[PATCH 3.18 00/12] 3.18.84-stable review

[PATCH 3.18 00/12] 3.18.84-stable review

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 3.18.84 release.
There are 12 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response
to this one.  If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please
let me know.

Responses should be made by Fri Nov 24 10:10:45 UTC 2017.
Anything received after that time might be too late.

The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:
	kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v3.x/stable-review/patch-3.18.84-rc1.gz
or in the git tree and branch at:
  git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git linux-3.18.y
and the diffstat can be found below.

thanks,

greg k-h

-------------
Pseudo-Shortlog of commits:

Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
    Linux 3.18.84-rc1

Jan Harkes <jaharkes@cs.cmu.edu>
    coda: fix 'kernel memory exposure attempt' in fsync

Corey Minyard <cminyard@mvista.com>
    ipmi: fix unsigned long underflow

alex chen <alex.chen@huawei.com>
    ocfs2: should wait dio before inode lock in ocfs2_setattr()

Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
    ima: do not update security.ima if appraisal status is not INTEGRITY_PASS

Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
    vlan: fix a use-after-free in vlan_device_event()

Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
    af_netlink: ensure that NLMSG_DONE never fails in dumps

Huacai Chen <chenhc@lemote.com>
    fealnx: Fix building error on MIPS

Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
    sctp: do not peel off an assoc from one netns to another one

Ye Yin <hustcat@gmail.com>
    netfilter/ipvs: clear ipvs_property flag when SKB net namespace changed

Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
    tcp: do not mangle skb->cb[] in tcp_make_synack()

Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
    net/sctp: Always set scope_id in sctp_inet6_skb_msgname

WANG Cong <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
    ipv6/dccp: do not inherit ipv6_mc_list from parent


-------------

Diffstat:

 Makefile                              |  4 ++--
 drivers/char/ipmi/ipmi_msghandler.c   | 10 ++++++----
 drivers/net/ethernet/fealnx.c         |  6 +++---
 fs/coda/upcall.c                      |  3 +--
 fs/ocfs2/file.c                       |  9 +++++++--
 include/linux/skbuff.h                |  7 +++++++
 net/8021q/vlan.c                      |  6 +++---
 net/core/skbuff.c                     |  1 +
 net/dccp/ipv6.c                       |  7 +++++++
 net/ipv4/tcp_output.c                 |  9 ++-------
 net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c                   |  2 ++
 net/netlink/af_netlink.c              | 17 +++++++++++------
 net/netlink/af_netlink.h              |  1 +
 net/sctp/ipv6.c                       |  2 ++
 net/sctp/socket.c                     |  4 ++++
 security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c |  3 +++
 16 files changed, 62 insertions(+), 29 deletions(-)

[PATCH 3.18 01/12] ipv6/dccp: do not inherit ipv6_mc_list from parent

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

3.18-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: WANG Cong <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>

commit 83eaddab4378db256d00d295bda6ca997cd13a52 upstream.

Like commit 657831ffc38e ("dccp/tcp: do not inherit mc_list from parent")
we should clear ipv6_mc_list etc. for IPv6 sockets too.

Cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Connor O'Brien <connoro@google.com>
[AmitP: cherry-picked this backported commit from android-3.18]
Signed-off-by: Amit Pundir <amit.pundir@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 net/dccp/ipv6.c     |    7 +++++++
 net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c |    2 ++
 2 files changed, 9 insertions(+)

--- a/net/dccp/ipv6.c
+++ b/net/dccp/ipv6.c
@@ -487,6 +487,9 @@ static struct sock *dccp_v6_request_recv
 		newsk->sk_backlog_rcv = dccp_v4_do_rcv;
 		newnp->pktoptions  = NULL;
 		newnp->opt	   = NULL;
+		newnp->ipv6_mc_list = NULL;
+		newnp->ipv6_ac_list = NULL;
+		newnp->ipv6_fl_list = NULL;
 		newnp->mcast_oif   = inet6_iif(skb);
 		newnp->mcast_hops  = ipv6_hdr(skb)->hop_limit;
 
@@ -562,6 +565,10 @@ static struct sock *dccp_v6_request_recv
 	/* Clone RX bits */
 	newnp->rxopt.all = np->rxopt.all;
 
