LKML Archive on lore.kernel.org
help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
To: Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com, chuck.lever@oracle.com
Cc: nfsv4@linux-nfs.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, selinux@tycho.nsa.gov,
	linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, dhowells@redhat.com
Subject: [PATCH 04/37] KEYS: Add keyctl function to get a security label
Date: Fri, 08 Feb 2008 16:52:19 +0000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20080208165218.15902.7388.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20080208165156.15902.62457.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk>

Add a keyctl() function to get the security label of a key.

The following is added to Documentation/keys.txt:

 (*) Get the LSM security context attached to a key.

	long keyctl(KEYCTL_GET_SECURITY, key_serial_t key, char *buffer,
		    size_t buflen)

     This function returns a string that represents the LSM security context
     attached to a key in the buffer provided.

     Unless there's an error, it always returns the amount of data it could
     produce, even if that's too big for the buffer, but it won't copy more
     than requested to userspace. If the buffer pointer is NULL then no copy
     will take place.

     A NUL character is included at the end of the string if the buffer is
     sufficiently big.  This is included in the returned count.  If no LSM is
     in force then an empty string will be returned.

     A process must have view permission on the key for this function to be
     successful.

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by:  Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
---

 Documentation/keys.txt   |   21 +++++++++++++++
 include/linux/keyctl.h   |    1 +
 include/linux/security.h |   20 +++++++++++++-
 security/dummy.c         |    8 ++++++
 security/keys/compat.c   |    3 ++
 security/keys/keyctl.c   |   66 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 security/security.c      |    5 +++
 security/selinux/hooks.c |   21 +++++++++++++--
 8 files changed, 141 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)


diff --git a/Documentation/keys.txt b/Documentation/keys.txt
index b82d38d..be424b0 100644
--- a/Documentation/keys.txt
+++ b/Documentation/keys.txt
@@ -711,6 +711,27 @@ The keyctl syscall functions are:
      The assumed authoritative key is inherited across fork and exec.
 
 
+ (*) Get the LSM security context attached to a key.
+
+	long keyctl(KEYCTL_GET_SECURITY, key_serial_t key, char *buffer,
+		    size_t buflen)
+
+     This function returns a string that represents the LSM security context
+     attached to a key in the buffer provided.
+
+     Unless there's an error, it always returns the amount of data it could
+     produce, even if that's too big for the buffer, but it won't copy more
+     than requested to userspace. If the buffer pointer is NULL then no copy
+     will take place.
+
+     A NUL character is included at the end of the string if the buffer is
+     sufficiently big.  This is included in the returned count.  If no LSM is
+     in force then an empty string will be returned.
+
+     A process must have view permission on the key for this function to be
+     successful.
+
+
 ===============
 KERNEL SERVICES
 ===============
diff --git a/include/linux/keyctl.h b/include/linux/keyctl.h
index 3365945..656ee6b 100644
--- a/include/linux/keyctl.h
+++ b/include/linux/keyctl.h
@@ -49,5 +49,6 @@
 #define KEYCTL_SET_REQKEY_KEYRING	14	/* set default request-key keyring */
 #define KEYCTL_SET_TIMEOUT		15	/* set key timeout */
 #define KEYCTL_ASSUME_AUTHORITY		16	/* assume request_key() authorisation */
+#define KEYCTL_GET_SECURITY		17	/* get key security label */
 
 #endif /*  _LINUX_KEYCTL_H */
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index fe52cde..a33fd03 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -970,6 +970,17 @@ struct request_sock;
  *	@perm describes the combination of permissions required of this key.
  *	Return 1 if permission granted, 0 if permission denied and -ve it the
  *      normal permissions model should be effected.
+ * @key_getsecurity:
+ *	Get a textual representation of the security context attached to a key
+ *	for the purposes of honouring KEYCTL_GETSECURITY.  This function
+ *	allocates the storage for the NUL-terminated string and the caller
+ *	should free it.
+ *	@key points to the key to be queried.
+ *	@_buffer points to a pointer that should be set to point to the
+ *	 resulting string (if no label or an error occurs).
+ *	Return the length of the string (including terminating NUL) or -ve if
+ *      an error.
+ *	May also return 0 (and a NULL buffer pointer) if there is no label.
  *
  * Security hooks affecting all System V IPC operations.
  *
@@ -1459,7 +1470,7 @@ struct security_operations {
 	int (*key_permission)(key_ref_t key_ref,
 			      struct task_struct *context,
 			      key_perm_t perm);
-
+	int (*key_getsecurity)(struct key *key, char **_buffer);
 #endif	/* CONFIG_KEYS */
 
