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From: Aleksa Sarai <cyphar@cyphar.com>
To: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>,
"Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>,
Christian Brauner <christian@brauner.io>,
Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>,
"J. Bruce Fields" <bfields@fieldses.org>,
Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>,
David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>, Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>,
Tycho Andersen <tycho@tycho.ws>,
David Drysdale <drysdale@google.com>,
dev@opencontainers.org,
Linux Containers <containers@lists.linux-foundation.org>,
Linux FS Devel <linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org>,
LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
linux-arch <linux-arch@vger.kernel.org>,
Linux API <linux-api@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 1/3] namei: implement O_BENEATH-style AT_* flags
Date: Wed, 10 Oct 2018 18:28:43 +1100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20181010072843.xnmqf7mktf25o4w7@ryuk> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20181010070747.byi2itbi4j42gynq@ryuk>
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On 2018-10-10, Aleksa Sarai <cyphar@cyphar.com> wrote:
> On 2018-10-09, Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> wrote:
> > On Mon, Oct 8, 2018 at 11:53 PM Aleksa Sarai <cyphar@cyphar.com> wrote:
> > > * AT_NO_PROCLINK: Disallows ->get_link "symlink" jumping. This is a very
> > > specific restriction, and it exists because /proc/$pid/fd/...
> > > "symlinks" allow for access outside nd->root and pose risk to
> > > container runtimes that don't want to be tricked into accessing a host
> > > path (but do want to allow no-funny-business symlink resolution).
> >
> > Can you elaborate on the use case?
> >
> [...]
> I think that AT_BENEATH allowing only proclinks that result in you
> being under the root is something we might want in the future, but I
> think there are some cases where you want to be _very_ sure you don't
> follow a proclink (now or in the future).
> [...]
Sorry, just to clarify this point a bit more.
At the moment, "proclinks" are entirely disabled with AT_BENEATH. This
is a (hopefully) temporary measure until it's decided _how_ they should
be allowed. Personally I think we should allow them if they follow the
same requirement as ".." escapes (that __d_path can resolve them).
But then the question arises -- what if we're looking at a never-mounted
pseudo-filesystem dentry (see the ->d_dname code in d_path)? If we don't
allow it then we'd probably disallow quite a few cases where you'd want
to allow access (nsfs proclinks come immediately to mind).
*But* if we allow it then there's no real way to tell if the container
process has tricked us into opening something we shouldn't (like an open
file descriptor to a memfd or pipe related to some host service). Maybe
we should still allow them in that case because the likelihood of such a
case is very small (and allowing them would let you open nsfs links with
AT_BENEATH), but I'm not sure.
--
Aleksa Sarai
Senior Software Engineer (Containers)
SUSE Linux GmbH
<https://www.cyphar.com/>
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next prev parent reply other threads:[~2018-10-10 7:29 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 12+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2018-10-09 6:52 [PATCH v2 0/3] namei: implement various lookup restriction AT_* flags Aleksa Sarai
2018-10-09 6:52 ` Aleksa Sarai
2018-10-09 6:52 ` [PATCH v2 1/3] namei: implement O_BENEATH-style " Aleksa Sarai
2018-10-09 19:25 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-10-10 7:07 ` Aleksa Sarai
2018-10-10 7:28 ` Aleksa Sarai [this message]
2018-10-12 1:12 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-10-27 1:41 ` Ed Maste
2018-10-27 7:17 ` Aleksa Sarai
2018-10-27 7:53 ` Al Viro
2018-10-27 12:11 ` : " Ed Maste
2018-10-27 15:37 ` Aleksa Sarai
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