+	newnp->ipv6_mc_list = NULL;
+	newnp->ipv6_ac_list = NULL;
+	newnp->ipv6_fl_list = NULL;
+
 	/* Clone pktoptions received with SYN */
 	newnp->pktoptions = NULL;
 	if (ireq->pktopts != NULL) {
--- a/net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c
+++ b/net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c
@@ -1113,6 +1113,7 @@ static struct sock *tcp_v6_syn_recv_sock
 		newtp->af_specific = &tcp_sock_ipv6_mapped_specific;
 #endif
 
+		newnp->ipv6_mc_list = NULL;
 		newnp->ipv6_ac_list = NULL;
 		newnp->ipv6_fl_list = NULL;
 		newnp->pktoptions  = NULL;
@@ -1184,6 +1185,7 @@ static struct sock *tcp_v6_syn_recv_sock
 	   First: no IPv4 options.
 	 */
 	newinet->inet_opt = NULL;
+	newnp->ipv6_mc_list = NULL;
 	newnp->ipv6_ac_list = NULL;
 	newnp->ipv6_fl_list = NULL;
 

[PATCH 3.18 02/12] net/sctp: Always set scope_id in sctp_inet6_skb_msgname

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

3.18-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>


[ Upstream commit 7c8a61d9ee1df0fb4747879fa67a99614eb62fec ]

Alexandar Potapenko while testing the kernel with KMSAN and syzkaller
discovered that in some configurations sctp would leak 4 bytes of
kernel stack.

Working with his reproducer I discovered that those 4 bytes that
are leaked is the scope id of an ipv6 address returned by recvmsg.

With a little code inspection and a shrewd guess I discovered that
sctp_inet6_skb_msgname only initializes the scope_id field for link
local ipv6 addresses to the interface index the link local address
pertains to instead of initializing the scope_id field for all ipv6
addresses.

That is almost reasonable as scope_id's are meaniningful only for link
local addresses.  Set the scope_id in all other cases to 0 which is
not a valid interface index to make it clear there is nothing useful
in the scope_id field.

There should be no danger of breaking userspace as the stack leak
guaranteed that previously meaningless random data was being returned.

Fixes: 372f525b495c ("SCTP:  Resync with LKSCTP tree.")
History-tree: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tglx/history.git
Reported-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Tested-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 net/sctp/ipv6.c |    2 ++
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)

--- a/net/sctp/ipv6.c
+++ b/net/sctp/ipv6.c
@@ -805,6 +805,8 @@ static void sctp_inet6_skb_msgname(struc
 		if (ipv6_addr_type(&addr->v6.sin6_addr) & IPV6_ADDR_LINKLOCAL) {
 			struct sctp_ulpevent *ev = sctp_skb2event(skb);
 			addr->v6.sin6_scope_id = ev->iif;
+		} else {
+			addr->v6.sin6_scope_id = 0;
 		}
 	}
 

[PATCH 3.18 03/12] tcp: do not mangle skb->cb[] in tcp_make_synack()

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

3.18-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>


[ Upstream commit 3b11775033dc87c3d161996c54507b15ba26414a ]

Christoph Paasch sent a patch to address the following issue :

tcp_make_synack() is leaving some TCP private info in skb->cb[],
then send the packet by other means than tcp_transmit_skb()

tcp_transmit_skb() makes sure to clear skb->cb[] to not confuse
IPv4/IPV6 stacks, but we have no such cleanup for SYNACK.

tcp_make_synack() should not use tcp_init_nondata_skb() :

tcp_init_nondata_skb() really should be limited to skbs put in write/rtx
queues (the ones that are only sent via tcp_transmit_skb())

This patch fixes the issue and should even save few cpu cycles ;)

Fixes: 971f10eca186 ("tcp: better TCP_SKB_CB layout to reduce cache line misses")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: Christoph Paasch <cpaasch@apple.com>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Paasch <cpaasch@apple.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 net/ipv4/tcp_output.c |    9 ++-------
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)

