From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Google-Smtp-Source: AB8JxZpgCs0HhH89FJO7bMo2Ma0gyvzEN0gGGvSF/Q4qxaCbTUvwPhwEBwrxRWyAJ3DM9tl2yEP9 ARC-Seal: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; t=1526568591; cv=none; d=google.com; s=arc-20160816; b=eYJeBMqnPQIKxsIfDeFAxos+PcMAmpxtkTHNSRlJjxDKwKamjR1J+Pv4+UZM+Kzbhz LaEgGORjvX50w4EA1CpO9OWQX8e24pc6xJVOCJ2B5Q0OBvB8re+jIN2fpr3mEzewFuOz ezOSNGtmHOOImh84KNquq9oMyTQiGXESMR2y1hJte4C+CtDhq6zw5Syp/HHJEbRqnxl0 F+UqBiGFsqQWekWTj6YCc02RWHLXFekjpsAYXetryUx+EJC3EvGhq8l8iWM88GWcwS9x OsnkVBi6n0vUDw4evpZffhMpBBZFBNLhmMl5vUhmFybjntkW4gN/sEHu/kCV99rq0Q2K ClYg== ARC-Message-Signature: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=google.com; s=arc-20160816; h=message-id:references:in-reply-to:date:subject:cc:to:from :arc-authentication-results; bh=aq6mzsOlRGILVIxAVw+U3wD2O/wbIFkzikuJBt68bgM=; b=XXOANSIokP++zvmni77M8nZxQjvHkdid2LJNDINRSVXefmONK8QDFEC3yAF0srX0Ro pBXYp2sVKXzLMzVAv4gbEdM16FEJK1H/X+RrhnEYsD8hR8xiOV6P+Mjod6D62Wj4cC19 87d2ldGLT+i47swx4vyulsIq0iNRR7qZzsU2tKEOTiMLzjAZIscRessW7ecipO+laH4W M+GznUR9jpdtCXP+ttwibTBJUVYq01yiX/EoascI8mwKkFy82yMF/f8od+PQvqY/cyel 5BLeT/1GrM93BcjFdgwJ1WNiiQaY36jQECX8m2JW8R2laI0liaBGY+AodmPVL95JdBsb 5srg== ARC-Authentication-Results: i=1; mx.google.com; spf=neutral (google.com: 148.163.156.1 is neither permitted nor denied by best guess record for domain of zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com) smtp.mailfrom=zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com; dmarc=fail (p=NONE sp=NONE dis=NONE) header.from=ibm.com Authentication-Results: mx.google.com; spf=neutral (google.com: 148.163.156.1 is neither permitted nor denied by best guess record for domain of zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com) smtp.mailfrom=zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com; dmarc=fail (p=NONE sp=NONE dis=NONE) header.from=ibm.com From: Mimi Zohar To: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org Cc: Mimi Zohar , linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, David Howells , "Luis R . Rodriguez" , Eric Biederman , kexec@lists.infradead.org, Andres Rodriguez , Greg Kroah-Hartman , Ard Biesheuvel , "Luis R . Rodriguez" , Kees Cook Subject: [PATCH v2 6/9] firmware: add call to LSM hook before firmware sysfs fallback Date: Thu, 17 May 2018 10:48:47 -0400 X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.7.5 In-Reply-To: <1526568530-9144-1-git-send-email-zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> References: <1526568530-9144-1-git-send-email-zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> X-TM-AS-GCONF: 00 x-cbid: 18051714-0012-0000-0000-000005D7A704 X-IBM-AV-DETECTION: SAVI=unused REMOTE=unused XFE=unused x-cbparentid: 18051714-0013-0000-0000-00001954D35C Message-Id: <1526568530-9144-7-git-send-email-zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> X-Proofpoint-Virus-Version: vendor=fsecure engine=2.50.10434:,, definitions=2018-05-17_08:,, signatures=0 X-Proofpoint-Spam-Details: rule=outbound_notspam policy=outbound score=0 priorityscore=1501 malwarescore=0 suspectscore=1 phishscore=0 bulkscore=0 spamscore=0 clxscore=1015 lowpriorityscore=0 impostorscore=0 adultscore=0 classifier=spam adjust=0 reason=mlx scancount=1 engine=8.0.1-1709140000 definitions=main-1805170137 X-getmail-retrieved-from-mailbox: INBOX X-GMAIL-THRID: =?utf-8?q?1600723187289207856?= X-GMAIL-MSGID: =?utf-8?q?1600723187289207856?= X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org List-ID: Add an LSM hook prior to allowing firmware sysfs fallback loading. Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar Cc: Luis R. Rodriguez Cc: David Howells Cc: Kees Cook Changelog: - call security_kernel_read_blob() - rename the READING_FIRMWARE_FALLBACK kernel_read_file_id enumeration to READING_FIRMWARE_FALLBACK_SYSFS. --- drivers/base/firmware_loader/fallback.c | 7 +++++++ include/linux/fs.h | 1 + 2 files changed, 8 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/base/firmware_loader/fallback.c b/drivers/base/firmware_loader/fallback.c index 358354148dec..6ec97e19c017 100644 --- a/drivers/base/firmware_loader/fallback.c +++ b/drivers/base/firmware_loader/fallback.c @@ -651,6 +651,8 @@ static bool fw_force_sysfs_fallback(unsigned int opt_flags) static bool fw_run_sysfs_fallback(unsigned int opt_flags) { + int ret; + if (fw_fallback_config.ignore_sysfs_fallback) { pr_info_once("Ignoring firmware sysfs fallback due to sysctl knob\n"); return false; @@ -659,6 +661,11 @@ static bool fw_run_sysfs_fallback(unsigned int opt_flags) if ((opt_flags & FW_OPT_NOFALLBACK)) return false; + /* Also permit LSMs and IMA to fail firmware sysfs fallback */ + ret = security_kernel_read_blob(READING_FIRMWARE_FALLBACK_SYSFS); + if (ret < 0) + return ret; + return fw_force_sysfs_fallback(opt_flags); } diff --git a/include/linux/fs.h b/include/linux/fs.h index 760d8da1b6c7..6e31d9207435 100644 --- a/include/linux/fs.h +++ b/include/linux/fs.h @@ -2810,6 +2810,7 @@ extern int do_pipe_flags(int *, int); id(UNKNOWN, unknown) \ id(FIRMWARE, firmware) \ id(FIRMWARE_PREALLOC_BUFFER, firmware) \ + id(FIRMWARE_FALLBACK_SYSFS, firmware) \ id(MODULE, kernel-module) \ id(KEXEC_IMAGE, kexec-image) \ id(KEXEC_INITRAMFS, kexec-initramfs) \ -- 2.7.5