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* [tip: x86/urgent] x86/ioremap: Map EFI runtime services data as encrypted for SEV
@ 2020-03-11 14:58 tip-bot2 for Tom Lendacky
  0 siblings, 0 replies; only message in thread
From: tip-bot2 for Tom Lendacky @ 2020-03-11 14:58 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-tip-commits
  Cc: Tom Lendacky, Borislav Petkov, Joerg Roedel, stable, x86, LKML

The following commit has been merged into the x86/urgent branch of tip:

Commit-ID:     985e537a4082b4635754a57f4f95430790afee6a
Gitweb:        https://git.kernel.org/tip/985e537a4082b4635754a57f4f95430790afee6a
Author:        Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
AuthorDate:    Tue, 10 Mar 2020 18:35:57 +01:00
Committer:     Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
CommitterDate: Wed, 11 Mar 2020 15:54:54 +01:00

x86/ioremap: Map EFI runtime services data as encrypted for SEV

The dmidecode program fails to properly decode the SMBIOS data supplied
by OVMF/UEFI when running in an SEV guest. The SMBIOS area, under SEV, is
encrypted and resides in reserved memory that is marked as EFI runtime
services data.

As a result, when memremap() is attempted for the SMBIOS data, it
can't be mapped as regular RAM (through try_ram_remap()) and, since
the address isn't part of the iomem resources list, it isn't mapped
encrypted through the fallback ioremap().

Add a new __ioremap_check_other() to deal with memory types like
EFI_RUNTIME_SERVICES_DATA which are not covered by the resource ranges.

This allows any runtime services data which has been created encrypted,
to be mapped encrypted too.

 [ bp: Move functionality to a separate function. ]

Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
Tested-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 5.3
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/2d9e16eb5b53dc82665c95c6764b7407719df7a0.1582645327.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com
---
 arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c | 18 ++++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 18 insertions(+)

diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c b/arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c
index 44e4beb..935a91e 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c
@@ -106,6 +106,19 @@ static unsigned int __ioremap_check_encrypted(struct resource *res)
 	return 0;
 }
 
+/*
+ * The EFI runtime services data area is not covered by walk_mem_res(), but must
+ * be mapped encrypted when SEV is active.
+ */
+static void __ioremap_check_other(resource_size_t addr, struct ioremap_desc *desc)
+{
+	if (!sev_active())
+		return;
+
+	if (efi_mem_type(addr) == EFI_RUNTIME_SERVICES_DATA)
+		desc->flags |= IORES_MAP_ENCRYPTED;
+}
+
 static int __ioremap_collect_map_flags(struct resource *res, void *arg)
 {
 	struct ioremap_desc *desc = arg;
@@ -124,6 +137,9 @@ static int __ioremap_collect_map_flags(struct resource *res, void *arg)
  * To avoid multiple resource walks, this function walks resources marked as
  * IORESOURCE_MEM and IORESOURCE_BUSY and looking for system RAM and/or a
  * resource described not as IORES_DESC_NONE (e.g. IORES_DESC_ACPI_TABLES).
+ *
+ * After that, deal with misc other ranges in __ioremap_check_other() which do
+ * not fall into the above category.
  */
 static void __ioremap_check_mem(resource_size_t addr, unsigned long size,
 				struct ioremap_desc *desc)
@@ -135,6 +151,8 @@ static void __ioremap_check_mem(resource_size_t addr, unsigned long size,
 	memset(desc, 0, sizeof(struct ioremap_desc));
 
 	walk_mem_res(start, end, desc, __ioremap_collect_map_flags);
+
+	__ioremap_check_other(addr, desc);
 }
 
 /*

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