--- a/net/ipv4/tcp_output.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_output.c
@@ -2911,13 +2911,8 @@ struct sk_buff *tcp_make_synack(struct s
 	tcp_ecn_make_synack(req, th, sk);
 	th->source = htons(ireq->ir_num);
 	th->dest = ireq->ir_rmt_port;
-	/* Setting of flags are superfluous here for callers (and ECE is
-	 * not even correctly set)
-	 */
-	tcp_init_nondata_skb(skb, tcp_rsk(req)->snt_isn,
-			     TCPHDR_SYN | TCPHDR_ACK);
-
-	th->seq = htonl(TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->seq);
+	skb->ip_summed = CHECKSUM_PARTIAL;
+	th->seq = htonl(tcp_rsk(req)->snt_isn);
 	/* XXX data is queued and acked as is. No buffer/window check */
 	th->ack_seq = htonl(tcp_rsk(req)->rcv_nxt);
 

[PATCH 3.18 04/12] netfilter/ipvs: clear ipvs_property flag when SKB net namespace changed

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

3.18-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Ye Yin <hustcat@gmail.com>


[ Upstream commit 2b5ec1a5f9738ee7bf8f5ec0526e75e00362c48f ]

When run ipvs in two different network namespace at the same host, and one
ipvs transport network traffic to the other network namespace ipvs.
'ipvs_property' flag will make the second ipvs take no effect. So we should
clear 'ipvs_property' when SKB network namespace changed.

Fixes: 621e84d6f373 ("dev: introduce skb_scrub_packet()")
Signed-off-by: Ye Yin <hustcat@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Wei Zhou <chouryzhou@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Julian Anastasov <ja@ssi.bg>
Signed-off-by: Simon Horman <horms@verge.net.au>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 include/linux/skbuff.h |    7 +++++++
 net/core/skbuff.c      |    1 +
 2 files changed, 8 insertions(+)

--- a/include/linux/skbuff.h
+++ b/include/linux/skbuff.h
@@ -3117,6 +3117,13 @@ static inline void nf_reset_trace(struct
 #endif
 }
 
+static inline void ipvs_reset(struct sk_buff *skb)
+{
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IP_VS)
+	skb->ipvs_property = 0;
+#endif
+}
+
 /* Note: This doesn't put any conntrack and bridge info in dst. */
 static inline void __nf_copy(struct sk_buff *dst, const struct sk_buff *src,
 			     bool copy)
--- a/net/core/skbuff.c
+++ b/net/core/skbuff.c
@@ -4069,6 +4069,7 @@ void skb_scrub_packet(struct sk_buff *sk
 	if (!xnet)
 		return;
 
+	ipvs_reset(skb);
 	skb_orphan(skb);
 	skb->mark = 0;
 }

[PATCH 3.18 05/12] sctp: do not peel off an assoc from one netns to another one

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

3.18-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>


[ Upstream commit df80cd9b28b9ebaa284a41df611dbf3a2d05ca74 ]

Now when peeling off an association to the sock in another netns, all
transports in this assoc are not to be rehashed and keep use the old
key in hashtable.

As a transport uses sk->net as the hash key to insert into hashtable,
it would miss removing these transports from hashtable due to the new
netns when closing the sock and all transports are being freeed, then
later an use-after-free issue could be caused when looking up an asoc
and dereferencing those transports.

This is a very old issue since very beginning, ChunYu found it with
syzkaller fuzz testing with this series:

  socket$inet6_sctp()
  bind$inet6()
  sendto$inet6()
  unshare(0x40000000)
  getsockopt$inet_sctp6_SCTP_GET_ASSOC_ID_LIST()
  getsockopt$inet_sctp6_SCTP_SOCKOPT_PEELOFF()

This patch is to block this call when peeling one assoc off from one
netns to another one, so that the netns of all transport would not
go out-sync with the key in hashtable.

Note that this patch didn't fix it by rehashing transports, as it's
difficult to handle the situation when the tuple is already in use
in the new netns. Besides, no one would like to peel off one assoc
to another netns, considering ipaddrs, ifaces, etc. are usually
different.

