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From: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> To: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>, x86@kernel.org, Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>, Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>, "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>, Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>, Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>, Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>, David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>, Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>, Kai Huang <kai.huang@linux.intel.com>, Jacob Pan <jacob.jun.pan@linux.intel.com>, Alison Schofield <alison.schofield@intel.com>, linux-mm@kvack.org, kvm@vger.kernel.org, keyrings@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, "Kirill A . Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> Subject: [PATCH, RFC 45/62] mm: Add the encrypt_mprotect() system call for MKTME Date: Wed, 8 May 2019 17:44:05 +0300 [thread overview] Message-ID: <20190508144422.13171-46-kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> (raw) In-Reply-To: <20190508144422.13171-1-kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> From: Alison Schofield <alison.schofield@intel.com> Implement memory encryption for MKTME (Multi-Key Total Memory Encryption) with a new system call that is an extension of the legacy mprotect() system call. In encrypt_mprotect the caller must pass a handle to a previously allocated and programmed MKTME encryption key. The key can be obtained through the kernel key service type "mktme". The caller must have KEY_NEED_VIEW permission on the key. MKTME places an additional restriction on the protected data: The length of the data must be page aligned. This is in addition to the existing mprotect restriction that the addr must be page aligned. encrypt_mprotect() will lookup the hardware keyid for the given userspace key. It will use previously defined helpers to insert that keyid in the VMAs during legacy mprotect() execution. Signed-off-by: Alison Schofield <alison.schofield@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> --- fs/exec.c | 4 +-- include/linux/mm.h | 3 +- mm/mprotect.c | 68 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----- 3 files changed, 65 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/exec.c b/fs/exec.c index 2e0033348d8e..695c121b34b3 100644 --- a/fs/exec.c +++ b/fs/exec.c @@ -755,8 +755,8 @@ int setup_arg_pages(struct linux_binprm *bprm, vm_flags |= mm->def_flags; vm_flags |= VM_STACK_INCOMPLETE_SETUP; - ret = mprotect_fixup(vma, &prev, vma->vm_start, vma->vm_end, - vm_flags); + ret = mprotect_fixup(vma, &prev, vma->vm_start, vma->vm_end, vm_flags, + -1); if (ret) goto out_unlock; BUG_ON(prev != vma); diff --git a/include/linux/mm.h b/include/linux/mm.h index c027044de9bf..a7f52d053826 100644 --- a/include/linux/mm.h +++ b/include/linux/mm.h @@ -1634,7 +1634,8 @@ extern unsigned long change_protection(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long int dirty_accountable, int prot_numa); extern int mprotect_fixup(struct vm_area_struct *vma, struct vm_area_struct **pprev, unsigned long start, - unsigned long end, unsigned long newflags); + unsigned long end, unsigned long newflags, + int newkeyid); /* * doesn't attempt to fault and will return short. diff --git a/mm/mprotect.c b/mm/mprotect.c index 23e680f4b1d5..38d766b5cc20 