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* [PATCH] net: atm: Fix potential Spectre v1
@ 2018-05-03 18:45 Gustavo A. R. Silva
  2018-05-04 16:54 ` David Miller
  0 siblings, 1 reply; 2+ messages in thread
From: Gustavo A. R. Silva @ 2018-05-03 18:45 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: David S. Miller; +Cc: netdev, linux-kernel, Gustavo A. R. Silva

ioc_data.dev_num can be controlled by user-space, hence leading to
a potential exploitation of the Spectre variant 1 vulnerability.

This issue was detected with the help of Smatch:
net/atm/lec.c:702 lec_vcc_attach() warn: potential spectre issue
'dev_lec'

Fix this by sanitizing ioc_data.dev_num before using it to index
dev_lec. Also, notice that there is another instance in which array
dev_lec is being indexed using ioc_data.dev_num at line 705:
lec_vcc_added(netdev_priv(dev_lec[ioc_data.dev_num]),

Notice that given that speculation windows are large, the policy is
to kill the speculation on the first load and not worry if it can be
completed with a dependent load/store [1].

[1] https://marc.info/?l=linux-kernel&m=152449131114778&w=2

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavo@embeddedor.com>
---
 net/atm/lec.c | 9 +++++++--
 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/net/atm/lec.c b/net/atm/lec.c
index 01d5d20..3138a86 100644
--- a/net/atm/lec.c
+++ b/net/atm/lec.c
@@ -41,6 +41,9 @@ static unsigned char bridge_ula_lec[] = { 0x01, 0x80, 0xc2, 0x00, 0x00 };
 #include <linux/module.h>
 #include <linux/init.h>
 
+/* Hardening for Spectre-v1 */
+#include <linux/nospec.h>
+
 #include "lec.h"
 #include "lec_arpc.h"
 #include "resources.h"
@@ -687,8 +690,10 @@ static int lec_vcc_attach(struct atm_vcc *vcc, void __user *arg)
 	bytes_left = copy_from_user(&ioc_data, arg, sizeof(struct atmlec_ioc));
 	if (bytes_left != 0)
 		pr_info("copy from user failed for %d bytes\n", bytes_left);
-	if (ioc_data.dev_num < 0 || ioc_data.dev_num >= MAX_LEC_ITF ||
-	    !dev_lec[ioc_data.dev_num])
+	if (ioc_data.dev_num < 0 || ioc_data.dev_num >= MAX_LEC_ITF)
+		return -EINVAL;
+	ioc_data.dev_num = array_index_nospec(ioc_data.dev_num, MAX_LEC_ITF);
+	if (!dev_lec[ioc_data.dev_num])
 		return -EINVAL;
 	vpriv = kmalloc(sizeof(struct lec_vcc_priv), GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (!vpriv)
-- 
2.7.4

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 2+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCH] net: atm: Fix potential Spectre v1
  2018-05-03 18:45 [PATCH] net: atm: Fix potential Spectre v1 Gustavo A. R. Silva
@ 2018-05-04 16:54 ` David Miller
  0 siblings, 0 replies; 2+ messages in thread
From: David Miller @ 2018-05-04 16:54 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: gustavo; +Cc: netdev, linux-kernel

From: "Gustavo A. R. Silva" <gustavo@embeddedor.com>
Date: Thu, 3 May 2018 13:45:58 -0500

> ioc_data.dev_num can be controlled by user-space, hence leading to
> a potential exploitation of the Spectre variant 1 vulnerability.
> 
> This issue was detected with the help of Smatch:
> net/atm/lec.c:702 lec_vcc_attach() warn: potential spectre issue
> 'dev_lec'
> 
> Fix this by sanitizing ioc_data.dev_num before using it to index
> dev_lec. Also, notice that there is another instance in which array
> dev_lec is being indexed using ioc_data.dev_num at line 705:
> lec_vcc_added(netdev_priv(dev_lec[ioc_data.dev_num]),
> 
> Notice that given that speculation windows are large, the policy is
> to kill the speculation on the first load and not worry if it can be
> completed with a dependent load/store [1].
> 
> [1] https://marc.info/?l=linux-kernel&m=152449131114778&w=2
> 
> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
> Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavo@embeddedor.com>

Applied and queued up for -stable, thanks.

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 2+ messages in thread

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