LKML Archive on lore.kernel.org
help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
To: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>,
	linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>,
	"Luis R . Rodriguez" <mcgrof@kernel.org>,
	Eric Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>,
	kexec@lists.infradead.org, Andres Rodriguez <andresx7@gmail.com>,
	Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
	Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Subject: [PATCH v3 0/7] kexec/firmware: support system wide policy requiring signatures
Date: Thu, 24 May 2018 07:09:29 -0400	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <1527160176-29269-1-git-send-email-zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> (raw)

IMA-appraisal is mostly being used in the embedded or single purpose
closed system environments.  In these environments, both the Kconfig
options and the userspace tools can be modified appropriately to limit
syscalls.  For stock kernels, userspace applications need to continue to
work with older kernels as well as with newer kernels.

In this environment, the customer needs the ability to define a system
wide IMA policy, such as requiring all kexec'ed images, firmware, kernel
modules to be signed, without being dependent on either the Kconfig
options or the userspace tools.[1]

This patch set allows the customer to define a policy which requires
the kexec'ed kernel images, firmware, and/or kernel modules to be
signed.

New to this patch set is the ability to configure a build time IMA policy,
which is automatically loaded at run time without needing to specify it
on the boot command line.  The build time policy rules persist after
loading a custom kernel policy.

[1] kexec-tools suupports the new syscall based on a flag (-s).

Changelog v3:
Based on James' feedback:
- Renamed security_kernel_read_file() to security_kernel_read_data().
- Cleaned up ima_read_data(), replacing if's with switch.

Changelog v2:
- combined "kexec: limit kexec_load syscall" and "firmware: kernel
signature verification" patch sets.
- add support for build time policy.
- defined generic security_kernel_read_blob() wrapper for
  security_kernel_read_file(). Suggested by Luis.
- removed the CONFIG_CFG80211_REQUIRE_SIGNED_REGDB ifdef.  If both REGDB
  and an IMA-appraisal policy require signed firmware, for now require
  both signatures.  Subsequent patches might change this.
- Still unclear if the pre-allocated firmware buffer can be accessed

Mimi Zohar (7):
  security: rename security_kernel_read_file() hook
  kexec: add call to LSM hook in original kexec_load syscall
  ima: based on policy require signed kexec kernel images
  firmware: add call to LSM hook before firmware sysfs fallback
  ima: based on policy require signed firmware (sysfs fallback)
  ima: add build time policy
  ima: based on policy prevent loading firmware (pre-allocated buffer)

 drivers/base/firmware_loader/fallback.c |  7 ++++
 fs/exec.c                               |  2 +-
 include/linux/fs.h                      |  1 +
 include/linux/ima.h                     |  4 +--
 include/linux/security.h                |  4 +--
 kernel/kexec.c                          |  8 +++++
 kernel/module.c                         |  2 +-
 security/integrity/ima/Kconfig          | 58 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 security/integrity/ima/ima.h            |  1 +
 security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c       | 39 ++++++++++++++++++----
 security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c     | 48 +++++++++++++++++++++++++--
 security/loadpin/loadpin.c              |  2 +-
 security/security.c                     |  6 ++--
 13 files changed, 162 insertions(+), 20 deletions(-)

-- 
2.7.5


             reply	other threads:[~2018-05-24 11:12 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 16+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2018-05-24 11:09 Mimi Zohar [this message]
2018-05-24 11:09 ` [PATCH v3 1/7] security: rename security_kernel_read_file() hook Mimi Zohar
2018-05-24 20:49   ` Eric W. Biederman
2018-05-24 23:29     ` Mimi Zohar
2018-05-25 12:22     ` Mimi Zohar
2018-05-25 15:41     ` James Morris
2018-05-25 19:51       ` Eric W. Biederman
2018-05-29 20:32         ` James Morris
2018-05-29 21:10           ` Eric W. Biederman
2018-05-24 11:09 ` [PATCH v3 2/7] kexec: add call to LSM hook in original kexec_load syscall Mimi Zohar
2018-05-24 20:50   ` Eric W. Biederman
2018-05-24 11:09 ` [PATCH v3 3/7] ima: based on policy require signed kexec kernel images Mimi Zohar
2018-05-24 11:09 ` [PATCH v3 4/7] firmware: add call to LSM hook before firmware sysfs fallback Mimi Zohar
2018-05-24 11:09 ` [PATCH v3 5/7] ima: based on policy require signed firmware (sysfs fallback) Mimi Zohar
2018-05-24 11:09 ` [PATCH v3 6/7] ima: add build time policy Mimi Zohar
2018-05-24 11:09 ` [RFC PATCH v3 7/7] ima: based on policy prevent loading firmware (pre-allocated buffer) Mimi Zohar

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=1527160176-29269-1-git-send-email-zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com \
    --to=zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com \
    --cc=andresx7@gmail.com \
    --cc=ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org \
    --cc=dhowells@redhat.com \
    --cc=ebiederm@xmission.com \
    --cc=gregkh@linuxfoundation.org \
    --cc=kexec@lists.infradead.org \
    --cc=linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=mcgrof@kernel.org \
    --subject='Re: [PATCH v3 0/7] kexec/firmware: support system wide policy requiring signatures' \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link

This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox;
as well as URLs for NNTP newsgroup(s).