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From: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> To: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>, x86@kernel.org, Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>, Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>, "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>, Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>, Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>, Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>, David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>, Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>, Kai Huang <kai.huang@linux.intel.com>, Jacob Pan <jacob.jun.pan@linux.intel.com>, Alison Schofield <alison.schofield@intel.com>, linux-mm@kvack.org, kvm@vger.kernel.org, keyrings@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, "Kirill A . Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> Subject: [PATCH, RFC 24/62] keys/mktme: Preparse the MKTME key payload Date: Wed, 8 May 2019 17:43:44 +0300 [thread overview] Message-ID: <20190508144422.13171-25-kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> (raw) In-Reply-To: <20190508144422.13171-1-kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> From: Alison Schofield <alison.schofield@intel.com> It is a requirement of the Kernel Keys subsystem to provide a preparse method that validates payloads before key instantiate methods are called. Verify that userspace provides valid MKTME options and prepare the payload for use at key instantiate time. Create a method to free the preparsed payload. The Kernel Key subsystem will that to clean up after the key is instantiated. Signed-off-by: Alison Schofield <alison.schofield@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> --- include/keys/mktme-type.h | 39 +++++++++ security/keys/mktme_keys.c | 165 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 204 insertions(+) create mode 100644 include/keys/mktme-type.h diff --git a/include/keys/mktme-type.h b/include/keys/mktme-type.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..032905b288b4 --- /dev/null +++ b/include/keys/mktme-type.h @@ -0,0 +1,39 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ + +/* Key service for Multi-KEY Total Memory Encryption */ + +#ifndef _KEYS_MKTME_TYPE_H +#define _KEYS_MKTME_TYPE_H + +#include <linux/key.h> + +/* + * The AES-XTS 128 encryption algorithm requires 128 bits for each + * user supplied data key and tweak key. + */ +#define MKTME_AES_XTS_SIZE 16 /* 16 bytes, 128 bits */ + +enum mktme_alg { + MKTME_ALG_AES_XTS_128, +}; + +const char *const mktme_alg_names[] = { + [MKTME_ALG_AES_XTS_128] = "aes-xts-128", +}; + +enum mktme_type { + MKTME_TYPE_ERROR = -1, + MKTME_TYPE_USER, + MKTME_TYPE_CPU, + MKTME_TYPE_NO_ENCRYPT, +}; + +const char *const mktme_type_names[] = { + [MKTME_TYPE_USER] = "user", + [MKTME_TYPE_CPU] = "cpu", + [MKTME_TYPE_NO_ENCRYPT] = "no-encrypt", +}; + +extern struct key_type key_type_mktme; + +#endif /* _KEYS_MKTME_TYPE_H */ diff --git a/security/keys/mktme_keys.c b/security/keys/mktme_keys.c index b5e8289f041b..92a047caa829 100644 --- a/security/keys/mktme_keys.c +++ b/security/keys/mktme_keys.c @@ -6,6 +6,10 @@ #include <linux/key.h> #include <linux/key-type.h> #include <linux/mm.h> +#include <linux/parser.h> +#include <linux/string.h> +#include <asm/intel_pconfig.h> +#include <keys/mktme-type.h> #include <keys/user-type.h> #include "internal.h" @@ -69,8 +73,169 @@ int mktme_keyid_from_key(struct