[PATCH v3 5/7] ima: based on policy require signed firmware (sysfs fallback)

[Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>]

With an IMA policy requiring signed firmware, this patch prevents
the sysfs fallback method of loading firmware.

Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Luis R. Rodriguez <mcgrof@suse.com>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com>
---
 security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 7 +++++++
 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+)

diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
index fbbcc02a1380..dd1f263f950a 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
@@ -451,10 +451,17 @@ int ima_read_data(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id read_id)
 			pr_err("impossible to appraise a kernel image without a file descriptor; try using kexec_file syscall.\n");
 			return -EACCES;	/* INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN */
 		}
+		break;
+	case READING_FIRMWARE_FALLBACK_SYSFS:
+		if (ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_FIRMWARE) {
+			pr_err("Prevent firmware sysfs fallback loading.\n");
+			return -EACCES;	/* INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN */
+		}
 	default:
 		break;
 	}
 	return 0;
+
 }
 
 static int read_idmap[READING_MAX_ID] = {
-- 
2.7.5