From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-0.7 required=3.0 tests=HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS, MAILING_LIST_MULTI,SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS,URIBL_BLOCKED autolearn=unavailable autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 532B3C31E5C for ; Tue, 18 Jun 2019 02:23:41 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [209.132.180.67]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 36C1920861 for ; Tue, 18 Jun 2019 02:23:41 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1727051AbfFRCXj (ORCPT ); Mon, 17 Jun 2019 22:23:39 -0400 Received: from mga05.intel.com ([192.55.52.43]:57213 "EHLO mga05.intel.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1725870AbfFRCXj (ORCPT ); Mon, 17 Jun 2019 22:23:39 -0400 X-Amp-Result: SKIPPED(no attachment in message) X-Amp-File-Uploaded: False Received: from orsmga007.jf.intel.com ([10.7.209.58]) by fmsmga105.fm.intel.com with ESMTP/TLS/DHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384; 17 Jun 2019 19:23:37 -0700 X-ExtLoop1: 1 Received: from khuang2-desk.gar.corp.intel.com ([10.255.91.82]) by orsmga007.jf.intel.com with ESMTP; 17 Jun 2019 19:23:33 -0700 Message-ID: <1560824611.5187.100.camel@linux.intel.com> Subject: Re: [PATCH, RFC 45/62] mm: Add the encrypt_mprotect() system call for MKTME From: Kai Huang To: Andy Lutomirski Cc: Dave Hansen , "Kirill A. Shutemov" , Andrew Morton , X86 ML , Thomas Gleixner , Ingo Molnar , "H. Peter Anvin" , Borislav Petkov , Peter Zijlstra , David Howells , Kees Cook , Jacob Pan , Alison Schofield , Linux-MM , kvm list , keyrings@vger.kernel.org, LKML , Tom Lendacky Date: Tue, 18 Jun 2019 14:23:31 +1200 In-Reply-To: References: <20190508144422.13171-1-kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> <20190508144422.13171-46-kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> <3c658cce-7b7e-7d45-59a0-e17dae986713@intel.com> <5cbfa2da-ba2e-ed91-d0e8-add67753fc12@intel.com> <1560816342.5187.63.camel@linux.intel.com> <1560821746.5187.82.camel@linux.intel.com> Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8" X-Mailer: Evolution 3.24.6 (3.24.6-1.fc26) Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org On Mon, 2019-06-17 at 18:43 -0700, Andy Lutomirski wrote: > On Mon, Jun 17, 2019 at 6:35 PM Kai Huang wrote: > > > > > > > > > > > > > > I'm having a hard time imagining that ever working -- wouldn't it blow > > > > > up if someone did: > > > > > > > > > > fd = open("/dev/anything987"); > > > > > ptr1 = mmap(fd); > > > > > ptr2 = mmap(fd); > > > > > sys_encrypt(ptr1); > > > > > > > > > > So I think it really has to be: > > > > > fd = open("/dev/anything987"); > > > > > ioctl(fd, ENCRYPT_ME); > > > > > mmap(fd); > > > > > > > > This requires "/dev/anything987" to support ENCRYPT_ME ioctl, right? > > > > > > > > So to support NVDIMM (DAX), we need to add ENCRYPT_ME ioctl to DAX? > > > > > > Yes and yes, or we do it with layers -- see below. > > > > > > I don't see how we can credibly avoid this. If we try to do MKTME > > > behind the DAX driver's back, aren't we going to end up with cache > > > coherence problems? > > > > I am not sure whether I understand correctly but how is cache coherence problem related to > > putting > > MKTME concept to different layers? To make MKTME work with DAX/NVDIMM, I think no matter which > > layer > > MKTME concept resides, eventually we need to put keyID into PTE which maps to NVDIMM, and kernel > > needs to manage cache coherence for NVDIMM just like for normal memory showed in this series? > > > > I mean is that, to avoid cache coherence problems, something has to > prevent user code from mapping the same page with two different key > ids. If the entire MKTME mechanism purely layers on top of DAX, > something needs to prevent the underlying DAX device from being mapped > at the same time as the MKTME-decrypted view. This is obviously > doable, but it's not automatic. Assuming I am understanding the context correctly, yes from this perspective it seems having sys_encrypt is annoying, and having ENCRYPT_ME should be better. But Dave said "nobody is going to do what you suggest in the ptr1/ptr2 example"? Thanks, -Kai