b/drivers/char/random.c
@@ -1725,26 +1725,28 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(del_random_ready_callback);
  * key known by the NSA).  So it's useful if we need the speed, but
  * only if we're willing to trust the hardware manufacturer not to
  * have put in a back door.
+ *
+ * Return number of bytes filled in.
  */
-void get_random_bytes_arch(void *buf, int nbytes)
+int __must_check get_random_bytes_arch(void *buf, int nbytes)
 {
 	char *p = buf;
+	int left = nbytes;
 
-	trace_get_random_bytes_arch(nbytes, _RET_IP_);
-	while (nbytes) {
+	trace_get_random_bytes_arch(left, _RET_IP_);
+	while (left) {
 		unsigned long v;
-		int chunk = min(nbytes, (int)sizeof(unsigned long));
+		int chunk = min_t(int, left, (int)sizeof(unsigned long));
 
 		if (!arch_get_random_long(&v))
 			break;
 
 		memcpy(p, &v, chunk);
 		p += chunk;
-		nbytes -= chunk;
+		left -= chunk;
 	}
 
-	if (nbytes)
-		get_random_bytes(p, nbytes);
+	return nbytes - left;
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(get_random_bytes_arch);
 
diff --git a/include/linux/random.h b/include/linux/random.h
index 2ddf13b4281e..f1c9bc5cd231 100644
--- a/include/linux/random.h
+++ b/include/linux/random.h
@@ -38,7 +38,7 @@ extern void get_random_bytes(void *buf, int nbytes);
 extern int wait_for_random_bytes(void);
 extern int add_random_ready_callback(struct random_ready_callback *rdy);
 extern void del_random_ready_callback(struct random_ready_callback *rdy);
-extern void get_random_bytes_arch(void *buf, int nbytes);
+extern int __must_check get_random_bytes_arch(void *buf, int nbytes);
 
 #ifndef MODULE
 extern const struct file_operations random_fops, urandom_fops;
-- 
2.7.4

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 7+ messages in thread

* [PATCH v2 3/4] vsprintf: Use hw RNG for ptr_key
  2018-05-02 22:50 [PATCH v2 0/4] enable early printing of hashed pointers Tobin C. Harding
  2018-05-02 22:50 ` [PATCH v2 1/4] random: Fix whitespace pre random-bytes work Tobin C. Harding
  2018-05-02 22:50 ` [PATCH v2 2/4] random: Return nbytes filled from hw RNG Tobin C. Harding
@ 2018-05-02 22:50 ` Tobin C. Harding
  2018-05-02 22:50 ` [PATCH v2 4/4] vsprintf: Add command line option debug_early_boot Tobin C. Harding
  3 siblings, 0 replies; 7+ messages in thread
From: Tobin C. Harding @ 2018-05-02 22:50 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-kernel
  Cc: Tobin C. Harding, Linus Torvalds, Randy Dunlap, Steven Rostedt,
	Kees Cook, Anna-Maria Gleixner, Andrew Morton, Theodore Ts'o,
	Greg Kroah-Hartman, Arnd Bergmann

Currently we must wait for enough entropy to become available before
hashed pointers can be printed.  We can remove this wait by using the
hw RNG if available.

Use hw RNG to get keying material by default if available.

Suggested-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Tobin C. Harding <me@tobin.cc>
---
 lib/vsprintf.c | 19 ++++++++++++++++---
 1 file changed, 16 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

diff --git a/lib/vsprintf.c b/lib/vsprintf.c
index b82f0c6c2aec..3697a19c2b25 100644
--- a/lib/vsprintf.c
+++ b/lib/vsprintf.c
@@ -1657,9 +1657,8 @@ char *device_node_string(char *buf, char *end, struct device_node *dn,
 static bool have_filled_random_ptr_key __read_mostly;
 static siphash_key_t ptr_key __read_mostly;
 
-static void fill_random_ptr_key(struct random_ready_callback *unused)
+static void ptr_key_ready(void)
 {
-	get_random_bytes(&ptr_key, sizeof(ptr_key));
 	/*
 	 * have_filled_random_ptr_key==true is dependent on get_random_bytes().
 	 * ptr_to_id() needs to see have_filled_random_ptr_key==true
@@ -1669,14 +1668,28 @@ static void fill_random_ptr_key(struct random_ready_callback *unused)
 	WRITE_ONCE(have_filled_random_ptr_key, true);
 }
 
