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From: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, selinux@tycho.nsa.gov,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Cc: sds@tycho.nsa.gov, jmorris@nameil.org, serue@us.ibm.com,
morgan@kernel.org, casey@schaufler-ca.com, esandeen@redhat.com
Subject: [PATCH -v3 4/4] SELinux: use new cap_noaudit interface
Date: Fri, 07 Nov 2008 10:23:43 -0500 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20081107152343.10328.60753.stgit@paris.rdu.redhat.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20081107152326.10328.44330.stgit@paris.rdu.redhat.com>
Currently SELinux jumps through some ugly hoops to not audit a capbility
check when determining if a process has additional powers to override
memory limits or when trying to read/write illegal file labels. Use
the new noaudit call instead.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
---
security/selinux/hooks.c | 19 ++-----------------
1 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-)
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index 0d4ee8c..d3fd051 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -1978,16 +1978,8 @@ static int selinux_syslog(int type)
static int selinux_vm_enough_memory(struct mm_struct *mm, long pages)
{
int rc, cap_sys_admin = 0;
- struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
-
- rc = secondary_ops->capable(current, CAP_SYS_ADMIN, SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT);
- if (rc == 0)
- rc = avc_has_perm_noaudit(tsec->sid, tsec->sid,
- SECCLASS_CAPABILITY,
- CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_SYS_ADMIN),
- 0,
- NULL);
+ rc = selinux_capable(current, CAP_SYS_ADMIN, SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT);
if (rc == 0)
cap_sys_admin = 1;
@@ -2812,7 +2804,6 @@ static int selinux_inode_getsecurity(const struct inode *inode, const char *name
u32 size;
int error;
char *context = NULL;
- struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX))
@@ -2827,13 +2818,7 @@ static int selinux_inode_getsecurity(const struct inode *inode, const char *name
* and lack of permission just means that we fall back to the
* in-core context value, not a denial.
*/
- error = secondary_ops->capable(current, CAP_MAC_ADMIN, SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT);
- if (!error)
- error = avc_has_perm_noaudit(tsec->sid, tsec->sid,
- SECCLASS_CAPABILITY2,
- CAPABILITY2__MAC_ADMIN,
- 0,
- NULL);
+ error = selinux_capable(current, CAP_MAC_ADMIN, SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT);
if (!error)
error = security_sid_to_context_force(isec->sid, &context,
&size);
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2008-11-07 15:24 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 6+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2008-11-07 15:23 [PATCH -v3 1/4] SECURITY: new capable_noaudit interface Eric Paris
2008-11-07 15:23 ` [PATCH -v3 2/4] vm: use new has_capability_noaudit Eric Paris
2008-11-07 15:39 ` Stephen Smalley
2008-11-07 15:23 ` [PATCH -v3 3/4] filesystems: use has_capability_noaudit interface for reserved blocks checks Eric Paris
2008-11-07 15:23 ` Eric Paris [this message]
2008-11-07 15:38 ` [PATCH -v3 4/4] SELinux: use new cap_noaudit interface Stephen Smalley
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