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From: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> To: "Ahmed S. Darwish" <darwish.07@gmail.com> Cc: jmorris@namei.org, sds@tycho.nsa.gov, casey@schaufler-ca.com, bunk@kernel.org, chrisw@sous-sol.org, eparis@parisplace.org, adobriyan@sw.ru, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org Subject: Re: [PATCH -v5 -mm] LSM: Add security= boot parameter Date: Wed, 5 Mar 2008 14:29:48 -0800 [thread overview] Message-ID: <20080305142948.3d391d84.akpm@linux-foundation.org> (raw) In-Reply-To: <20080304030407.GA25686@ubuntu> On Tue, 4 Mar 2008 05:04:07 +0200 "Ahmed S. Darwish" <darwish.07@gmail.com> wrote: > Hi!, > > [ > Fix stuff mentioned by James in parent mail: > - use spinlocks instead of atomic counter (yes, this is clearer). > - remove redundant BUG_ON > - don't let LSMs loudly complain when they aren't chosen. > ] > > --> > > Add the security= boot parameter. This is done to avoid LSM > registration clashes in case of more than one bult-in module. > > User can choose a security module to enable at boot. If no > security= boot parameter is specified, only the first LSM > asking for registration will be loaded. An invalid security > module name will be treated as if no module has been chosen. > > LSM modules must check now if they are allowed to register > by calling security_module_enable(ops) first. Modify SELinux > and SMACK to do so. > > ... > > +/* Maximum number of letters for an LSM name string */ > +#define SECURITY_NAME_MAX 10 Is this long enough? > struct ctl_table; > struct audit_krule; > > ... > > -struct security_operations dummy_security_ops; > +struct security_operations dummy_security_ops = { "dummy" }; Please don't rely upon the layout of data structures in this manner. Use ".name = ". > > #define set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, function) \ > do { \ > diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c > index 1bf2ee4..def9fc0 100644 > --- a/security/security.c > +++ b/security/security.c > @@ -17,6 +17,9 @@ > #include <linux/kernel.h> > #include <linux/security.h> > > +/* Boot-time LSM user choice */ > +static spinlock_t chosen_lsm_lock; > +static char chosen_lsm[SECURITY_NAME_MAX + 1]; > > /* things that live in dummy.c */ > extern struct security_operations dummy_security_ops; > @@ -62,18 +65,59 @@ int __init security_init(void) > } > > security_ops = &dummy_security_ops; > + spin_lock_init(&chosen_lsm_lock); Please remove this and use compile-time initialisation with DEFINE_SPINLOCK. Do we actually need the lock? This code is only called at boot-time if I understand it correctly? Can chosen_lsm[] be __initdata? > do_security_initcalls(); > > return 0; > } > > +/* Save user chosen LSM */ > +static int __init choose_lsm(char *str) > +{ > + strncpy(chosen_lsm, str, SECURITY_NAME_MAX); > + return 1; > +} > +__setup("security=", choose_lsm); > + > +/** > + * security_module_enable - Load given security module on boot ? > + * @ops: a pointer to the struct security_operations that is to be checked. > + * > + * Each LSM must pass this method before registering its own operations > + * to avoid security registration races. > + * > + * Return true if: > + * -The passed LSM is the one chosen by user at boot time, > + * -or user didsn't specify a specific LSM and we're the first to ask > + * for registeration permissoin. > + * Otherwise, return false. > + */ > +int security_module_enable(struct security_operations *ops) > +{ > + int rc = 1; > + > + spin_lock(&chosen_lsm_lock); > + if (!*chosen_lsm) > + strncpy(chosen_lsm, ops->name, SECURITY_NAME_MAX); > + else if (strncmp(ops->name, chosen_lsm, SECURITY_NAME_MAX)) > + rc = 0; > + spin_unlock(&chosen_lsm_lock); > + > + if (rc) > + printk(KERN_INFO "Security: Loading '%s' security module.\n", > + ops->name); > + > + return rc; > +} I believe this can be __init. > + if (!security_module_enable(&selinux_ops)) { > + selinux_enabled = 0; > + return 0; > + } > + > > ... > > static __init int smack_init(void) > { > + if (!security_module_enable(&smack_ops)) > + return 0; > + > printk(KERN_INFO "Smack: Initializing.\n"); > > /* hm. selinux has a global selinux_enabled knob, but smack seems to be able to get by without one. +1 for smack ;)
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2008-03-05 22:31 UTC|newest] Thread overview: 21+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top 2008-03-01 19:07 [RFC PATCH -mm] LSM: Add lsm= boot parameter Ahmed S. Darwish 2008-03-01 20:28 ` Casey Schaufler 2008-03-01 21:11 ` Adrian Bunk 2008-03-01 21:29 ` Casey Schaufler 2008-03-01 23:27 ` [PATCH -v2 -mm] LSM: Add security= " Ahmed S. Darwish 2008-03-02 3:41 ` Casey Schaufler 2008-03-02 7:55 ` Ahmed S. Darwish 2008-03-02 7:49 ` Ahmed S. Darwish 2008-03-02 10:59 ` [PATCH -v3 " Ahmed S. Darwish 2008-03-02 18:37 ` Casey Schaufler 2008-03-03 8:29 ` James Morris 2008-03-03 15:35 ` Ahmed S. Darwish 2008-03-03 15:54 ` Stephen Smalley 2008-03-03 21:24 ` [PATCH -v4 " Ahmed S. Darwish 2008-03-03 22:16 ` James Morris 2008-03-04 3:04 ` [PATCH -v5 " Ahmed S. Darwish 2008-03-04 4:07 ` James Morris 2008-03-05 22:29 ` Andrew Morton [this message] 2008-03-05 22:56 ` Ahmed S. Darwish 2008-03-05 23:06 ` Ahmed S. Darwish 2008-03-05 22:56 ` James Morris
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