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From: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
To: Balbir Singh <bsingharora@gmail.com>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org,
	"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>, "H.J. Lu" <hjl.tools@gmail.com>,
	Vedvyas Shanbhogue <vedvyas.shanbhogue@intel.com>,
	"Ravi V. Shankar" <ravi.v.shankar@intel.com>,
	Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
	Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>,
	Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>, Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>,
	Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>,
	Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 01/10] x86/cet: User-mode shadow stack support
Date: Tue, 12 Jun 2018 08:03:01 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <1528815781.8271.15.camel@2b52.sc.intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <0e80c181-83b2-457f-a419-01e79f94ca1c@gmail.com>

On Tue, 2018-06-12 at 21:56 +1000, Balbir Singh wrote:
> 
> On 08/06/18 00:37, Yu-cheng Yu wrote:
> > This patch adds basic shadow stack enabling/disabling routines.
> > A task's shadow stack is allocated from memory with VM_SHSTK
> > flag set and read-only protection.  The shadow stack is
> > allocated to a fixed size and that can be changed by the system
> > admin.
> > 
> 
> I presume a read-only permission on the kernel side, but it
> can be written by hardware?

Yes, the shadow stack is written by the processor when a call
instruction is executed.

...

> > 
> > diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/cet.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/cet.h
> > new file mode 100644
> > index 000000000000..9d5bc1efc9b7
> > --- /dev/null
> > +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cet.h
> > @@ -0,0 +1,32 @@
> > +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
> > +#ifndef _ASM_X86_CET_H
> > +#define _ASM_X86_CET_H
> > +
> > +#ifndef __ASSEMBLY__
> > +#include <linux/types.h>
> > +
> > +struct task_struct;
> > +/*
> > + * Per-thread CET status
> > + */
> > +struct cet_stat {
> 
> stat sounds like statistics, just expand out to status please

I will make it 'cet_status'.

> > +	unsigned long	shstk_base;
> > +	unsigned long	shstk_size;
> > +	unsigned int	shstk_enabled:1;
> > +};
> > +
> > +#ifdef CONFIG_X86_INTEL_CET
> > +unsigned long cet_get_shstk_ptr(void);
> 
> For the current task? Why does _ptr routine return an unsigned long?

What about cet_get_shstk_addr()?

...

> > diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
> > index fda2114197b3..428d13828ba9 100644
> > --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
> > +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
> > @@ -770,4 +770,18 @@
> >  #define MSR_VM_IGNNE                    0xc0010115
> >  #define MSR_VM_HSAVE_PA                 0xc0010117
> >  
> > +/* Control-flow Enforcement Technology MSRs */
> > +#define MSR_IA32_U_CET		0x6a0
> > +#define MSR_IA32_S_CET		0x6a2
> > +#define MSR_IA32_PL0_SSP	0x6a4
> > +#define MSR_IA32_PL3_SSP	0x6a7
> > +#define MSR_IA32_INT_SSP_TAB	0x6a8
> 
> some comments on the purpose of the MSR would be nice

Sure.

...

> 
> I think there was a comment about this being TASK_SIZE_MAX
> 
> > +
> > +	rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_U_CET, r);
> > +	wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_U_CET, r | MSR_IA32_CET_SHSTK_EN);
> > +	wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_PL3_SSP, addr);
> 
> Should the enable happen before setting addr? I would expect to do this in the opposite order.

I will check.

> > +	return 0;
> > +}
> > +
> > +unsigned long cet_get_shstk_ptr(void)
> > +{
> > +	unsigned long ptr;
> > +
> > +	if (!current->thread.cet.shstk_enabled)
> > +		return 0;
> > +
> > +	rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_PL3_SSP, ptr);
> > +	return ptr;
> > +}
> > +
> > +static unsigned long shstk_mmap(unsigned long addr, unsigned long len)
> > +{
> > +	struct mm_struct *mm = current->mm;
> > +	unsigned long populate;
> > +
> > +	down_write(&mm->mmap_sem);
> > +	addr = do_mmap(NULL, addr, len, PROT_READ,
> > +		       MAP_ANONYMOUS | MAP_PRIVATE, VM_SHSTK,
> > +		       0, &populate, NULL);
> > +	up_write(&mm->mmap_sem);
> 
> What happens if the mmap fails for any reason? I presume the caller disables shadow stack on this process?

This is from exec(), and that fails.

> > +
> > +	if (populate)
> > +		mm_populate(addr, populate);
> > +
> > +	return addr;
> > +}
> > +
> > +int cet_setup_shstk(void)
> > +{
> > +	unsigned long addr, size;
> > +
> > +	if (!cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_SHSTK))
> > +		return -EOPNOTSUPP;
> > +
> > +	size = SHSTK_SIZE;
> > +	addr = shstk_mmap(0, size);
> > +
> > +	if (addr >= TASK_SIZE)
> > +		return -ENOMEM;
> > +
> 
> TASK_SIZE_MAX?

Yes.