 };
@@ -2600,6 +2611,7 @@ int security_key_alloc(struct key *key, struct task_struct *tsk, unsigned long f
 void security_key_free(struct key *key);
 int security_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref,
 			    struct task_struct *context, key_perm_t perm);
+int security_key_getsecurity(struct key *key, char **_buffer);
 
 #else
 
@@ -2621,6 +2633,12 @@ static inline int security_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref,
 	return 0;
 }
 
+static inline int security_key_getsecurity(struct key *key, char **_buffer)
+{
+	*_buffer = NULL;
+	return 0;
+}
+
 #endif
 #endif /* CONFIG_KEYS */
 
diff --git a/security/dummy.c b/security/dummy.c
index 649326b..6a0056b 100644
--- a/security/dummy.c
+++ b/security/dummy.c
@@ -977,6 +977,13 @@ static inline int dummy_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref,
 {
 	return 0;
 }
+
+static int dummy_key_getsecurity(struct key *key, char **_buffer)
+{
+	*_buffer = NULL;
+	return 0;
+}
+
 #endif /* CONFIG_KEYS */
 
 struct security_operations dummy_security_ops;
@@ -1164,6 +1171,7 @@ void security_fixup_ops (struct security_operations *ops)
 	set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, key_alloc);
 	set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, key_free);
 	set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, key_permission);
+	set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, key_getsecurity);
 #endif	/* CONFIG_KEYS */
 
 }
diff --git a/security/keys/compat.c b/security/keys/compat.c
index e10ec99..c766c68 100644
--- a/security/keys/compat.c
+++ b/security/keys/compat.c
@@ -79,6 +79,9 @@ asmlinkage long compat_sys_keyctl(u32 option,
 	case KEYCTL_ASSUME_AUTHORITY:
 		return keyctl_assume_authority(arg2);
 
+	case KEYCTL_GET_SECURITY:
+		return keyctl_get_security(arg2, compat_ptr(arg3), arg4);
+
 	default:
 		return -EOPNOTSUPP;
 	}
diff --git a/security/keys/keyctl.c b/security/keys/keyctl.c
index 1698bf9..56e963b 100644
--- a/security/keys/keyctl.c
+++ b/security/keys/keyctl.c
@@ -20,6 +20,7 @@
 #include <linux/string.h>
 #include <linux/err.h>
 #include <linux/vmalloc.h>
+#include <linux/security.h>
 #include <asm/uaccess.h>
 #include "internal.h"
 
@@ -1080,6 +1081,66 @@ error:
 