Reported-by: ChunYu Wang <chunwang@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 net/sctp/socket.c |    4 ++++
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)

--- a/net/sctp/socket.c
+++ b/net/sctp/socket.c
@@ -4466,6 +4466,10 @@ int sctp_do_peeloff(struct sock *sk, sct
 	struct socket *sock;
 	int err = 0;
 
+	/* Do not peel off from one netns to another one. */
+	if (!net_eq(current->nsproxy->net_ns, sock_net(sk)))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
 	if (!asoc)
 		return -EINVAL;
 

[PATCH 3.18 06/12] fealnx: Fix building error on MIPS

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

3.18-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Huacai Chen <chenhc@lemote.com>


[ Upstream commit cc54c1d32e6a4bb3f116721abf900513173e4d02 ]

This patch try to fix the building error on MIPS. The reason is MIPS
has already defined the LONG macro, which conflicts with the LONG enum
in drivers/net/ethernet/fealnx.c.

Signed-off-by: Huacai Chen <chenhc@lemote.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 drivers/net/ethernet/fealnx.c |    6 +++---
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

--- a/drivers/net/ethernet/fealnx.c
+++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/fealnx.c
@@ -257,8 +257,8 @@ enum rx_desc_status_bits {
 	RXFSD = 0x00000800,	/* first descriptor */
 	RXLSD = 0x00000400,	/* last descriptor */
 	ErrorSummary = 0x80,	/* error summary */
-	RUNT = 0x40,		/* runt packet received */
-	LONG = 0x20,		/* long packet received */
+	RUNTPKT = 0x40,		/* runt packet received */
+	LONGPKT = 0x20,		/* long packet received */
 	FAE = 0x10,		/* frame align error */
 	CRC = 0x08,		/* crc error */
 	RXER = 0x04,		/* receive error */
@@ -1633,7 +1633,7 @@ static int netdev_rx(struct net_device *
 					       dev->name, rx_status);
 
 				dev->stats.rx_errors++;	/* end of a packet. */
-				if (rx_status & (LONG | RUNT))
+				if (rx_status & (LONGPKT | RUNTPKT))
 					dev->stats.rx_length_errors++;
 				if (rx_status & RXER)
 					dev->stats.rx_frame_errors++;

[PATCH 3.18 07/12] af_netlink: ensure that NLMSG_DONE never fails in dumps

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

3.18-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@zx2c4.com>


[ Upstream commit 0642840b8bb008528dbdf929cec9f65ac4231ad0 ]

The way people generally use netlink_dump is that they fill in the skb
as much as possible, breaking when nla_put returns an error. Then, they
get called again and start filling out the next skb, and again, and so
forth. The mechanism at work here is the ability for the iterative
dumping function to detect when the skb is filled up and not fill it
past the brim, waiting for a fresh skb for the rest of the data.

However, if the attributes are small and nicely packed, it is possible
that a dump callback function successfully fills in attributes until the
skb is of size 4080 (libmnl's default page-sized receive buffer size).
The dump function completes, satisfied, and then, if it happens to be
that this is actually the last skb, and no further ones are to be sent,
then netlink_dump will add on the NLMSG_DONE part:

  nlh = nlmsg_put_answer(skb, cb, NLMSG_DONE, sizeof(len), NLM_F_MULTI);

It is very important that netlink_dump does this, of course. However, in
this example, that call to nlmsg_put_answer will fail, because the
previous filling by the dump function did not leave it enough room. And
how could it possibly have done so? All of the nla_put variety of
functions simply check to see if the skb has enough tailroom,
independent of the context it is in.

In order to keep the important assumptions of all netlink dump users, it
is therefore important to give them an skb that has this end part of the
tail already reserved, so that the call to nlmsg_put_answer does not
fail. Otherwise, library authors are forced to find some bizarre sized
receive buffer that has a large modulo relative to the common sizes of
messages received, which is ugly and buggy.

This patch thus saves the NLMSG_DONE for an additional message, for the
case that things are dangerously close to the brim. This requires
keeping track of the errno from ->dump() across calls.

Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 net/netlink/af_netlink.c |   17 +++++++++++------
 net/netlink/af_netlink.h |    1 +
 2 files changed, 12 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)

--- a/net/netlink/af_netlink.c
+++ b/net/netlink/af_netlink.c
@@ -1927,7 +1927,7 @@ static int netlink_dump(struct sock *sk)
 	struct sk_buff *skb = NULL;
 	struct nlmsghdr *nlh;
 	struct module *module;
-	int len, err = -ENOBUFS;
+	int err = -ENOBUFS;
 	int alloc_size;
 
 	mutex_lock(nlk->cb_mutex);
@@ -1965,9 +1965,11 @@ static int netlink_dump(struct sock *sk)
 		goto errout_skb;
 	netlink_skb_set_owner_r(skb, sk);
 
-	len = cb->dump(skb, cb);
+	if (nlk->dump_done_errno > 0)
+		nlk->dump_done_errno = cb->dump(skb, cb);
 
-	if (len > 0) {
+	if (nlk->dump_done_errno > 0 ||
+	    skb_tailroom(skb) < nlmsg_total_size(sizeof(nlk->dump_done_errno))) {
 		mutex_unlock(nlk->cb_mutex);
 
 		if (sk_filter(sk, skb))
@@ -1977,13 +1979,15 @@ static int netlink_dump(struct sock *sk)
 		return 0;
 	}
 
-	nlh = nlmsg_put_answer(skb, cb, NLMSG_DONE, sizeof(len), NLM_F_MULTI);
-	if (!nlh)
+	nlh = nlmsg_put_answer(skb, cb, NLMSG_DONE,
+			       sizeof(nlk->dump_done_errno), NLM_F_MULTI);
+	if (WARN_ON(!nlh))
 		goto errout_skb;
 
 	nl_dump_check_consistent(cb, nlh);
 
-	memcpy(nlmsg_data(nlh), &len, sizeof(len));
+	memcpy(nlmsg_data(nlh), &nlk->dump_done_errno,
+	       sizeof(nlk->dump_done_errno));
 
 	if (sk_filter(sk, skb))
 		kfree_skb(skb);
@@ -2048,6 +2052,7 @@ int __netlink_dump_start(struct sock *ss
 	cb->skb = skb;
 
 	nlk->cb_running = true;
+	nlk->dump_done_errno = INT_MAX;
 
 	mutex_unlock(nlk->cb_mutex);
 
--- a/net/netlink/af_netlink.h
+++ b/net/netlink/af_netlink.h
@@ -35,6 +35,7 @@ struct netlink_sock {
 	size_t			max_recvmsg_len;
 	wait_queue_head_t	wait;
 	bool			cb_running;
+	int			dump_done_errno;
 	struct netlink_callback	cb;
 	struct mutex		*cb_mutex;
 	struct mutex		cb_def_mutex;

[PATCH 3.18 08/12] vlan: fix a use-after-free in vlan_device_event()

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

3.18-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>


[ Upstream commit 052d41c01b3a2e3371d66de569717353af489d63 ]

After refcnt reaches zero, vlan_vid_del() could free
dev->vlan_info via RCU:

	RCU_INIT_POINTER(dev->vlan_info, NULL);
	call_rcu(&vlan_info->rcu, vlan_info_rcu_free);

However, the pointer 'grp' still points to that memory
since it is set before vlan_vid_del():

        vlan_info = rtnl_dereference(dev->vlan_info);
        if (!vlan_info)
                goto out;
        grp = &vlan_info->grp;

Depends on when that RCU callback is scheduled, we could
trigger a use-after-free in vlan_group_for_each_dev()
right following this vlan_vid_del().

Fix it by moving vlan_vid_del() before setting grp. This
is also symmetric to the vlan_vid_add() we call in
vlan_device_event().