key *key) return 0; } +enum mktme_opt_id { + OPT_ERROR, + OPT_TYPE, + OPT_KEY, + OPT_TWEAK, + OPT_ALGORITHM, +}; + +static const match_table_t mktme_token = { + {OPT_TYPE, "type=%s"}, + {OPT_KEY, "key=%s"}, + {OPT_TWEAK, "tweak=%s"}, + {OPT_ALGORITHM, "algorithm=%s"}, + {OPT_ERROR, NULL} +}; + +struct mktme_payload { + u32 keyid_ctrl; /* Command & Encryption Algorithm */ + u8 data_key[MKTME_AES_XTS_SIZE]; + u8 tweak_key[MKTME_AES_XTS_SIZE]; +}; + +/* Make sure arguments are correct for the TYPE of key requested */ +static int mktme_check_options(struct mktme_payload *payload, + unsigned long token_mask, enum mktme_type type) +{ + if (!token_mask) + return -EINVAL; + + switch (type) { + case MKTME_TYPE_USER: + if (test_bit(OPT_ALGORITHM, &token_mask)) + payload->keyid_ctrl |= MKTME_AES_XTS_128; + else + return -EINVAL; + + if ((test_bit(OPT_KEY, &token_mask)) && + (test_bit(OPT_TWEAK, &token_mask))) + payload->keyid_ctrl |= MKTME_KEYID_SET_KEY_DIRECT; + else + return -EINVAL; + break; + + case MKTME_TYPE_CPU: + if (test_bit(OPT_ALGORITHM, &token_mask)) + payload->keyid_ctrl |= MKTME_AES_XTS_128; + else + return -EINVAL; + + payload->keyid_ctrl |= MKTME_KEYID_SET_KEY_RANDOM; + break; + + case MKTME_TYPE_NO_ENCRYPT: + payload->keyid_ctrl |= MKTME_KEYID_NO_ENCRYPT; + break; + + default: + return -EINVAL; + } + return 0; +} + +/* Parse the options and store the key programming data in the payload. */ +static int mktme_get_options(char *options, struct mktme_payload *payload) +{ + enum mktme_type type = MKTME_TYPE_ERROR; + substring_t args[MAX_OPT_ARGS]; + unsigned long token_mask = 0; + char *p = options; + int ret, token; + + while ((p = strsep(&options, " \t"))) { + if (*p == '\0' || *p == ' ' || *p == '\t') + continue; + token = match_token(p, mktme_token, args); + if (token == OPT_ERROR) + return -EINVAL; + if (test_and_set_bit(token, &token_mask)) + return -EINVAL; + + switch (token) { + case OPT_KEY: + ret = hex2bin(payload->data_key, args[0].from, + MKTME_AES_XTS_SIZE); + if (ret < 0) + return -EINVAL; + break; + + case OPT_TWEAK: + ret = hex2bin(payload->tweak_key, args[0].from, + MKTME_AES_XTS_SIZE); + if (ret < 0) + return -EINVAL; + break; + + case OPT_TYPE: + type = match_string(mktme_type_names, + ARRAY_SIZE(mktme_type_names), + args[0].from); + if (type < 0) + return -EINVAL; + break; + + case OPT_ALGORITHM: + ret = match_string(mktme_alg_names, + ARRAY_SIZE(mktme_alg_names), + args[0].from); + if (ret < 0) + return -EINVAL; + break; + + default: + return -EINVAL; + } + } + return mktme_check_options(payload, token_mask, type); +} + +void mktme_free_preparsed_payload(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep) +{ + kzfree(prep->payload.data[0]); +} + +/* + * Key Service Method to preparse a payload before a key is created. + * Check permissions and the options. Load the proposed key field + * data into the payload for use by the instantiate method. + */ +int mktme_preparse_payload(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep) +{ + struct mktme_payload *mktme_payload; + size_t datalen = prep->datalen; + char *options; + int ret; + + if (datalen <= 0 || datalen > 1024 || !prep->data) + return -EINVAL; + + options = kmemdup_nul(prep->data, datalen, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!options) + return -ENOMEM; + + mktme_payload = kzalloc(sizeof(*mktme_payload), GFP_KERNEL); + if (!mktme_payload) { + ret = -ENOMEM; + goto out; + } + ret = mktme_get_options(options, mktme_payload); + if (ret < 0) { + kzfree(mktme_payload); + goto out; + } + prep->quotalen = sizeof(mktme_payload); + prep->payload.data[0] = mktme_payload; +out: + kzfree(options); + return ret; +} + struct key_type key_type_mktme = { .name = "mktme", + .preparse = mktme_preparse_payload, + .free_preparse = mktme_free_preparsed_payload, .describe = user_describe, }; -- 2.20.1
