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From: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> To: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>, y2038 Mailman List <y2038@lists.linaro.org>, Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>, the arch/x86 maintainers <x86@kernel.org>, Linux API <linux-api@vger.kernel.org>, linux-arch <linux-arch@vger.kernel.org>, Paul Eggert <eggert@cs.ucla.edu>, Richard Henderson <rth@twiddle.net>, Ivan Kokshaysky <ink@jurassic.park.msu.ru>, Matt Turner <mattst88@gmail.com>, Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>, Dominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net>, Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>, Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>, linux-alpha@vger.kernel.org, Deepa Dinamani <deepa.kernel@gmail.com> Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 2/2] rusage: allow 64-bit times ru_utime/ru_stime Date: Mon, 25 Jun 2018 11:14:26 +0200 [thread overview] Message-ID: <20180625091426.GA18351@gmail.com> (raw) In-Reply-To: <87y3f31wsv.fsf@xmission.com> * Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com> wrote: > Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> writes: > > > * Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com> wrote: > > > >> The trouble with attributes is that means you can't filter your system > >> call arguments with seccomp. [...] > > > > There's nothing keeping seccomp from securely fetching those arguments and > > extending filtering to them as well ... > > > > Allowing that would make sense for a lot of other system calls as > > well. > > Possibly. The challenge is that if the fetch for the kernel to use > those arguments is different from the fetch of seccomp to test those > arguments you have a time of test vs time of use race. Those fetched values should obviously then be used to call permitted system calls. > Given the location of the seccomp hook at the kernel user space border > there is no easy way for seccomp to share the fetch with the system > call itself. > > So I don't see how seccomp could perform the fetch securely. Looks like more of a seccomp mis-design/mis-implementation than some fundamental problem. Mis-designed security features should not hinder system call design. Thanks, Ingo
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2018-06-25 9:14 UTC|newest] Thread overview: 13+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top 2018-04-20 12:05 [PATCH v2 1/2] y2038: rusage: Use __kernel_old_timeval for process times Arnd Bergmann 2018-04-20 12:05 ` [PATCH v2 2/2] rusage: allow 64-bit times ru_utime/ru_stime Arnd Bergmann 2018-06-21 15:49 ` Ingo Molnar 2018-06-21 16:01 ` Arnd Bergmann 2018-06-21 16:11 ` Ingo Molnar 2018-06-21 16:25 ` Arnd Bergmann 2018-06-22 2:16 ` Ingo Molnar 2018-06-22 17:45 ` Eric W. Biederman 2018-06-24 7:12 ` Ingo Molnar 2018-06-25 1:26 ` Eric W. Biederman 2018-06-25 9:14 ` Ingo Molnar [this message] 2018-06-25 16:21 ` Eric W. Biederman 2018-06-25 11:42 ` Arnd Bergmann
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