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From: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@gmail.com>
To: Dmitry Safonov <dima@arista.com>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
Alexey Izbyshev <izbyshev@ispras.ru>,
Alexander Monakov <amonakov@ispras.ru>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>, Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>,
Dmitry Safonov <0x7f454c46@gmail.com>,
"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>, Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
"Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
linux-mm@kvack.org, x86@kernel.org, stable@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH] x86/mm: Drop TS_COMPAT on 64-bit exec() syscall
Date: Fri, 18 May 2018 10:20:26 +0300 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20180518072026.GY31735@uranus> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20180517233510.24996-1-dima@arista.com>
On Fri, May 18, 2018 at 12:35:10AM +0100, Dmitry Safonov wrote:
> The x86 mmap() code selects the mmap base for an allocation depending on
> the bitness of the syscall. For 64bit sycalls it select mm->mmap_base and
> for 32bit mm->mmap_compat_base.
>
> exec() calls mmap() which in turn uses in_compat_syscall() to check whether
> the mapping is for a 32bit or a 64bit task. The decision is made on the
> following criteria:
>
> ia32 child->thread.status & TS_COMPAT
> x32 child->pt_regs.orig_ax & __X32_SYSCALL_BIT
> ia64 !ia32 && !x32
>
> __set_personality_x32() was dropping TS_COMPAT flag, but
> set_personality_64bit() has kept compat syscall flag making
> in_compat_syscall() return true during the first exec() syscall.
>
> Which in result has user-visible effects, mentioned by Alexey:
> 1) It breaks ASAN
> $ gcc -fsanitize=address wrap.c -o wrap-asan
> $ ./wrap32 ./wrap-asan true
> ==1217==Shadow memory range interleaves with an existing memory mapping. ASan cannot proceed correctly. ABORTING.
> ==1217==ASan shadow was supposed to be located in the [0x00007fff7000-0x10007fff7fff] range.
> ==1217==Process memory map follows:
> 0x000000400000-0x000000401000 /home/izbyshev/test/gcc/asan-exec-from-32bit/wrap-asan
> 0x000000600000-0x000000601000 /home/izbyshev/test/gcc/asan-exec-from-32bit/wrap-asan
> 0x000000601000-0x000000602000 /home/izbyshev/test/gcc/asan-exec-from-32bit/wrap-asan
> 0x0000f7dbd000-0x0000f7de2000 /lib64/ld-2.27.so
> 0x0000f7fe2000-0x0000f7fe3000 /lib64/ld-2.27.so
> 0x0000f7fe3000-0x0000f7fe4000 /lib64/ld-2.27.so
> 0x0000f7fe4000-0x0000f7fe5000
> 0x7fed9abff000-0x7fed9af54000
> 0x7fed9af54000-0x7fed9af6b000 /lib64/libgcc_s.so.1
> [snip]
>
> 2) It doesn't seem to be great for security if an attacker always knows
> that ld.so is going to be mapped into the first 4GB in this case
> (the same thing happens for PIEs as well).
>
> The testcase:
> $ cat wrap.c
>
> int main(int argc, char *argv[]) {
> execvp(argv[1], &argv[1]);
> return 127;
> }
>
> $ gcc wrap.c -o wrap
> $ LD_SHOW_AUXV=1 ./wrap ./wrap true |& grep AT_BASE
> AT_BASE: 0x7f63b8309000
> AT_BASE: 0x7faec143c000
> AT_BASE: 0x7fbdb25fa000
>
> $ gcc -m32 wrap.c -o wrap32
> $ LD_SHOW_AUXV=1 ./wrap32 ./wrap true |& grep AT_BASE
> AT_BASE: 0xf7eff000
> AT_BASE: 0xf7cee000
> AT_BASE: 0x7f8b9774e000
>
> Fixes:
> commit 1b028f784e8c ("x86/mm: Introduce mmap_compat_base() for 32-bit mmap()")
> commit ada26481dfe6 ("x86/mm: Make in_compat_syscall() work during exec")
>
> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
> Cc: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@openvz.org>
> Cc: Dmitry Safonov <0x7f454c46@gmail.com>
> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
> Cc: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
> Cc: <linux-mm@kvack.org>
> Cc: <x86@kernel.org>
> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.12+
> Reported-by: Alexey Izbyshev <izbyshev@ispras.ru>
> Bisected-by: Alexander Monakov <amonakov@ispras.ru>
> Investigated-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
> Signed-off-by: Dmitry Safonov <dima@arista.com>
Reviewed-by: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@openvz.org>
Thanks a lot! (At first I had to scratch my head for a second
to realize that the key moment is executing 64 bit application
from inside of a compat process :-)
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2018-05-18 7:20 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 13+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2018-05-17 23:35 Dmitry Safonov
2018-05-17 23:40 ` Dmitry Safonov
2018-05-18 22:03 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-05-18 23:10 ` Dmitry Safonov
2018-05-18 23:16 ` Dmitry Safonov
2018-05-18 23:25 ` Dmitry Safonov
2018-05-19 2:05 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-05-19 2:22 ` Dmitry Safonov
2018-05-19 2:25 ` Dmitry Safonov
2018-05-19 2:33 ` Dmitry Safonov
2018-05-18 7:20 ` Cyrill Gorcunov [this message]
2018-05-19 10:24 ` [tip:x86/urgent] " tip-bot for Dmitry Safonov
2018-05-19 10:34 ` tip-bot for Dmitry Safonov
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