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2019-05-08 14:46 UTC|newest] Thread overview: 153+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top 2019-05-08 14:43 [PATCH, RFC 00/62] Intel MKTME enabling Kirill A. Shutemov 2019-05-08 14:43 ` [PATCH, RFC 01/62] mm: Do no merge VMAs with different encryption KeyIDs Kirill A. Shutemov 2019-05-08 14:43 ` [PATCH, RFC 02/62] mm: Add helpers to setup zero page mappings Kirill A. Shutemov 2019-05-29 7:21 ` Mike Rapoport 2019-05-08 14:43 ` [PATCH, RFC 03/62] mm/ksm: Do not merge pages with different KeyIDs Kirill A. Shutemov 2019-05-10 18:07 ` Dave Hansen 2019-05-13 14:27 ` Kirill A. Shutemov 2019-05-08 14:43 ` [PATCH, RFC 04/62] mm/page_alloc: Unify alloc_hugepage_vma() Kirill A. Shutemov 2019-05-08 14:43 ` [PATCH, RFC 05/62] mm/page_alloc: Handle allocation for encrypted memory Kirill A. Shutemov 2019-05-29 7:21 ` Mike Rapoport 2019-05-29 12:47 ` Kirill A. Shutemov 2019-05-08 14:43 ` [PATCH, RFC 06/62] mm/khugepaged: Handle encrypted pages Kirill A. Shutemov 2019-05-08 14:43 ` [PATCH, RFC 07/62] x86/mm: Mask out KeyID bits from page table entry pfn Kirill A. Shutemov 2019-05-08 14:43 ` [PATCH, RFC 08/62] x86/mm: Introduce variables to store number, shift and mask of KeyIDs Kirill A. Shutemov 2019-05-08 14:43 ` [PATCH, RFC 09/62] x86/mm: Preserve KeyID on pte_modify() and pgprot_modify() Kirill A. Shutemov 2019-06-14 9:15 ` Peter Zijlstra 2019-06-14 13:03 ` Kirill A. Shutemov 2019-05-08 14:43 ` [PATCH, RFC 10/62] x86/mm: Detect MKTME early Kirill A. Shutemov 2019-05-08 14:43 ` [PATCH, RFC 11/62] x86/mm: Add a helper to retrieve KeyID for a page Kirill A. Shutemov 2019-05-08 14:43 ` [PATCH, RFC 12/62] x86/mm: Add a helper to retrieve KeyID for a VMA Kirill A. Shutemov 2019-05-08 14:43 ` [PATCH, RFC 13/62] x86/mm: Add hooks to allocate and free encrypted pages Kirill A. Shutemov 2019-06-14 9:34 ` Peter Zijlstra 2019-06-14 11:04 ` Peter Zijlstra 2019-06-14 13:28 ` Kirill A. Shutemov 2019-06-14 13:43 ` Peter Zijlstra 2019-06-14 22:41 ` Kirill A. Shutemov 2019-06-17 9:25 ` Peter Zijlstra 2019-06-14 13:14 ` Kirill A. Shutemov 2019-05-08 14:43 ` [PATCH, RFC 14/62] x86/mm: Map zero pages into encrypted mappings correctly Kirill A. Shutemov 2019-05-08 14:43 ` [PATCH, RFC 15/62] x86/mm: Rename CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_MEMORY_PHYSICAL_PADDING Kirill A. Shutemov 2019-05-08 14:43 ` [PATCH, RFC 16/62] x86/mm: Allow to disable MKTME after enumeration Kirill A. Shutemov 2019-05-08 14:43 ` [PATCH, RFC 17/62] x86/mm: Calculate direct mapping size Kirill A. Shutemov 2019-05-08 14:43 ` [PATCH, RFC 18/62] x86/mm: Implement syncing per-KeyID direct mappings Kirill A. Shutemov 2019-06-14 9:51 ` Peter Zijlstra 2019-06-14 22:43 ` Kirill A. Shutemov 2019-06-17 9:27 ` Peter Zijlstra 2019-06-17 14:43 ` Kirill A. Shutemov 2019-06-17 14:51 ` Peter Zijlstra 2019-06-17 15:17 ` Kirill A. Shutemov 2019-05-08 14:43 ` [PATCH, RFC 19/62] x86/mm: Handle encrypted memory in page_to_virt() and __pa() Kirill A. Shutemov 2019-06-14 11:10 ` Peter Zijlstra 2019-05-08 14:43 ` [PATCH, RFC 20/62] mm/page_ext: Export lookup_page_ext() symbol Kirill A. Shutemov 