+static void fill_random_ptr_key(struct random_ready_callback *unused)
+{
+	get_random_bytes(&ptr_key, sizeof(ptr_key));
+	ptr_key_ready();
+}
+
 static struct random_ready_callback random_ready = {
 	.func = fill_random_ptr_key
 };
 
 static int __init initialize_ptr_random(void)
 {
-	int ret = add_random_ready_callback(&random_ready);
+	int ret;
+	int key_size = sizeof(ptr_key);
+
+	/* Use hw RNG if available */
+	if (get_random_bytes_arch(&ptr_key, key_size) == key_size) {
+		ptr_key_ready();
+		return 0;
+	}
 
+	ret = add_random_ready_callback(&random_ready);
 	if (!ret) {
 		return 0;
 	} else if (ret == -EALREADY) {
-- 
2.7.4

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 7+ messages in thread

* [PATCH v2 4/4] vsprintf: Add command line option debug_early_boot
  2018-05-02 22:50 [PATCH v2 0/4] enable early printing of hashed pointers Tobin C. Harding
                   ` (2 preceding siblings ...)
  2018-05-02 22:50 ` [PATCH v2 3/4] vsprintf: Use hw RNG for ptr_key Tobin C. Harding
@ 2018-05-02 22:50 ` Tobin C. Harding
  2018-05-03  4:57   ` Kees Cook
  3 siblings, 1 reply; 7+ messages in thread
From: Tobin C. Harding @ 2018-05-02 22:50 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-kernel
  Cc: Tobin C. Harding, Linus Torvalds, Randy Dunlap, Steven Rostedt,
	Kees Cook, Anna-Maria Gleixner, Andrew Morton, Theodore Ts'o,
	Greg Kroah-Hartman, Arnd Bergmann

Currently printing [hashed] pointers requires either a hw RNG or enough
entropy to be available.  Early in the boot sequence these conditions
may not be met resulting in a dummy string '(____ptrval____)' being
printed.  This makes debugging the early boot sequence difficult.  We
can relax the requirement to use cryptographically secure hashing during
debugging.  This enables debugging while keeping development/production
kernel behaviour the same.

If new command line option debug_early_boot is enabled use
cryptographically insecure hashing and hash pointer value immediately.

Signed-off-by: Tobin C. Harding <me@tobin.cc>
---
 Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt |  8 ++++++++
 lib/vsprintf.c                                  | 18 ++++++++++++++++++
 2 files changed, 26 insertions(+)

diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
index b8d1379aa039..ab619c4ccbf2 100644
--- a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
+++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
@@ -748,6 +748,14 @@
 
 	debug		[KNL] Enable kernel debugging (events log level).
 
+	debug_early_boot
+			[KNL] Enable debugging early in the boot sequence.  If
+			enabled, we use a weak hash instead of siphash to hash
+			pointers.  Use this option if you need to see pointer
+			values during early boot (i.e you are seeing instances
+			of '(___ptrval___)') - cryptographically insecure,
+			please do not use on production kernels.
+
 	debug_locks_verbose=
 			[KNL] verbose self-tests
 			Format=<0|1>
diff --git a/lib/vsprintf.c b/lib/vsprintf.c
index 3697a19c2b25..6c139b442267 100644
--- a/lib/vsprintf.c
+++ b/lib/vsprintf.c
@@ -1654,6 +1654,18 @@ char *device_node_string(char *buf, char *end, struct device_node *dn,
 	return widen_string(buf, buf - buf_start, end, spec);
 }
 
+/* Make pointers available for printing early in the boot sequence. */
+static int debug_early_boot;
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(debug_early_boot);
+
+static int __init debug_early_boot_enable(char *str)
+{
+	debug_early_boot = 1;
+	pr_info("debug_early_boot enabled\n");
+	return 0;
+}
+early_param("debug_early_boot", debug_early_boot_enable);
+
 static bool have_filled_random_ptr_key __read_mostly;
 static siphash_key_t ptr_key __read_mostly;
 
@@ -1707,6 +1719,12 @@ static char *ptr_to_id(char *buf, char *end, void *ptr, struct printf_spec spec)
 	const char *str = sizeof(ptr) == 8 ? "(____ptrval____)" : "(ptrval)";
 	unsigned long hashval;
 