100644 --- a/mm/mprotect.c +++ b/mm/mprotect.c @@ -28,6 +28,7 @@ #include <linux/ksm.h> #include <linux/uaccess.h> #include <linux/mm_inline.h> +#include <linux/key.h> #include <asm/pgtable.h> #include <asm/cacheflush.h> #include <asm/mmu_context.h> @@ -347,7 +348,8 @@ static int prot_none_walk(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long start, int mprotect_fixup(struct vm_area_struct *vma, struct vm_area_struct **pprev, - unsigned long start, unsigned long end, unsigned long newflags) + unsigned long start, unsigned long end, unsigned long newflags, + int newkeyid) { struct mm_struct *mm = vma->vm_mm; unsigned long oldflags = vma->vm_flags; @@ -357,7 +359,14 @@ mprotect_fixup(struct vm_area_struct *vma, struct vm_area_struct **pprev, int error; int dirty_accountable = 0; - if (newflags == oldflags) { + /* + * Flags match and Keyids match or we have NO_KEY. + * This _fixup is usually called from do_mprotect_ext() except + * for one special case: caller fs/exec.c/setup_arg_pages() + * In that case, newkeyid is passed as -1 (NO_KEY). + */ + if (newflags == oldflags && + (newkeyid == vma_keyid(vma) || newkeyid == NO_KEY)) { *pprev = vma; return 0; } @@ -423,6 +432,8 @@ mprotect_fixup(struct vm_area_struct *vma, struct vm_area_struct **pprev, } success: + if (newkeyid != NO_KEY) + mprotect_set_encrypt(vma, newkeyid, start, end); /* * vm_flags and vm_page_prot are protected by the mmap_sem * held in write mode. @@ -454,10 +465,15 @@ mprotect_fixup(struct vm_area_struct *vma, struct vm_area_struct **pprev, } /* - * When pkey==NO_KEY we get legacy mprotect behavior here. + * do_mprotect_ext() supports the legacy mprotect behavior plus extensions + * for Protection Keys and Memory Encryption Keys. These extensions are + * mutually exclusive and the behavior is: + * (pkey==NO_KEY && keyid==NO_KEY) ==> legacy mprotect + * (pkey is valid) ==> legacy mprotect plus Protection Key extensions + * (keyid is valid) ==> legacy mprotect plus Encryption Key extensions */ static int do_mprotect_ext(unsigned long start, size_t len, - unsigned long prot, int pkey) + unsigned long prot, int pkey, int keyid) { unsigned long nstart, end, tmp, reqprot; struct vm_area_struct *vma, *prev; @@ -555,7 +571,8 @@ static int do_mprotect_ext(unsigned long start, size_t len, tmp = vma->vm_end; if (tmp > end) tmp = end; - error = mprotect_fixup(vma, &prev, nstart, tmp, newflags); + error = mprotect_fixup(vma, &prev, nstart, tmp, newflags, + keyid); if (error) goto out; nstart = tmp; @@ -580,7 +597,7 @@ static int do_mprotect_ext(unsigned long start, size_t len, SYSCALL_DEFINE3(mprotect, unsigned long, start, size_t, len, unsigned long, prot) { - return do_mprotect_ext(start, len, prot, NO_KEY); + return do_mprotect_ext(start, len, prot, NO_KEY, NO_KEY); } #ifdef CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_PKEYS @@ -588,7 +605,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE3(mprotect, unsigned long, start, size_t, len, SYSCALL_DEFINE4(pkey_mprotect, unsigned long, start, size_t, len, unsigned long, prot, int, pkey) { - return do_mprotect_ext(start, len, prot, pkey); + return do_mprotect_ext(start, len, prot, pkey, NO_KEY); } SYSCALL_DEFINE2(pkey_alloc, unsigned long, flags, unsigned long, init_val) @@ -637,3 +654,40 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE1(pkey_free, int, pkey) } #endif /* CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_PKEYS */ + +#ifdef CONFIG_X86_INTEL_MKTME + +extern int