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From: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com>
To: Miklos Szeredi <miklos@szeredi.hu>
Cc: serge@hallyn.com, hpa@zytor.com, linuxram@us.ibm.com,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, containers@lists.osdl.org,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, ebiederm@xmission.com,
viro@ftp.linux.org.uk, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org,
akpm@linux-foundation.org
Subject: Re: [patch] unprivileged mounts update
Date: Thu, 26 Apr 2007 11:19:29 -0500 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20070426161929.GA6439@sergelap.austin.ibm.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <E1Hh5oQ-0000w1-00@dorka.pomaz.szeredi.hu>
Quoting Miklos Szeredi (miklos@szeredi.hu):
> > Quoting Miklos Szeredi (miklos@szeredi.hu):
> > > > Right, I figure if the normal action is to always do
> > > > mnt->user = current->fsuid, then for the special case we
> > > > pass a uid in someplace. Of course... do we not have a
> > > > place to do that? Would it be a no-no to use 'data' for
> > > > a non-fs-specific arg?
> > >
> > > I guess it would be OK for bind, but not for new- and remounts, where
> > > 'data' is already used.
> > >
> > > Maybe it's best to stay with fsuid after all, and live with having to
> > > restore capabilities. It's not so bad after all, this seems to do the
> > > trick:
> > >
> > > cap_t cap = cap_get_proc();
> > > setfsuid(uid);
> > > cap_set_proc(cap);
> > >
> > > Unfortunately these functions are not in libc, but in a separate
> > > "libcap" library. Ugh.
> >
> > Ok, are you still planning to nix the MS_SETUSER flag, though, as
> > Eric suggested? I think it's cleanest - always set the mnt->user
> > field to current->fsuid, and require CAP_SYS_ADMIN if the
> > mountpoint->mnt->user != current->fsuid.
>
> It would be a nice cleanup, but I think it's unworkable for the
> following reasons:
>
> Up till now mount(2) and umount(2) always required CAP_SYS_ADMIN, and
> we must make sure, that unless there's some explicit action by the
> sysadmin, these rules are still enfoced.
>
> For example, with just a check for mnt->mnt_uid == current->fsuid, a
> fsuid=0 process could umount or submount all the "legacy" mounts even
> without CAP_SYS_ADMIN.
>
> This is a fundamental security problem, with getting rid of MS_SETUSER
> and MNT_USER.
>
> Another, rather unlikely situation is if an existing program sets
> fsuid to non-zero before calling mount, hence unwantingly making that
> mount owned by some user after these patches.
>
> Also adding "user=0" to the options in /proc/mounts would be an
> inteface breakage, that is probably harmless, but people wouldn't like
> it. Special casing the zero uid for this case is more ugly IMO, than
> the problem we are trying to solve.
>
> If we didn't have existing systems to deal with, then of course I'd
> agree with Eric's suggestion.
>
> Miklos
So then as far as you're concerned, the patches which were in -mm will
remain unchanged?
-serge
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2007-04-26 16:20 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 24+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2007-04-25 7:45 Miklos Szeredi
2007-04-25 15:18 ` Miklos Szeredi
2007-04-25 16:55 ` H. Peter Anvin
2007-04-25 17:20 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2007-04-25 17:46 ` Eric W. Biederman
2007-04-25 17:56 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2007-04-25 18:41 ` Eric W. Biederman
2007-04-25 18:52 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2007-04-25 19:33 ` Miklos Szeredi
2007-04-26 14:57 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2007-04-26 15:23 ` Miklos Szeredi
2007-04-26 16:19 ` Serge E. Hallyn [this message]
2007-04-26 16:29 ` Miklos Szeredi
2007-04-26 19:42 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2007-04-26 19:56 ` Miklos Szeredi
2007-04-27 2:10 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2007-04-25 17:21 ` Eric W. Biederman
2007-04-25 17:30 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2007-04-26 19:10 ` Jan Engelhardt
2007-04-26 20:27 ` Miklos Szeredi
2007-04-27 4:10 ` Eric W. Biederman
2007-04-27 7:01 ` Jan Engelhardt
2007-04-25 19:33 ` Andrew Morton
2007-04-25 19:45 ` Miklos Szeredi
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