+	/* When debugging early boot use non-cryptographically secure hash */
+	if (unlikely(debug_early_boot)) {
+		hashval = hash_long((unsigned long)ptr, 32);
+		return pointer_string(buf, end, (const void *)hashval, spec);
+	}
+
 	if (unlikely(!have_filled_random_ptr_key)) {
 		spec.field_width = 2 * sizeof(ptr);
 		/* string length must be less than default_width */
-- 
2.7.4

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 7+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCH v2 4/4] vsprintf: Add command line option debug_early_boot
  2018-05-02 22:50 ` [PATCH v2 4/4] vsprintf: Add command line option debug_early_boot Tobin C. Harding
@ 2018-05-03  4:57   ` Kees Cook
  2018-05-03  5:09     ` Tobin C. Harding
  0 siblings, 1 reply; 7+ messages in thread
From: Kees Cook @ 2018-05-03  4:57 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Tobin C. Harding
  Cc: LKML, Linus Torvalds, Randy Dunlap, Steven Rostedt,
	Anna-Maria Gleixner, Andrew Morton, Theodore Ts'o,
	Greg Kroah-Hartman, Arnd Bergmann

On Wed, May 2, 2018 at 3:50 PM, Tobin C. Harding <me@tobin.cc> wrote:
> Currently printing [hashed] pointers requires either a hw RNG or enough
> entropy to be available.  Early in the boot sequence these conditions
> may not be met resulting in a dummy string '(____ptrval____)' being
> printed.  This makes debugging the early boot sequence difficult.  We
> can relax the requirement to use cryptographically secure hashing during
> debugging.  This enables debugging while keeping development/production
> kernel behaviour the same.
>
> If new command line option debug_early_boot is enabled use
> cryptographically insecure hashing and hash pointer value immediately.
>
> Signed-off-by: Tobin C. Harding <me@tobin.cc>
> ---
>  Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt |  8 ++++++++
>  lib/vsprintf.c                                  | 18 ++++++++++++++++++
>  2 files changed, 26 insertions(+)
>
> diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
> index b8d1379aa039..ab619c4ccbf2 100644
> --- a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
> +++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
> @@ -748,6 +748,14 @@
>
>         debug           [KNL] Enable kernel debugging (events log level).
>
> +       debug_early_boot
> +                       [KNL] Enable debugging early in the boot sequence.  If
> +                       enabled, we use a weak hash instead of siphash to hash
> +                       pointers.  Use this option if you need to see pointer
> +                       values during early boot (i.e you are seeing instances
> +                       of '(___ptrval___)') - cryptographically insecure,
> +                       please do not use on production kernels.
> +
>         debug_locks_verbose=
>                         [KNL] verbose self-tests
>                         Format=<0|1>
> diff --git a/lib/vsprintf.c b/lib/vsprintf.c
> index 3697a19c2b25..6c139b442267 100644
> --- a/lib/vsprintf.c
> +++ b/lib/vsprintf.c
> @@ -1654,6 +1654,18 @@ char *device_node_string(char *buf, char *end, struct device_node *dn,
>         return widen_string(buf, buf - buf_start, end, spec);
>  }
>
> +/* Make pointers available for printing early in the boot sequence. */
> +static int debug_early_boot;

Please make this __ro_after_init too.

-Kees

> +EXPORT_SYMBOL(debug_early_boot);
> +
> +static int __init debug_early_boot_enable(char *str)
> +{
> +       debug_early_boot = 1;
> +       pr_info("debug_early_boot enabled\n");
> +       return 0;
> +}
> +early_param("debug_early_boot", debug_early_boot_enable);
> +
>  static bool have_filled_random_ptr_key __read_mostly;
>  static siphash_key_t ptr_key __read_mostly;
>
> @@ -1707,6 +1719,12 @@ static char *ptr_to_id(char *buf, char *end, void *ptr, struct printf_spec spec)
>         const char *str = sizeof(ptr) == 8 ? "(____ptrval____)" : "(ptrval)";
>         unsigned long hashval;
>
> +       /* When debugging early boot use non-cryptographically secure hash */
> +       if (unlikely(debug_early_boot)) {
> +               hashval = hash_long((unsigned long)ptr, 32);
> +               return pointer_string(buf, end, (const void *)hashval, spec);
> +       }
> +
>         if (unlikely(!have_filled_random_ptr_key)) {
>                 spec.field_width = 2 * sizeof(ptr);
>                 /* string length must be less than default_width */
> --
> 2.7.4
>