mktme_keyid_from_key(struct key *key); + +SYSCALL_DEFINE4(encrypt_mprotect, unsigned long, start, size_t, len, + unsigned long, prot, key_serial_t, serial) +{ + key_ref_t key_ref; + struct key *key; + int ret, keyid; + + /* MKTME restriction */ + if (!PAGE_ALIGNED(len)) + return -EINVAL; + + /* + * key_ref prevents the destruction of the key + * while the memory encryption is being set up. + */ + + key_ref = lookup_user_key(serial, 0, KEY_NEED_VIEW); + if (IS_ERR(key_ref)) + return PTR_ERR(key_ref); + + key = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref); + keyid = mktme_keyid_from_key(key); + if (!keyid) { + key_ref_put(key_ref); + return -EINVAL; + } + ret = do_mprotect_ext(start, len, prot, NO_KEY, keyid); + key_ref_put(key_ref); + return ret; +} + +#endif /* CONFIG_X86_INTEL_MKTME */ -- 2.20.1
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2019-05-08 14:45 UTC|newest] Thread overview: 153+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top 2019-05-08 14:43 [PATCH, RFC 00/62] Intel MKTME enabling Kirill A. Shutemov 2019-05-08 14:43 ` [PATCH, RFC 01/62] mm: Do no merge VMAs with different encryption KeyIDs Kirill A. Shutemov 2019-05-08 14:43 ` [PATCH, RFC 02/62] mm: Add helpers to setup zero page mappings Kirill A. Shutemov 2019-05-29 7:21 ` Mike Rapoport 2019-05-08 14:43 ` [PATCH, RFC 03/62] mm/ksm: Do not merge pages with different KeyIDs Kirill A. Shutemov 2019-05-10 18:07 ` Dave Hansen 2019-05-13 14:27 ` Kirill A. Shutemov 2019-05-08 14:43 ` [PATCH, RFC 04/62] mm/page_alloc: Unify alloc_hugepage_vma() Kirill A. Shutemov 2019-05-08 14:43 ` [PATCH, RFC 05/62] mm/page_alloc: Handle allocation for encrypted memory Kirill A. Shutemov 2019-05-29 7:21 ` Mike Rapoport 2019-05-29 12:47 ` Kirill A. Shutemov 2019-05-08 14:43 ` [PATCH, RFC 06/62] mm/khugepaged: Handle encrypted pages Kirill A. Shutemov 2019-05-08 14:43 ` [PATCH, RFC 07/62] x86/mm: Mask out KeyID bits from page table entry pfn Kirill A. Shutemov 2019-05-08 14:43 ` [PATCH, RFC 08/62] x86/mm: Introduce variables to store number, shift and mask of KeyIDs Kirill A. Shutemov 2019-05-08 14:43 ` [PATCH, RFC 09/62] x86/mm: Preserve KeyID on pte_modify() and pgprot_modify() Kirill A. Shutemov 2019-06-14 9:15 ` Peter Zijlstra 2019-06-14 13:03 ` Kirill A. Shutemov 2019-05-08 14:43 ` [PATCH, RFC 10/62] x86/mm: Detect MKTME early Kirill A. Shutemov 2019-05-08 14:43 ` [PATCH, RFC 11/62] x86/mm: Add a helper to retrieve KeyID for a page Kirill A. Shutemov 2019-05-08 14:43 ` [PATCH, RFC 12/62] x86/mm: Add a helper to retrieve KeyID for a VMA Kirill A. Shutemov 2019-05-08 14:43 ` [PATCH, RFC 13/62] x86/mm: Add hooks to allocate and free encrypted pages Kirill A. Shutemov 2019-06-14 9:34 ` Peter Zijlstra 2019-06-14 11:04 ` Peter Zijlstra 2019-06-14 13:28 ` Kirill A. Shutemov 2019-06-14 13:43 ` Peter Zijlstra 2019-06-14 22:41 ` Kirill A. Shutemov 2019-06-17 9:25 ` Peter Zijlstra 2019-06-14 13:14 ` Kirill A. Shutemov 2019-05-08 14:43 ` [PATCH, RFC 14/62] x86/mm: Map zero pages into encrypted mappings correctly Kirill A. Shutemov 2019-05-08 14:43 ` [PATCH, RFC 15/62] x86/mm: Rename CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_MEMORY_PHYSICAL_PADDING Kirill A. Shutemov 2019-05-08 14:43 ` [PATCH, RFC 16/62] x86/mm: Allow to disable MKTME after enumeration Kirill A. Shutemov 2019-05-08 14:43 ` [PATCH, RFC 17/62] x86/mm: Calculate direct mapping size Kirill A. Shutemov 2019-05-08 14:43 ` [PATCH, RFC 18/62] x86/mm: Implement syncing per-KeyID direct