Reported-by: Fengguang Wu <fengguang.wu@intel.com>
Fixes: efc73f4bbc23 ("net: Fix memory leak - vlan_info struct")
Cc: Alexander Duyck <alexander.duyck@gmail.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Girish Moodalbail <girish.moodalbail@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Girish Moodalbail <girish.moodalbail@oracle.com>
Tested-by: Fengguang Wu <fengguang.wu@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 net/8021q/vlan.c |    6 +++---
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

--- a/net/8021q/vlan.c
+++ b/net/8021q/vlan.c
@@ -376,6 +376,9 @@ static int vlan_device_event(struct noti
 			dev->name);
 		vlan_vid_add(dev, htons(ETH_P_8021Q), 0);
 	}
+	if (event == NETDEV_DOWN &&
+	    (dev->features & NETIF_F_HW_VLAN_CTAG_FILTER))
+		vlan_vid_del(dev, htons(ETH_P_8021Q), 0);
 
 	vlan_info = rtnl_dereference(dev->vlan_info);
 	if (!vlan_info)
@@ -420,9 +423,6 @@ static int vlan_device_event(struct noti
 		break;
 
 	case NETDEV_DOWN:
-		if (dev->features & NETIF_F_HW_VLAN_CTAG_FILTER)
-			vlan_vid_del(dev, htons(ETH_P_8021Q), 0);
-
 		/* Put all VLANs for this dev in the down state too.  */
 		vlan_group_for_each_dev(grp, i, vlandev) {
 			flgs = vlandev->flags;

[PATCH 3.18 09/12] ima: do not update security.ima if appraisal status is not INTEGRITY_PASS

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

3.18-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>

commit 020aae3ee58c1af0e7ffc4e2cc9fe4dc630338cb upstream.

Commit b65a9cfc2c38 ("Untangling ima mess, part 2: deal with counters")
moved the call of ima_file_check() from may_open() to do_filp_open() at a
point where the file descriptor is already opened.

This breaks the assumption made by IMA that file descriptors being closed
belong to files whose access was granted by ima_file_check(). The
consequence is that security.ima and security.evm are updated with good
values, regardless of the current appraisal status.

For example, if a file does not have security.ima, IMA will create it after
opening the file for writing, even if access is denied. Access to the file
will be allowed afterwards.

Avoid this issue by checking the appraisal status before updating
security.ima.

Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c |    3 +++
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)

--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
@@ -297,6 +297,9 @@ void ima_update_xattr(struct integrity_i
 	if (iint->flags & IMA_DIGSIG)
 		return;
 
+	if (iint->ima_file_status != INTEGRITY_PASS)
+		return;
+
 	rc = ima_collect_measurement(iint, file, NULL, NULL);
 	if (rc < 0)
 		return;

[PATCH 3.18 10/12] ocfs2: should wait dio before inode lock in ocfs2_setattr()

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

3.18-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: alex chen <alex.chen@huawei.com>

commit 28f5a8a7c033cbf3e32277f4cc9c6afd74f05300 upstream.

we should wait dio requests to finish before inode lock in
ocfs2_setattr(), otherwise the following deadlock will happen:

process 1                  process 2                    process 3
truncate file 'A'          end_io of writing file 'A'   receiving the bast messages
ocfs2_setattr
 ocfs2_inode_lock_tracker
  ocfs2_inode_lock_full
 inode_dio_wait
  __inode_dio_wait
  -->waiting for all dio
  requests finish
                                                        dlm_proxy_ast_handler
                                                         dlm_do_local_bast
                                                          ocfs2_blocking_ast
                                                           ocfs2_generic_handle_bast
                                                            set OCFS2_LOCK_BLOCKED flag
                        dio_end_io
                         dio_bio_end_aio
                          dio_complete
                           ocfs2_dio_end_io
                            ocfs2_dio_end_io_write
                             ocfs2_inode_lock
                              __ocfs2_cluster_lock
                               ocfs2_wait_for_mask
                               -->waiting for OCFS2_LOCK_BLOCKED
                               flag to be cleared, that is waiting
                               for 'process 1' unlocking the inode lock
                           inode_dio_end
                           -->here dec the i_dio_count, but will never
                           be called, so a deadlock happened.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/59F81636.70508@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Alex Chen <alex.chen@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Jun Piao <piaojun@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Joseph Qi <jiangqi903@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Changwei Ge <ge.changwei@h3c.com>
Cc: Mark Fasheh <mfasheh@versity.com>
Cc: Joel Becker <jlbec@evilplan.org>
Cc: Junxiao Bi <junxiao.bi@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 fs/ocfs2/file.c |    9 +++++++--
 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

