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From: "Ahmed S. Darwish" <darwish.07@gmail.com>
To: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>,
Adrian Bunk <bunk@kernel.org>, Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org>,
Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>,
Eric Paris <eparis@parisplace.org>,
Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@sw.ru>,
LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
LSM-ML <linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>,
Anrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH -v3 -mm] LSM: Add security= boot parameter
Date: Mon, 3 Mar 2008 17:35:10 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20080303153510.GA6963@ubuntu> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <Xine.LNX.4.64.0803031910170.6729@us.intercode.com.au>
Hi James,
On Mon, Mar 03, 2008 at 07:29:22PM +1100, James Morris wrote:
> On Sun, 2 Mar 2008, Ahmed S. Darwish wrote:
>
> > Add the security= boot parameter. This is done to avoid LSM
> > registration clashes in case of more than one bult-in module.
> >
> > User can choose a security module to enable at boot. If no
> > security= boot parameter is specified, only the first LSM
> > asking for registration will be loaded. An invalid security
> > module name will be treated as if no module has been chosen.
> >
> > LSM modules must check now if they are allowed to register
> > by calling security_module_enable(ops) first. Modify SELinux
> > and SMACK to do so.
>
> I think this can be simplified by folding the logic into
> register_security(), rather than having a two-stage LSM registration
> process.
>
> So, this function would now look like
>
> int register_security(ops, *status);
>
> and set *status to LSM_WAS_CHOSEN (or similar) if the module being
> registered was also chosen via the security= parameter. If there is no
> value for the parameter, the first module to register is automatically
> chosen, to preserve existing behavior.
>
> The calling code can then decide what to do, e.g. not panic if
> registration failed and the LSM was not chosen; panic on failure when it
> was chosen.
>
I liked to do it like that at first, but I faced two problems:
SElinux (As you already know ;)) does the security setup of the initial
task before calling register_security. Would it be safe to do this
setup after registeration ?
Same case occurs for Smack, it does some locking initializations and
setup initial task's security before registration.
Personally, I feel that it's nicer to let the LSM know if it's
OK to initialize itself before hitting _the point of no return_ (registration).
Anyway, I have no problem to implement it using *status if my
concerns are wrong.
> > +static atomic_t security_ops_enabled = ATOMIC_INIT(-1);
>
> I'd suggest getting rid of this atomic and using a spinlock to protect the
> global chosen_lsm string, which is always filled when an LSM registers.
>
> >
> > +/* Save user chosen LSM */
> > +static int __init choose_lsm(char *str)
> > +{
> > + strncpy(chosen_lsm, str, SECURITY_NAME_MAX);
> > + chosen_lsm[SECURITY_NAME_MAX] = NULL;
>
> You should never need to set the last byte to NULL -- it's initialized to
> that and by definition should never be overwritten.
>
> > +int security_module_enable(struct security_operations *ops)
> > +{
> > + if (!ops || !ops->name)
> > + return 0;
>
> Lack of ops->name during registration needs to be a BUG_ON.
>
You'll find above three points fixed the next send. Thank you.
Regards,
--
"Better to light a candle, than curse the darkness"
Ahmed S. Darwish
Homepage: http://darwish.07.googlepages.com
Blog: http://darwish-07.blogspot.com
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2008-03-03 15:38 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 21+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2008-03-01 19:07 [RFC PATCH -mm] LSM: Add lsm= " Ahmed S. Darwish
2008-03-01 20:28 ` Casey Schaufler
2008-03-01 21:11 ` Adrian Bunk
2008-03-01 21:29 ` Casey Schaufler
2008-03-01 23:27 ` [PATCH -v2 -mm] LSM: Add security= " Ahmed S. Darwish
2008-03-02 3:41 ` Casey Schaufler
2008-03-02 7:55 ` Ahmed S. Darwish
2008-03-02 7:49 ` Ahmed S. Darwish
2008-03-02 10:59 ` [PATCH -v3 " Ahmed S. Darwish
2008-03-02 18:37 ` Casey Schaufler
2008-03-03 8:29 ` James Morris
2008-03-03 15:35 ` Ahmed S. Darwish [this message]
2008-03-03 15:54 ` Stephen Smalley
2008-03-03 21:24 ` [PATCH -v4 " Ahmed S. Darwish
2008-03-03 22:16 ` James Morris
2008-03-04 3:04 ` [PATCH -v5 " Ahmed S. Darwish
2008-03-04 4:07 ` James Morris
2008-03-05 22:29 ` Andrew Morton
2008-03-05 22:56 ` Ahmed S. Darwish
2008-03-05 23:06 ` Ahmed S. Darwish
2008-03-05 22:56 ` James Morris
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