 } /* end keyctl_assume_authority() */
 
+/*
+ * get the security label of a key
+ * - the key must grant us view permission
+ * - if there's a buffer, we place up to buflen bytes of data into it
+ * - unless there's an error, we return the amount of information available,
+ *   irrespective of how much we may have copied (including the terminal NUL)
+ * - implements keyctl(KEYCTL_GET_SECURITY)
+ */
+long keyctl_get_security(key_serial_t keyid,
+			 char __user *buffer,
+			 size_t buflen)
+{
+	struct key *key, *instkey;
+	key_ref_t key_ref;
+	char *context;
+	long ret;
+
+	key_ref = lookup_user_key(NULL, keyid, 0, 1, KEY_VIEW);
+	if (IS_ERR(key_ref)) {
+		if (PTR_ERR(key_ref) != -EACCES)
+			return PTR_ERR(key_ref);
+
+		/* viewing a key under construction is also permitted if we
+		 * have the authorisation token handy */
+		instkey = key_get_instantiation_authkey(keyid);
+		if (IS_ERR(instkey))
+			return PTR_ERR(key_ref);
+		key_put(instkey);
+
+		key_ref = lookup_user_key(NULL, keyid, 0, 1, 0);
+		if (IS_ERR(key_ref))
+			return PTR_ERR(key_ref);
+	}
+
+	key = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref);
+	ret = security_key_getsecurity(key, &context);
+	if (ret == 0) {
+		/* if no information was returned, give userspace an empty
+		 * string */
+		ret = 1;
+		if (buffer && buflen > 0 &&
+		    copy_to_user(buffer, "", 1) != 0)
+			ret = -EFAULT;
+	} else if (ret > 0) {
+		/* return as much data as there's room for */
+		if (buffer && buflen > 0) {
+			if (buflen > ret)
+				buflen = ret;
+
+			if (copy_to_user(buffer, context, buflen) != 0)
+				ret = -EFAULT;
+		}
+
+		kfree(context);
+	}
+
+	key_ref_put(key_ref);
+	return ret;
+}
+
 /*****************************************************************************/
 /*
  * the key control system call
@@ -1160,6 +1221,11 @@ asmlinkage long sys_keyctl(int option, unsigned long arg2, unsigned long arg3,
 	case KEYCTL_ASSUME_AUTHORITY:
 		return keyctl_assume_authority((key_serial_t) arg2);
 
+	case KEYCTL_GET_SECURITY:
+		return keyctl_get_security((key_serial_t) arg2,
+					   (char *) arg3,
+					   (size_t) arg4);
+
 	default:
 		return -EOPNOTSUPP;
 	}
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index d15e56c..3e75b90 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -1102,4 +1102,9 @@ int security_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref,
 	return security_ops->key_permission(key_ref, context, perm);
 }
 
+int security_key_getsecurity(struct key *key, char **_buffer)
+{
+	return security_ops->key_getsecurity(key, _buffer);
+}
+
 #endif	/* CONFIG_KEYS */
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index e5ed075..face4b4 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -5203,6 +5203,20 @@ static int selinux_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref,
 			    SECCLASS_KEY, perm, NULL);
 }
 
+static int selinux_key_getsecurity(struct key *key, char **_buffer)
+{
+	struct key_security_struct *ksec = key->security;
+	char *context = NULL;
+	unsigned len;
+	int rc;
+
+	rc = security_sid_to_context(ksec->sid, &context, &len);
+	if (!rc)
+		rc = len;
+	*_buffer = context;
+	return rc;
+}
+
 #endif
 
 static struct security_operations selinux_ops = {
@@ -5382,9 +5396,10 @@ static struct security_operations selinux_ops = {
 #endif
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
-	.key_alloc =                    selinux_key_alloc,
-	.key_free =                     selinux_key_free,
-	.key_permission =               selinux_key_permission,
+	.key_alloc =			selinux_key_alloc,
+	.key_free =			selinux_key_free,
+	.key_permission =		selinux_key_permission,
+	.key_getsecurity =		selinux_key_getsecurity,
 #endif
 };
 