--- a/fs/ocfs2/file.c
+++ b/fs/ocfs2/file.c
@@ -1151,6 +1151,13 @@ int ocfs2_setattr(struct dentry *dentry,
 		dquot_initialize(inode);
 	size_change = S_ISREG(inode->i_mode) && attr->ia_valid & ATTR_SIZE;
 	if (size_change) {
+		/*
+		 * Here we should wait dio to finish before inode lock
+		 * to avoid a deadlock between ocfs2_setattr() and
+		 * ocfs2_dio_end_io_write()
+		 */
+		inode_dio_wait(inode);
+
 		status = ocfs2_rw_lock(inode, 1);
 		if (status < 0) {
 			mlog_errno(status);
@@ -1170,8 +1177,6 @@ int ocfs2_setattr(struct dentry *dentry,
 		if (status)
 			goto bail_unlock;
 
-		inode_dio_wait(inode);
-
 		if (i_size_read(inode) >= attr->ia_size) {
 			if (ocfs2_should_order_data(inode)) {
 				status = ocfs2_begin_ordered_truncate(inode,

[PATCH 3.18 11/12] ipmi: fix unsigned long underflow

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

3.18-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Corey Minyard <cminyard@mvista.com>

commit 392a17b10ec4320d3c0e96e2a23ebaad1123b989 upstream.

When I set the timeout to a specific value such as 500ms, the timeout
event will not happen in time due to the overflow in function
check_msg_timeout:
...
	ent->timeout -= timeout_period;
	if (ent->timeout > 0)
		return;
...

The type of timeout_period is long, but ent->timeout is unsigned long.
This patch makes the type consistent.

Reported-by: Weilong Chen <chenweilong@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Corey Minyard <cminyard@mvista.com>
Tested-by: Weilong Chen <chenweilong@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 drivers/char/ipmi/ipmi_msghandler.c |   10 ++++++----
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

--- a/drivers/char/ipmi/ipmi_msghandler.c
+++ b/drivers/char/ipmi/ipmi_msghandler.c
@@ -4010,7 +4010,8 @@ smi_from_recv_msg(ipmi_smi_t intf, struc
 }
 
 static void check_msg_timeout(ipmi_smi_t intf, struct seq_table *ent,
-			      struct list_head *timeouts, long timeout_period,
+			      struct list_head *timeouts,
+			      unsigned long timeout_period,
 			      int slot, unsigned long *flags,
 			      unsigned int *waiting_msgs)
 {
@@ -4023,8 +4024,8 @@ static void check_msg_timeout(ipmi_smi_t
 	if (!ent->inuse)
 		return;
 
-	ent->timeout -= timeout_period;
-	if (ent->timeout > 0) {
+	if (timeout_period < ent->timeout) {
+		ent->timeout -= timeout_period;
 		(*waiting_msgs)++;
 		return;
 	}
@@ -4091,7 +4092,8 @@ static void check_msg_timeout(ipmi_smi_t
 	}
 }
 
-static unsigned int ipmi_timeout_handler(ipmi_smi_t intf, long timeout_period)
+static unsigned int ipmi_timeout_handler(ipmi_smi_t intf,
+					 unsigned long timeout_period)
 {
 	struct list_head     timeouts;
 	struct ipmi_recv_msg *msg, *msg2;

[PATCH 3.18 12/12] coda: fix kernel memory exposure attempt in fsync

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

3.18-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Jan Harkes <jaharkes@cs.cmu.edu>

commit d337b66a4c52c7b04eec661d86c2ef6e168965a2 upstream.

When an application called fsync on a file in Coda a small request with
just the file identifier was allocated, but the declared length was set
to the size of union of all possible upcall requests.

This bug has been around for a very long time and is now caught by the
extra checking in usercopy that was introduced in Linux-4.8.

The exposure happens when the Coda cache manager process reads the fsync
upcall request at which point it is killed. As a result there is nobody
servicing any further upcalls, trapping any processes that try to access
the mounted Coda filesystem.