mappings Kirill A. Shutemov 2019-06-14 9:51 ` Peter Zijlstra 2019-06-14 22:43 ` Kirill A. Shutemov 2019-06-17 9:27 ` Peter Zijlstra 2019-06-17 14:43 ` Kirill A. Shutemov 2019-06-17 14:51 ` Peter Zijlstra 2019-06-17 15:17 ` Kirill A. Shutemov 2019-05-08 14:43 ` [PATCH, RFC 19/62] x86/mm: Handle encrypted memory in page_to_virt() and __pa() Kirill A. Shutemov 2019-06-14 11:10 ` Peter Zijlstra 2019-05-08 14:43 ` [PATCH, RFC 20/62] mm/page_ext: Export lookup_page_ext() symbol Kirill A. Shutemov 2019-06-14 11:12 ` Peter Zijlstra 2019-06-14 22:44 ` Kirill A. Shutemov 2019-06-17 9:30 ` Peter Zijlstra 2019-06-17 11:01 ` Kai Huang 2019-06-17 11:13 ` Huang, Kai 2019-05-08 14:43 ` [PATCH, RFC 21/62] mm/rmap: Clear vma->anon_vma on unlink_anon_vmas() Kirill A. Shutemov 2019-05-08 14:43 ` [PATCH, RFC 22/62] x86/pconfig: Set a valid encryption algorithm for all MKTME commands Kirill A. Shutemov 2019-05-08 14:43 ` [PATCH, RFC 23/62] keys/mktme: Introduce a Kernel Key Service for MKTME Kirill A. Shutemov 2019-05-08 14:43 ` [PATCH, RFC 24/62] keys/mktme: Preparse the MKTME key payload Kirill A. Shutemov 2019-05-08 14:43 ` [PATCH, RFC 25/62] keys/mktme: Instantiate and destroy MKTME keys Kirill A. Shutemov 2019-05-08 14:43 ` [PATCH, RFC 26/62] keys/mktme: Move the MKTME payload into a cache aligned structure Kirill A. Shutemov 2019-06-14 11:35 ` Peter Zijlstra 2019-06-14 17:10 ` Alison Schofield 2019-05-08 14:43 ` [PATCH, RFC 27/62] keys/mktme: Strengthen the entropy of CPU generated MKTME keys Kirill A. Shutemov 2019-05-08 14:43 ` [PATCH, RFC 28/62] keys/mktme: Set up PCONFIG programming targets for " Kirill A. Shutemov 2019-05-08 14:43 ` [PATCH, RFC 29/62] keys/mktme: Program MKTME keys into the platform hardware Kirill A. Shutemov 2019-05-08 14:43 ` [PATCH, RFC 30/62] keys/mktme: Set up a percpu_ref_count for MKTME keys Kirill A. Shutemov 2019-05-08 14:43 ` [PATCH, RFC 31/62] keys/mktme: Require CAP_SYS_RESOURCE capability " Kirill A. Shutemov 2019-05-08 14:43 ` [PATCH, RFC 32/62] keys/mktme: Store MKTME payloads if cmdline parameter allows Kirill A. Shutemov 2019-05-08 14:43 ` [PATCH, RFC 33/62] acpi: Remove __init from acpi table parsing functions Kirill A. Shutemov 2019-05-08 14:43 ` [PATCH, RFC 34/62] acpi/hmat: Determine existence of an ACPI HMAT Kirill A. Shutemov 2019-05-08 14:43 ` [PATCH, RFC 35/62] keys/mktme: Require ACPI HMAT to register the MKTME Key Service Kirill A. Shutemov 2019-05-08 14:43 ` [PATCH, RFC 36/62] acpi/hmat: Evaluate topology presented in ACPI HMAT for MKTME Kirill A. Shutemov 2019-05-08 14:43 ` [PATCH, RFC 37/62] keys/mktme: Do not allow key creation in unsafe topologies Kirill A. Shutemov 2019-05-08 14:43 ` [PATCH, RFC 38/62] keys/mktme: Support CPU hotplug for MKTME key service Kirill A. Shutemov 2019-05-08 14:43 ` [PATCH, RFC 39/62] keys/mktme: Find new PCONFIG targets during memory hotplug Kirill A. Shutemov 2019-05-08 14:44 ` [PATCH, RFC 40/62] keys/mktme: Program new PCONFIG targets with MKTME keys Kirill A. Shutemov 2019-05-08 14:44 ` [PATCH, RFC 41/62] keys/mktme: Support memory hotplug for " Kirill A. Shutemov 2019-05-08 14:44 ` [PATCH, RFC 42/62] mm: Generalize the mprotect implementation to support extensions Kirill A. Shutemov 2019-05-08 14:44 ` [PATCH, RFC 43/62] syscall/x86: Wire up a system call for MKTME encryption keys Kirill A. Shutemov 2019-05-29 7:21 ` Mike Rapoport 2019-05-29 18:12 ` Alison Schofield 2019-05-08 14:44 ` [PATCH, RFC 44/62] x86/mm: Set KeyIDs in encrypted VMAs