From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1752211AbeCNUUy (ORCPT ); Wed, 14 Mar 2018 16:20:54 -0400 Received: from mx0b-001b2d01.pphosted.com ([148.163.158.5]:42426 "EHLO mx0a-001b2d01.pphosted.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-FAIL) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1752189AbeCNUUu (ORCPT ); Wed, 14 Mar 2018 16:20:50 -0400 From: Thiago Jung Bauermann To: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, James Morris , "Serge E. Hallyn" , Mimi Zohar , Dmitry Kasatkin , Thiago Jung Bauermann Subject: [PATCH 4/4] integrity: Introduce struct evm_xattr Date: Wed, 14 Mar 2018 17:20:20 -0300 X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.14.3 In-Reply-To: <20180314202020.3794-1-bauerman@linux.vnet.ibm.com> References: <20180314202020.3794-1-bauerman@linux.vnet.ibm.com> X-TM-AS-GCONF: 00 x-cbid: 18031420-0048-0000-0000-0000024A902F X-IBM-SpamModules-Scores: X-IBM-SpamModules-Versions: BY=3.00008674; HX=3.00000241; KW=3.00000007; PH=3.00000004; SC=3.00000254; SDB=6.01003063; UDB=6.00510447; IPR=6.00782393; MB=3.00020035; MTD=3.00000008; XFM=3.00000015; UTC=2018-03-14 20:20:47 X-IBM-AV-DETECTION: SAVI=unused REMOTE=unused XFE=unused x-cbparentid: 18031420-0049-0000-0000-000044700822 Message-Id: <20180314202020.3794-5-bauerman@linux.vnet.ibm.com> X-Proofpoint-Virus-Version: vendor=fsecure engine=2.50.10432:,, definitions=2018-03-14_11:,, signatures=0 X-Proofpoint-Spam-Details: rule=outbound_notspam policy=outbound score=0 priorityscore=1501 malwarescore=0 suspectscore=1 phishscore=0 bulkscore=0 spamscore=0 clxscore=1015 lowpriorityscore=0 impostorscore=0 adultscore=0 classifier=spam adjust=0 reason=mlx scancount=1 engine=8.0.1-1709140000 definitions=main-1803140218 Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Even though struct evm_ima_xattr_data includes a fixed-size array to hold a SHA1 digest, most of the code ignores the array and uses the struct to mean "type indicator followed by data of unspecified size" and tracks the real size of what the struct represents in a separate length variable. The only exception to that is the EVM code, which correctly uses the definition of struct evm_ima_xattr_data. This patch makes this explicit in the code by removing the length specification from the array in struct evm_ima_xattr_data. It also changes the name of the element from digest to data, since in most places the array doesn't hold a digest. A separate struct evm_xattr is introduced, with the original definition of evm_ima_xattr_data to be used in the places that actually expect that definition. Signed-off-by: Thiago Jung Bauermann --- security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c | 4 ++-- security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c | 10 +++++----- security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c | 7 ++++--- security/integrity/integrity.h | 5 +++++ 4 files changed, 16 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-) diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c b/security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c index a46fba322340..86511cf171c1 100644 --- a/security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c +++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c @@ -302,7 +302,7 @@ int evm_update_evmxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name, const char *xattr_value, size_t xattr_value_len) { struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry); - struct evm_ima_xattr_data xattr_data; + struct evm_xattr xattr_data; int rc = 0; /* @@ -318,7 +318,7 @@ int evm_update_evmxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name, rc = evm_calc_hmac(dentry, xattr_name, xattr_value, xattr_value_len, xattr_data.digest); if (rc == 0) { - xattr_data.type = EVM_XATTR_HMAC; + xattr_data.data.type = EVM_XATTR_HMAC; rc = __vfs_setxattr_noperm(dentry, XATTR_NAME_EVM, &xattr_data, sizeof(xattr_data), 0); diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c index 7a968faca739..cd17744d4749 100644 --- a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c +++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c @@ -122,7 +122,7 @@ static enum integrity_status evm_verify_hmac(struct dentry *dentry, struct integrity_iint_cache *iint) { struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_data = NULL; - struct evm_ima_xattr_data calc; + struct evm_xattr calc; enum integrity_status evm_status = INTEGRITY_PASS; int rc, xattr_len; @@ -154,7 +154,7 @@ static enum integrity_status evm_verify_hmac(struct dentry *dentry, /* check value type */ switch (xattr_data->type) { case EVM_XATTR_HMAC: - if (xattr_len != sizeof(struct evm_ima_xattr_data)) { + if (xattr_len != sizeof(struct evm_xattr)) { evm_status = INTEGRITY_FAIL; goto out; } @@ -162,7 +162,7 @@ static enum integrity_status evm_verify_hmac(struct dentry *dentry, xattr_value_len, calc.digest); if (rc) break; - rc = crypto_memneq(xattr_data->digest, calc.digest, + rc = crypto_memneq(xattr_data->data, calc.digest, sizeof(calc.digest)); if (rc) rc = -EINVAL; @@ -501,7 +501,7 @@ int evm_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, const struct xattr *lsm_xattr, struct xattr *evm_xattr) { - struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_data; + struct evm_xattr *xattr_data; int rc; if (!evm_key_loaded() || !evm_protected_xattr(lsm_xattr->name)) @@ -511,7 +511,7 @@ int evm_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, if (!xattr_data) return -ENOMEM; - xattr_data->type = EVM_XATTR_HMAC; + xattr_data->data.type = EVM_XATTR_HMAC; rc = evm_init_hmac(inode, lsm_xattr, xattr_data->digest); if (rc < 0) goto out; diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c index dd10ecbdce45..96e0f95c294b 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c @@ -167,7 +167,8 @@ enum hash_algo ima_get_hash_algo(struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value, return sig->hash_algo; break; case IMA_XATTR_DIGEST_NG: - ret = xattr_value->digest[0]; + /* first byte contains algorithm id */ + ret = xattr_value->data[0]; if (ret < HASH_ALGO__LAST) return ret; break; @@ -175,7 +176,7 @@ enum hash_algo ima_get_hash_algo(struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value, /* this is for backward compatibility */ if (xattr_len == 21) { unsigned int zero = 0; - if (!memcmp(&xattr_value->digest[16], &zero, 4)) + if (!memcmp(&xattr_value->data[16], &zero, 4)) return HASH_ALGO_MD5; else return HASH_ALGO_SHA1; @@ -272,7 +273,7 @@ int ima_appraise_measurement(enum ima_hooks func, /* xattr length may be longer. md5 hash in previous version occupied 20 bytes in xattr, instead of 16 */ - rc = memcmp(&xattr_value->digest[hash_start], + rc = memcmp(&xattr_value->data[hash_start], iint->ima_hash->digest, iint->ima_hash->length); else diff --git a/security/integrity/integrity.h b/security/integrity/integrity.h index 5e58e02ba8dc..79799a0d9195 100644 --- a/security/integrity/integrity.h +++ b/security/integrity/integrity.h @@ -78,6 +78,11 @@ enum evm_ima_xattr_type { struct evm_ima_xattr_data { u8 type; + u8 data[]; +} __packed; + +struct evm_xattr { + struct evm_ima_xattr_data data; u8 digest[SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE]; } __packed;