2019-06-14 11:12 ` Peter Zijlstra 2019-06-14 22:44 ` Kirill A. Shutemov 2019-06-17 9:30 ` Peter Zijlstra 2019-06-17 11:01 ` Kai Huang 2019-06-17 11:13 ` Huang, Kai 2019-05-08 14:43 ` [PATCH, RFC 21/62] mm/rmap: Clear vma->anon_vma on unlink_anon_vmas() Kirill A. Shutemov 2019-05-08 14:43 ` [PATCH, RFC 22/62] x86/pconfig: Set a valid encryption algorithm for all MKTME commands Kirill A. Shutemov 2019-05-08 14:43 ` [PATCH, RFC 23/62] keys/mktme: Introduce a Kernel Key Service for MKTME Kirill A. Shutemov 2019-05-08 14:43 ` Kirill A. Shutemov [this message] 2019-05-08 14:43 ` [PATCH, RFC 25/62] keys/mktme: Instantiate and destroy MKTME keys Kirill A. Shutemov 2019-05-08 14:43 ` [PATCH, RFC 26/62] keys/mktme: Move the MKTME payload into a cache aligned structure Kirill A. Shutemov 2019-06-14 11:35 ` Peter Zijlstra 2019-06-14 17:10 ` Alison Schofield 2019-05-08 14:43 ` [PATCH, RFC 27/62] keys/mktme: Strengthen the entropy of CPU generated MKTME keys Kirill A. Shutemov 2019-05-08 14:43 ` [PATCH, RFC 28/62] keys/mktme: Set up PCONFIG programming targets for " Kirill A. Shutemov 2019-05-08 14:43 ` [PATCH, RFC 29/62] keys/mktme: Program MKTME keys into the platform hardware Kirill A. Shutemov 2019-05-08 14:43 ` [PATCH, RFC 30/62] keys/mktme: Set up a percpu_ref_count for MKTME keys Kirill A. Shutemov 2019-05-08 14:43 ` [PATCH, RFC 31/62] keys/mktme: Require CAP_SYS_RESOURCE capability " Kirill A. Shutemov 2019-05-08 14:43 ` [PATCH, RFC 32/62] keys/mktme: Store MKTME payloads if cmdline parameter allows Kirill A. Shutemov 2019-05-08 14:43 ` [PATCH, RFC 33/62] acpi: Remove __init from acpi table parsing functions Kirill A. Shutemov 2019-05-08 14:43 ` [PATCH, RFC 34/62] acpi/hmat: Determine existence of an ACPI HMAT Kirill A. Shutemov 2019-05-08 14:43 ` [PATCH, RFC 35/62] keys/mktme: Require ACPI HMAT to register the MKTME Key Service Kirill A. Shutemov 2019-05-08 14:43 ` [PATCH, RFC 36/62] acpi/hmat: Evaluate topology presented in ACPI HMAT for MKTME Kirill A. Shutemov 2019-05-08 14:43 ` [PATCH, RFC 37/62] keys/mktme: Do not allow key creation in unsafe topologies Kirill A. Shutemov 2019-05-08 14:43 ` [PATCH, RFC 38/62] keys/mktme: Support CPU hotplug for MKTME key service Kirill A. Shutemov 2019-05-08 14:43 ` [PATCH, RFC 39/62] keys/mktme: Find new PCONFIG targets during memory hotplug Kirill A. Shutemov 2019-05-08 14:44 ` [PATCH, RFC 40/62] keys/mktme: Program new PCONFIG targets with MKTME keys Kirill A. Shutemov 2019-05-08 14:44 ` [PATCH, RFC 41/62] keys/mktme: Support memory hotplug for " Kirill A. Shutemov 2019-05-08 14:44 ` [PATCH, RFC 42/62] mm: Generalize the mprotect implementation to support extensions Kirill A. Shutemov 2019-05-08 14:44 ` [PATCH, RFC 43/62] syscall/x86: Wire up a system call for MKTME encryption keys Kirill A. Shutemov 2019-05-29 7:21 ` Mike Rapoport 2019-05-29 18:12 ` Alison Schofield 2019-05-08 14:44 ` [PATCH, RFC 44/62] x86/mm: Set KeyIDs in encrypted VMAs for MKTME Kirill A. Shutemov 2019-06-14 11:44 ` Peter Zijlstra 2019-06-14 17:33 ` Alison Schofield 2019-06-14 18:26 ` Dave Hansen 2019-06-14 18:46 ` Alison Schofield 2019-06-14 19:11 ` Dave Hansen 2019-06-17 9:10 ` Peter Zijlstra 2019-05-08 14:44 ` [PATCH, RFC 45/62] mm: Add the encrypt_mprotect() system call " Kirill A. Shutemov 2019-06-14 11:47 ` Peter Zijlstra 2019-06-14 17:35 ` Alison Schofield 2019-06-14 11:51 ` Peter Zijlstra 2019-06-15 0:32 ` Alison Schofield 2019-06-17 9:08 ` Peter Zijlstra 2019-06-17 15:07 ` Andy Lutomirski 2019-06-17 15:28 ` Dave Hansen 