> 
> > +	cet_set_shstk_ptr(addr + size - sizeof(void *));
> > +	current->thread.cet.shstk_base = addr;
> > +	current->thread.cet.shstk_size = size;
> > +	current->thread.cet.shstk_enabled = 1;
> > +	return 0;
> > +}
> > +
> > +void cet_disable_shstk(void)
> > +{
> > +	u64 r;
> > +
> > +	if (!cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_SHSTK))
> > +		return;
> > +
> > +	rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_U_CET, r);
> > +	r &= ~(MSR_IA32_CET_SHSTK_EN);
> > +	wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_U_CET, r);
> > +	wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_PL3_SSP, 0);
> 
> Again, I'd expect the order to be the reverse
> 
> > +	current->thread.cet.shstk_enabled = 0;
> > +}
> > +
> > +void cet_disable_free_shstk(struct task_struct *tsk)
> > +{
> > +	if (!cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_SHSTK) ||
> > +	    !tsk->thread.cet.shstk_enabled)
> > +		return;
> > +
> > +	if (tsk == current)
> > +		cet_disable_shstk();
> > +
> > +	/*
> > +	 * Free only when tsk is current or shares mm
> > +	 * with current but has its own shstk.
> > +	 */
> > +	if (tsk->mm && (tsk->mm == current->mm) &&
> > +	    (tsk->thread.cet.shstk_base)) {
> 
> Does the caller hold a reference to tsk->mm?

If (tsk->mm == current->mm), i.e. it is current or it is a pthread of
current, then yes.

Yu-cheng


  reply	other threads:[~2018-06-12 15:06 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 98+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2018-06-07 14:37 [PATCH 00/10] Control Flow Enforcement - Part (3) Yu-cheng Yu
2018-06-07 14:37 ` [PATCH 01/10] x86/cet: User-mode shadow stack support Yu-cheng Yu
2018-06-07 16:37   ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-06-07 17:46     ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-06-07 17:55       ` Dave Hansen
2018-06-07 18:23       ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-06-12 11:56   ` Balbir Singh
2018-06-12 15:03     ` Yu-cheng Yu [this message]
2018-06-07 14:37 ` [PATCH 02/10] x86/cet: Introduce WRUSS instruction Yu-cheng Yu
2018-06-07 16:40   ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-06-07 16:51     ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-06-07 18:41     ` Peter Zijlstra
2018-06-07 20:31       ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-06-11  8:17     ` Peter Zijlstra
2018-06-11 15:02       ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-06-14  1:30   ` Balbir Singh
2018-06-14 14:43     ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-06-07 14:38 ` [PATCH 03/10] x86/cet: Signal handling for shadow stack Yu-cheng Yu
2018-06-07 18:30   ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-06-07 18:58     ` Florian Weimer
2018-06-07 19:51       ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-06-07 20:07     ` Cyrill Gorcunov
2018-06-07 20:57       ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-06-08 12:07         ` Cyrill Gorcunov
2018-06-07 20:12     ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-06-07 20:17       ` Dave Hansen
2018-06-07 14:38 ` [PATCH 04/10] x86/cet: Handle thread " Yu-cheng Yu
2018-06-07 18:21   ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-06-07 19:47     ` Florian Weimer
2018-06-07 20:53       ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-06-08 14:53         ` Florian Weimer
2018-06-08 15:01           ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-06-08 15:50             ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-06-07 14:38 ` [PATCH 05/10] x86/cet: ELF header parsing of Control Flow Enforcement Yu-cheng Yu
2018-06-07 18:38   ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-06-07 20:40     ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-06-07 14:38 ` [PATCH 06/10] x86/cet: Add arch_prctl functions for shadow stack Yu-cheng Yu
2018-06-07 18:48   ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-06-07 20:30     ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-06-07 21:01       ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-06-07 22:02         ` H.J. Lu
2018-06-07 23:01           ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-06-08  4:09             ` H.J. Lu
2018-06-08  4:38               ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-06-08 12:24                 ` H.J. Lu
2018-06-08 14:57                   ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-06-08 15:52                     ` Cyrill Gorcunov
2018-06-08  4:22           ` H.J. Lu
2018-06-08  4:35             ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-06-08 12:17               ` H.J. Lu
2018-06-12 10:03           ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-06-12 11:43             ` H.J. Lu
2018-06-12 16:01               ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-06-12 16:05                 ` H.J. Lu
2018-06-12 16:34                   ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-06-12 16:51                     ` H.J. Lu
2018-06-12 18:59                       ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-06-12 19:34                         ` H.J. Lu
2018-06-18 22:03                           ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-06-19  0:52                             ` Kees Cook
2018-06-19  6:40                               ` Florian Weimer
2018-06-19 14:50                               ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-06-19 16:44                                 ` Kees Cook
2018-06-19 16:59                                   ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-06-19 17:07                                     ` Kees Cook
2018-06-19 17:20                                       ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-06-19 20:12                                         ` Kees Cook
2018-06-19 20:47                                           ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-06-19 22:38                                             ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-06-20  0:50                                               ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-06-21 23:07                                                 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-06-07 14:38 ` [PATCH 07/10] mm: Prevent mprotect from changing " Yu-cheng Yu
2018-06-07 14:38 ` [PATCH 08/10] mm: Prevent mremap of " Yu-cheng Yu
2018-06-07 18:48   ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-06-07 20:18     ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-06-07 14:38 ` [PATCH 09/10] mm: Prevent madvise from changing " Yu-cheng Yu
2018-06-07 20:54   ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-06-07 21:09   ` Nadav Amit
2018-06-07 21:18     ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-06-07 14:38 ` [PATCH 10/10] mm: Prevent munmap and remap_file_pages of " Yu-cheng Yu
2018-06-07 18:50   ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-06-07 20:15     ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-06-12 10:56 ` [PATCH 00/10] Control Flow Enforcement - Part (3) Balbir Singh
2018-06-12 15:03   ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-06-12 16:00     ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-06-12 16:21       ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-06-12 16:31         ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-06-12 17:24           ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-06-12 20:15             ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-06-14  1:07     ` Balbir Singh
2018-06-14 14:56       ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-06-17  3:16         ` Balbir Singh
2018-06-18 21:44           ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-06-19  8:52             ` Balbir Singh
2018-06-26  2:46 ` Jann Horn
2018-06-26 14:56   ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-06-26  5:26 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-06-26 14:56   ` Yu-cheng Yu

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