Signed-off-by: Jan Harkes <jaharkes@cs.cmu.edu>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 fs/coda/upcall.c |    3 +--
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 2 deletions(-)

--- a/fs/coda/upcall.c
+++ b/fs/coda/upcall.c
@@ -446,8 +446,7 @@ int venus_fsync(struct super_block *sb,
 	UPARG(CODA_FSYNC);
 
 	inp->coda_fsync.VFid = *fid;
-	error = coda_upcall(coda_vcp(sb), sizeof(union inputArgs),
-			    &outsize, inp);
+	error = coda_upcall(coda_vcp(sb), insize, &outsize, inp);
 
 	CODA_FREE(inp, insize);
 	return error;

Re: [PATCH 3.18 00/12] 3.18.84-stable review

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

On Wed, Nov 22, 2017 at 06:03:00AM -0800, kernelci.org bot wrote:
> stable-rc/linux-3.18.y boot: 44 boots: 2 failed, 42 passed (v3.18.83-12-g09d9c198f334)
> 
> Full Boot Summary: https://kernelci.org/boot/all/job/stable-rc/branch/linux-3.18.y/kernel/v3.18.83-12-g09d9c198f334/
> Full Build Summary: https://kernelci.org/build/stable-rc/branch/linux-3.18.y/kernel/v3.18.83-12-g09d9c198f334/
> 
> Tree: stable-rc
> Branch: linux-3.18.y
> Git Describe: v3.18.83-12-g09d9c198f334
> Git Commit: 09d9c198f3343abad9fceeab61c33c351793aac7
> Git URL: http://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git
> Tested: 18 unique boards, 9 SoC families, 13 builds out of 177
> 
> Boot Regressions Detected:
> 
> arm:
> 
>     multi_v7_defconfig:
>         armada-xp-openblocks-ax3-4:
>             lab-free-electrons: new failure (last pass: v3.18.83-10-g097340129e75)
> 
>     sama5_defconfig:
>         at91-sama5d3_xplained_rootfs:nfs:
>             lab-free-electrons: new failure (last pass: v3.18.83-10-g097340129e75)

Are these "real"?

thanks,

greg k-h

Re: [PATCH 3.18 00/12] 3.18.84-stable review

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

On Wed, Nov 22, 2017 at 03:49:03PM -0800, Kevin Hilman wrote:
> kernelci.org bot <bot@kernelci.org> writes:
> 
> > stable-rc/linux-3.18.y boot: 44 boots: 2 failed, 42 passed (v3.18.83-12-g09d9c198f334)
> >
> > Full Boot Summary: https://kernelci.org/boot/all/job/stable-rc/branch/linux-3.18.y/kernel/v3.18.83-12-g09d9c198f334/
> > Full Build Summary: https://kernelci.org/build/stable-rc/branch/linux-3.18.y/kernel/v3.18.83-12-g09d9c198f334/
> >
> > Tree: stable-rc
> > Branch: linux-3.18.y
> > Git Describe: v3.18.83-12-g09d9c198f334
> > Git Commit: 09d9c198f3343abad9fceeab61c33c351793aac7
> > Git URL: http://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git
> > Tested: 18 unique boards, 9 SoC families, 13 builds out of 177
> >
> > Boot Regressions Detected:
> >
> > arm:
> >
> >     multi_v7_defconfig:
> >         armada-xp-openblocks-ax3-4:
> >             lab-free-electrons: new failure (last pass: v3.18.83-10-g097340129e75)
> >
> >     sama5_defconfig:
> >         at91-sama5d3_xplained_rootfs:nfs:
> >             lab-free-electrons: new failure (last pass: v3.18.83-10-g097340129e75)
> 
> These are both passing now in the latest 3.18.y branch[1], so whatever it
> was is now gone:

Thanks for the manual verification on all of these.

greg k-h

Re: [PATCH 3.18 00/12] 3.18.84-stable review

[Guenter Roeck]

On Wed, Nov 22, 2017 at 11:11:43AM +0100, Greg Kroah-Hartman wrote:
> This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 3.18.84 release.
> There are 12 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response
> to this one.  If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please
> let me know.
> 
> Responses should be made by Fri Nov 24 10:10:45 UTC 2017.
> Anything received after that time might be too late.
> 

Build results:
	total: 136 pass: 136 fail: 0
Qemu test results:
	total: 112 pass: 112 fail: 0

Details are available at http://kerneltests.org/builders.

Guenter