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From: Dianzhang Chen <dianzhangchen0@gmail.com>
To: tglx@linutronix.de, mingo@redhat.com, bp@alien8.de
Cc: hpa@zytor.com, x86@kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	Dianzhang Chen <dianzhangchen0@gmail.com>
Subject: [PATCH] x86: fix possible spectre-v1 in do_get_thread_area()
Date: Fri, 24 May 2019 19:45:12 +0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <1558698312-5716-1-git-send-email-dianzhangchen0@gmail.com> (raw)

The idx in do_get_thread_area() is controlled by userspace via syscall: ptrace(defined in kernel/ptrace.c), hence leading to a potential exploitation of the Spectre variant 1 vulnerability.
The idx can be controlled from: ptrace -> arch_ptrace -> do_get_thread_area.

Fix this by sanitizing idx before using it to index p->thread.tls_array.

Signed-off-by: Dianzhang Chen <dianzhangchen0@gmail.com>
---
 arch/x86/kernel/tls.c | 9 +++++++--
 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/tls.c b/arch/x86/kernel/tls.c
index a5b802a..e3dc05b 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/tls.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/tls.c
@@ -5,6 +5,7 @@
 #include <linux/user.h>
 #include <linux/regset.h>
 #include <linux/syscalls.h>
+#include <linux/nospec.h>
 
 #include <linux/uaccess.h>
 #include <asm/desc.h>
@@ -220,15 +221,19 @@ int do_get_thread_area(struct task_struct *p, int idx,
 		       struct user_desc __user *u_info)
 {
 	struct user_desc info;
+	int index = idx - GDT_ENTRY_TLS_MIN;
 
 	if (idx == -1 && get_user(idx, &u_info->entry_number))
 		return -EFAULT;
 
-	if (idx < GDT_ENTRY_TLS_MIN || idx > GDT_ENTRY_TLS_MAX)
+	if (index < 0 || index > GDT_ENTRY_TLS_MAX - GDT_ENTRY_TLS_MIN)
 		return -EINVAL;
 
+	index = array_index_nospec(index,
+				GDT_ENTRY_TLS_MAX - GDT_ENTRY_TLS_MIN + 1);
+
 	fill_user_desc(&info, idx,
-		       &p->thread.tls_array[idx - GDT_ENTRY_TLS_MIN]);
+		       &p->thread.tls_array[index]);
 
 	if (copy_to_user(u_info, &info, sizeof(info)))
 		return -EFAULT;
-- 
2.7.4


             reply	other threads:[~2019-05-24 11:45 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 2+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2019-05-24 11:45 Dianzhang Chen [this message]
2019-06-23 11:47 ` Thomas Gleixner

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