2019-06-17 15:46 ` Andy Lutomirski 2019-06-17 18:27 ` Dave Hansen 2019-06-17 19:12 ` Andy Lutomirski 2019-06-17 21:36 ` Dave Hansen 2019-06-18 0:48 ` Kai Huang 2019-06-18 1:50 ` Andy Lutomirski 2019-06-18 2:11 ` Kai Huang 2019-06-18 4:24 ` Andy Lutomirski 2019-06-18 14:19 ` Dave Hansen 2019-06-18 0:05 ` Kai Huang 2019-06-18 0:15 ` Andy Lutomirski 2019-06-18 1:35 ` Kai Huang 2019-06-18 1:43 ` Andy Lutomirski 2019-06-18 2:23 ` Kai Huang 2019-06-18 9:12 ` Peter Zijlstra 2019-06-18 14:09 ` Dave Hansen 2019-06-18 16:15 ` Kirill A. Shutemov 2019-06-18 16:22 ` Dave Hansen 2019-06-18 16:36 ` Andy Lutomirski 2019-06-18 16:48 ` Dave Hansen 2019-06-18 14:13 ` Dave Hansen 2019-06-17 23:59 ` Kai Huang 2019-06-18 1:34 ` Lendacky, Thomas 2019-06-18 1:40 ` Andy Lutomirski 2019-06-18 2:02 ` Lendacky, Thomas 2019-06-18 4:19 ` Andy Lutomirski 2019-05-08 14:44 ` [PATCH, RFC 46/62] x86/mm: Keep reference counts on encrypted VMAs " Kirill A. Shutemov 2019-06-14 11:54 ` Peter Zijlstra 2019-06-14 18:39 ` Alison Schofield 2019-05-08 14:44 ` [PATCH, RFC 47/62] mm: Restrict MKTME memory encryption to anonymous VMAs Kirill A. Shutemov 2019-06-14 11:55 ` Peter Zijlstra 2019-06-15 0:07 ` Alison Schofield 2019-05-08 14:44 ` [PATCH, RFC 48/62] selftests/x86/mktme: Test the MKTME APIs Kirill A. Shutemov 2019-05-08 17:09 ` Alison Schofield 2019-05-08 14:44 ` [PATCH, RFC 49/62] mm, x86: export several MKTME variables Kirill A. Shutemov 2019-06-14 11:56 ` Peter Zijlstra 2019-06-17 3:14 ` Kai Huang 2019-06-17 7:46 ` Peter Zijlstra 2019-06-17 8:39 ` Kai Huang 2019-06-17 11:25 ` Kirill A. Shutemov 2019-05-08 14:44 ` [PATCH, RFC 50/62] kvm, x86, mmu: setup MKTME keyID to spte for given PFN Kirill A. Shutemov 2019-05-08 14:44 ` [PATCH, RFC 51/62] iommu/vt-d: Support MKTME in DMA remapping Kirill A. Shutemov 2019-06-14 12:04 ` Peter Zijlstra 2019-05-08 14:44 ` [PATCH, RFC 52/62] x86/mm: introduce common code for mem encryption Kirill A. Shutemov 2019-05-08 16:58 ` Christoph Hellwig 2019-05-08 20:52 ` Jacob Pan 2019-05-08 21:21 ` Kirill A. Shutemov 2019-05-08 14:44 ` [PATCH, RFC 53/62] x86/mm: Use common code for DMA memory encryption Kirill A. Shutemov 2019-05-08 14:44 ` [PATCH, RFC 54/62] x86/mm: Disable MKTME on incompatible platform configurations Kirill A. Shutemov 2019-05-08 14:44 ` [PATCH, RFC 55/62] x86/mm: Disable MKTME if not all system memory supports encryption Kirill A. Shutemov 2019-05-08 14:44 ` [PATCH, RFC 56/62] x86: Introduce CONFIG_X86_INTEL_MKTME Kirill A. Shutemov 2019-05-08 14:44 ` [PATCH, RFC 57/62] x86/mktme: Overview of Multi-Key Total Memory Encryption Kirill A. Shutemov 2019-05-29 7:21 ` Mike Rapoport 2019-05-29 18:13 ` Alison Schofield 2019-07-14 18:16 ` Randy Dunlap 2019-07-15 9:02 ` Kirill A. Shutemov 2019-05-08 14:44 ` [PATCH, RFC 58/62] x86/mktme: Document the MKTME provided security mitigations Kirill A. Shutemov 2019-05-08 14:44 ` [PATCH, RFC 59/62] x86/mktme: Document the MKTME kernel configuration requirements Kirill A. Shutemov 2019-05-08 14:44 ` [PATCH, RFC 60/62] x86/mktme: Document the MKTME Key Service API Kirill A. Shutemov 2019-05-08 14:44 ` [PATCH, RFC 61/62] x86/mktme: Document the MKTME API for anonymous memory encryption Kirill A. Shutemov 2019-05-08 14:44 ` [PATCH, RFC 62/62] x86/mktme: Demonstration program using the MKTME APIs Kirill A. Shutemov 2019-05-29 7:30 ` [PATCH, RFC 00/62] Intel MKTME enabling Mike Rapoport 2019-05-29 18:20 ` Alison Schofield 2019-06-14 12:15 ` Peter Zijlstra
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