  parent reply	other threads:[~2008-02-08 16:59 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 45+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2008-02-08 16:51 [PATCH 00/37] Permit filesystem local caching David Howells
2008-02-08 16:52 ` [PATCH 01/37] KEYS: Increase the payload size when instantiating a key David Howells
2008-02-08 16:52 ` [PATCH 02/37] KEYS: Check starting keyring as part of search David Howells
2008-02-08 16:52 ` [PATCH 03/37] KEYS: Allow the callout data to be passed as a blob rather than a string David Howells
2008-02-08 16:52 ` David Howells [this message]
2008-02-08 16:52 ` [PATCH 05/37] Security: Change current->fs[ug]id to current_fs[ug]id() David Howells
2008-02-11 10:38   ` James Morris
2008-02-08 16:52 ` [PATCH 06/37] Security: Separate task security context from task_struct David Howells
2008-02-11 10:43   ` James Morris
2008-02-08 16:52 ` [PATCH 07/37] Security: De-embed task security record from task and use refcounting David Howells
2008-02-11 10:57   ` James Morris
2008-02-11 17:30   ` David Howells
2008-02-11 18:48     ` Stephen Smalley
2008-02-08 16:52 ` [PATCH 08/37] Security: Add a kernel_service object class to SELinux David Howells
2008-02-11 10:59   ` James Morris
2008-02-08 16:52 ` [PATCH 09/37] Security: Allow kernel services to override LSM settings for task actions David Howells
2008-02-08 16:52 ` [PATCH 10/37] Security: Make NFSD work with detached security David Howells
2008-02-08 16:52 ` [PATCH 11/37] FS-Cache: Release page->private after failed readahead David Howells
2008-02-08 16:53 ` [PATCH 12/37] FS-Cache: Recruit a couple of page flags for cache management David Howells
2008-02-08 16:53 ` [PATCH 13/37] FS-Cache: Provide an add_wait_queue_tail() function David Howells
2008-02-08 16:53 ` [PATCH 14/37] FS-Cache: Generic filesystem caching facility David Howells
2008-02-08 16:53 ` [PATCH 15/37] CacheFiles: Add missing copy_page export for ia64 David Howells
2008-02-08 16:53 ` [PATCH 16/37] CacheFiles: Be consistent about the use of mapping vs file->f_mapping in Ext3 David Howells
2008-02-08 16:53 ` [PATCH 17/37] CacheFiles: Add a hook to write a single page of data to an inode David Howells
2008-02-08 16:53 ` [PATCH 18/37] CacheFiles: Permit the page lock state to be monitored David Howells
2008-02-08 16:53 ` [PATCH 19/37] CacheFiles: Export things for CacheFiles David Howells
2008-02-08 16:53 ` [PATCH 20/37] CacheFiles: A cache that backs onto a mounted filesystem David Howells
2008-02-08 16:53 ` [PATCH 21/37] NFS: Add comment banners to some NFS functions David Howells
2008-02-08 16:53 ` [PATCH 22/37] NFS: Add FS-Cache option bit and debug bit David Howells
2008-02-08 16:54 ` [PATCH 23/37] NFS: Permit local filesystem caching to be enabled for NFS David Howells
2008-02-08 16:54 ` [PATCH 24/37] NFS: Register NFS for caching and retrieve the top-level index David Howells
2008-02-08 16:54 ` [PATCH 25/37] NFS: Define and create server-level objects David Howells
2008-02-08 16:54 ` [PATCH 26/37] NFS: Define and create superblock-level objects David Howells
2008-02-08 16:54 ` [PATCH 27/37] NFS: Define and create inode-level cache objects David Howells
2008-02-08 16:54 ` [PATCH 28/37] NFS: Use local disk inode cache David Howells
2008-02-08 16:54 ` [PATCH 29/37] NFS: Invalidate FsCache page flags when cache removed David Howells
2008-02-08 16:54 ` [PATCH 30/37] NFS: Add some new I/O event counters for FS-Cache events David Howells
2008-02-08 16:54 ` [PATCH 31/37] NFS: FS-Cache page management David Howells
2008-02-08 16:54 ` [PATCH 32/37] NFS: Add read context retention for FS-Cache to call back with David Howells
2008-02-08 16:54 ` [PATCH 33/37] NFS: nfs_readpage_async() needs to be accessible as a fallback for local caching David Howells
2008-02-08 16:54 ` [PATCH 34/37] NFS: Read pages from FS-Cache into an NFS inode David Howells
2008-02-08 16:55 ` [PATCH 35/37] NFS: Store pages from an NFS inode into a local cache David Howells
2008-02-08 16:55 ` [PATCH 36/37] NFS: Display local caching state David Howells
2008-02-08 16:55 ` [PATCH 37/37] NFS: Add mount options to enable local caching on NFS David Howells
2008-02-20 16:05 [PATCH 00/37] Permit filesystem local caching David Howells
2008-02-20 16:06 ` [PATCH 04/37] KEYS: Add keyctl function to get a security label David Howells

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=20080208165218.15902.7388.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk \
    --to=dhowells@redhat.com \
    --cc=Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com \
    --cc=chuck.lever@oracle.com \
    --cc=linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=nfsv4@linux-nfs.org \
    --cc=selinux@tycho.nsa.gov \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox;
as well as URLs for NNTP newsgroup(s).