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From: "Ahmed S. Darwish" <darwish.07@gmail.com>
To: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: jmorris@namei.org, sds@tycho.nsa.gov, casey@schaufler-ca.com,
bunk@kernel.org, chrisw@sous-sol.org, eparis@parisplace.org,
adobriyan@sw.ru, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH -v5 -mm] LSM: Add security= boot parameter
Date: Thu, 6 Mar 2008 00:56:28 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20080305225628.GA6746@ubuntu> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20080305142948.3d391d84.akpm@linux-foundation.org>
On Wed, Mar 05, 2008 at 02:29:48PM -0800, Andrew Morton wrote:
> On Tue, 4 Mar 2008 05:04:07 +0200
> "Ahmed S. Darwish" <darwish.07@gmail.com> wrote:
>
...
> > ...
> >
> > +/* Maximum number of letters for an LSM name string */
> > +#define SECURITY_NAME_MAX 10
>
> Is this long enough?
>
I've judged from the four common applicants (selinux, smack,
apparmor, tomoyo) that 10 would be enough. Anyway this will be
easy to fix when something longer appears.
> > struct ctl_table;
> > struct audit_krule;
> >
> > ...
> >
> > -struct security_operations dummy_security_ops;
> > +struct security_operations dummy_security_ops = { "dummy" };
>
> Please don't rely upon the layout of data structures in this manner. Use
> ".name = ".
>
Will do.
> >
> > #define set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, function) \
> > do { \
> > diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
> > index 1bf2ee4..def9fc0 100644
> > --- a/security/security.c
> > +++ b/security/security.c
> > @@ -17,6 +17,9 @@
> > #include <linux/kernel.h>
> > #include <linux/security.h>
> >
> > +/* Boot-time LSM user choice */
> > +static spinlock_t chosen_lsm_lock;
> > +static char chosen_lsm[SECURITY_NAME_MAX + 1];
> >
> > /* things that live in dummy.c */
> > extern struct security_operations dummy_security_ops;
> > @@ -62,18 +65,59 @@ int __init security_init(void)
> > }
> >
> > security_ops = &dummy_security_ops;
> > + spin_lock_init(&chosen_lsm_lock);
>
> Please remove this and use compile-time initialisation with DEFINE_SPINLOCK.
>
Ooh I thought the dynamic one was better cause I remember I read it
somewhere on LWN that this is nicer for the RT-patches. I'll modify
it, no problem.
> Do we actually need the lock? This code is only called at boot-time if I
> understand it correctly?
>
In the latest version (-v7b, in another thread, CCed), security_module_enable()
is also used to let an LSM know if it's currently loaded or not. This
was done to avoid using a `smack_enabled' global.
I'll resend the v7b for -mm once the LSM devs give their ACKs for the
-rc3 one.
> Can chosen_lsm[] be __initdata?
>
You're the expert ;), I don't really understand the difference.
...
> >
> > +/**
> > + * security_module_enable - Load given security module on boot ?
> > + * @ops: a pointer to the struct security_operations that is to be checked.
> > + *
> > + * Each LSM must pass this method before registering its own operations
> > + * to avoid security registration races.
> > + *
> > + * Return true if:
> > + * -The passed LSM is the one chosen by user at boot time,
> > + * -or user didsn't specify a specific LSM and we're the first to ask
> > + * for registeration permissoin.
> > + * Otherwise, return false.
> > + */
> > +int security_module_enable(struct security_operations *ops)
> > +{
> > + int rc = 1;
> > +
> > + spin_lock(&chosen_lsm_lock);
> > + if (!*chosen_lsm)
> > + strncpy(chosen_lsm, ops->name, SECURITY_NAME_MAX);
> > + else if (strncmp(ops->name, chosen_lsm, SECURITY_NAME_MAX))
> > + rc = 0;
> > + spin_unlock(&chosen_lsm_lock);
> > +
> > + if (rc)
> > + printk(KERN_INFO "Security: Loading '%s' security module.\n",
> > + ops->name);
> > +
> > + return rc;
> > +}
>
> I believe this can be __init.
>
Will do.
> > + if (!security_module_enable(&selinux_ops)) {
> > + selinux_enabled = 0;
> > + return 0;
> > + }
> > +
> >
> > ...
> >
> > static __init int smack_init(void)
> > {
> > + if (!security_module_enable(&smack_ops))
> > + return 0;
> > +
> > printk(KERN_INFO "Smack: Initializing.\n");
> >
> > /*
>
> hm. selinux has a global selinux_enabled knob, but smack seems to be able
> to get by without one. +1 for smack ;)
>
Thanks to Linus ;).
I've sent a patch that added a similar global yesterday and it was
knocked-down by Linus after exactly 2 minutes.
The situation is handled now without a global in v7/v7b.
Regards,
--
"Better to light a candle, than curse the darkness"
Ahmed S. Darwish
Homepage: http://darwish.07.googlepages.com
Blog: http://darwish-07.blogspot.com
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2008-03-05 23:05 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 21+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2008-03-01 19:07 [RFC PATCH -mm] LSM: Add lsm= " Ahmed S. Darwish
2008-03-01 20:28 ` Casey Schaufler
2008-03-01 21:11 ` Adrian Bunk
2008-03-01 21:29 ` Casey Schaufler
2008-03-01 23:27 ` [PATCH -v2 -mm] LSM: Add security= " Ahmed S. Darwish
2008-03-02 3:41 ` Casey Schaufler
2008-03-02 7:55 ` Ahmed S. Darwish
2008-03-02 7:49 ` Ahmed S. Darwish
2008-03-02 10:59 ` [PATCH -v3 " Ahmed S. Darwish
2008-03-02 18:37 ` Casey Schaufler
2008-03-03 8:29 ` James Morris
2008-03-03 15:35 ` Ahmed S. Darwish
2008-03-03 15:54 ` Stephen Smalley
2008-03-03 21:24 ` [PATCH -v4 " Ahmed S. Darwish
2008-03-03 22:16 ` James Morris
2008-03-04 3:04 ` [PATCH -v5 " Ahmed S. Darwish
2008-03-04 4:07 ` James Morris
2008-03-05 22:29 ` Andrew Morton
2008-03-05 22:56 ` Ahmed S. Darwish [this message]
2008-03-05 23:06 ` Ahmed S. Darwish
2008-03-05 22:56 ` James Morris
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