-- 
Kees Cook
Pixel Security

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 7+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCH v2 4/4] vsprintf: Add command line option debug_early_boot
  2018-05-03  4:57   ` Kees Cook
@ 2018-05-03  5:09     ` Tobin C. Harding
  0 siblings, 0 replies; 7+ messages in thread
From: Tobin C. Harding @ 2018-05-03  5:09 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Kees Cook
  Cc: LKML, Linus Torvalds, Randy Dunlap, Steven Rostedt,
	Anna-Maria Gleixner, Andrew Morton, Theodore Ts'o,
	Greg Kroah-Hartman, Arnd Bergmann

On Wed, May 02, 2018 at 09:57:57PM -0700, Kees Cook wrote:
> On Wed, May 2, 2018 at 3:50 PM, Tobin C. Harding <me@tobin.cc> wrote:
> > Currently printing [hashed] pointers requires either a hw RNG or enough
> > entropy to be available.  Early in the boot sequence these conditions
> > may not be met resulting in a dummy string '(____ptrval____)' being
> > printed.  This makes debugging the early boot sequence difficult.  We
> > can relax the requirement to use cryptographically secure hashing during
> > debugging.  This enables debugging while keeping development/production
> > kernel behaviour the same.
> >
> > If new command line option debug_early_boot is enabled use
> > cryptographically insecure hashing and hash pointer value immediately.
> >
> > Signed-off-by: Tobin C. Harding <me@tobin.cc>
> > ---
> >  Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt |  8 ++++++++
> >  lib/vsprintf.c                                  | 18 ++++++++++++++++++
> >  2 files changed, 26 insertions(+)
> >
> > diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
> > index b8d1379aa039..ab619c4ccbf2 100644
> > --- a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
> > +++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
> > @@ -748,6 +748,14 @@
> >
> >         debug           [KNL] Enable kernel debugging (events log level).
> >
> > +       debug_early_boot
> > +                       [KNL] Enable debugging early in the boot sequence.  If
> > +                       enabled, we use a weak hash instead of siphash to hash
> > +                       pointers.  Use this option if you need to see pointer
> > +                       values during early boot (i.e you are seeing instances
> > +                       of '(___ptrval___)') - cryptographically insecure,
> > +                       please do not use on production kernels.
> > +
> >         debug_locks_verbose=
> >                         [KNL] verbose self-tests
> >                         Format=<0|1>
> > diff --git a/lib/vsprintf.c b/lib/vsprintf.c
> > index 3697a19c2b25..6c139b442267 100644
> > --- a/lib/vsprintf.c
> > +++ b/lib/vsprintf.c
> > @@ -1654,6 +1654,18 @@ char *device_node_string(char *buf, char *end, struct device_node *dn,
> >         return widen_string(buf, buf - buf_start, end, spec);
> >  }
> >
> > +/* Make pointers available for printing early in the boot sequence. */
> > +static int debug_early_boot;
> 
> Please make this __ro_after_init too.

Good suggestion.  I forgot, we are supposed to be closing security
wholes not opening them :)

thanks,
Tobin.

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 7+ messages in thread

end of thread, other threads:[~2018-05-03  5:09 UTC | newest]

Thread overview: 7+ messages (download: mbox.gz / follow: Atom feed)
-- links below jump to the message on this page --
2018-05-02 22:50 [PATCH v2 0/4] enable early printing of hashed pointers Tobin C. Harding
2018-05-02 22:50 ` [PATCH v2 1/4] random: Fix whitespace pre random-bytes work Tobin C. Harding
2018-05-02 22:50 ` [PATCH v2 2/4] random: Return nbytes filled from hw RNG Tobin C. Harding
2018-05-02 22:50 ` [PATCH v2 3/4] vsprintf: Use hw RNG for ptr_key Tobin C. Harding
2018-05-02 22:50 ` [PATCH v2 4/4] vsprintf: Add command line option debug_early_boot Tobin C. Harding
2018-05-03  4:57   ` Kees Cook
2018-05-03  5:09     ` Tobin C. Harding

This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox;
as well as URLs for NNTP newsgroup(s).