for MKTME Kirill A. Shutemov 2019-06-14 11:44 ` Peter Zijlstra 2019-06-14 17:33 ` Alison Schofield 2019-06-14 18:26 ` Dave Hansen 2019-06-14 18:46 ` Alison Schofield 2019-06-14 19:11 ` Dave Hansen 2019-06-17 9:10 ` Peter Zijlstra 2019-05-08 14:44 ` Kirill A. Shutemov [this message] 2019-06-14 11:47 ` [PATCH, RFC 45/62] mm: Add the encrypt_mprotect() system call " Peter Zijlstra 2019-06-14 17:35 ` Alison Schofield 2019-06-14 11:51 ` Peter Zijlstra 2019-06-15 0:32 ` Alison Schofield 2019-06-17 9:08 ` Peter Zijlstra 2019-06-17 15:07 ` Andy Lutomirski 2019-06-17 15:28 ` Dave Hansen 2019-06-17 15:46 ` Andy Lutomirski 2019-06-17 18:27 ` Dave Hansen 2019-06-17 19:12 ` Andy Lutomirski 2019-06-17 21:36 ` Dave Hansen 2019-06-18 0:48 ` Kai Huang 2019-06-18 1:50 ` Andy Lutomirski 2019-06-18 2:11 ` Kai Huang 2019-06-18 4:24 ` Andy Lutomirski 2019-06-18 14:19 ` Dave Hansen 2019-06-18 0:05 ` Kai Huang 2019-06-18 0:15 ` Andy Lutomirski 2019-06-18 1:35 ` Kai Huang 2019-06-18 1:43 ` Andy Lutomirski 2019-06-18 2:23 ` Kai Huang 2019-06-18 9:12 ` Peter Zijlstra 2019-06-18 14:09 ` Dave Hansen 2019-06-18 16:15 ` Kirill A. Shutemov 2019-06-18 16:22 ` Dave Hansen 2019-06-18 16:36 ` Andy Lutomirski 2019-06-18 16:48 ` Dave Hansen 2019-06-18 14:13 ` Dave Hansen 2019-06-17 23:59 ` Kai Huang 2019-06-18 1:34 ` Lendacky, Thomas 2019-06-18 1:40 ` Andy Lutomirski 2019-06-18 2:02 ` Lendacky, Thomas 2019-06-18 4:19 ` Andy Lutomirski 2019-05-08 14:44 ` [PATCH, RFC 46/62] x86/mm: Keep reference counts on encrypted VMAs " Kirill A. Shutemov 2019-06-14 11:54 ` Peter Zijlstra 2019-06-14 18:39 ` Alison Schofield 2019-05-08 14:44 ` [PATCH, RFC 47/62] mm: Restrict MKTME memory encryption to anonymous VMAs Kirill A. Shutemov 2019-06-14 11:55 ` Peter Zijlstra 2019-06-15 0:07 ` Alison Schofield 2019-05-08 14:44 ` [PATCH, RFC 48/62] selftests/x86/mktme: Test the MKTME APIs Kirill A. Shutemov 2019-05-08 17:09 ` Alison Schofield 2019-05-08 14:44 ` [PATCH, RFC 49/62] mm, x86: export several MKTME variables Kirill A. Shutemov 2019-06-14 11:56 ` Peter Zijlstra 2019-06-17 3:14 ` Kai Huang 2019-06-17 7:46 ` Peter Zijlstra 2019-06-17 8:39 ` Kai Huang 2019-06-17 11:25 ` Kirill A. Shutemov 2019-05-08 14:44 ` [PATCH, RFC 50/62] kvm, x86, mmu: setup MKTME keyID to spte for given PFN Kirill A. Shutemov 2019-05-08 14:44 ` [PATCH, RFC 51/62] iommu/vt-d: Support MKTME in DMA remapping Kirill A. Shutemov 2019-06-14 12:04 ` Peter Zijlstra 2019-05-08 14:44 ` [PATCH, RFC 52/62] x86/mm: introduce common code for mem encryption Kirill A. Shutemov 2019-05-08 16:58 ` Christoph Hellwig 2019-05-08 20:52 ` Jacob Pan 2019-05-08 21:21 ` Kirill A. Shutemov 2019-05-08 14:44 ` [PATCH, RFC 53/62] x86/mm: Use common code for DMA memory encryption Kirill A. Shutemov 2019-05-08 14:44 ` [PATCH, RFC 54/62] x86/mm: Disable MKTME on incompatible platform configurations Kirill A. Shutemov 2019-05-08 14:44 ` [PATCH, RFC 55/62] x86/mm: Disable MKTME if not all system memory supports encryption Kirill A. Shutemov 2019-05-08 14:44 ` [PATCH, RFC 56/62] x86: Introduce CONFIG_X86_INTEL_MKTME Kirill A. Shutemov 2019-05-08 14:44 ` [PATCH, RFC 57/62] x86/mktme: Overview of Multi-Key Total Memory Encryption Kirill A. Shutemov 2019-05-29 7:21 ` Mike Rapoport 2019-05-29 18:13 ` Alison Schofield 2019-07-14 18:16 ` Randy Dunlap 2019-07-15 9:02 ` Kirill A. Shutemov 2019-05-08 14:44 ` [PATCH, RFC 58/62] x86/mktme: Document the MKTME provided security mitigations Kirill A. Shutemov 2019-05-08 14:44 ` [PATCH, RFC 59/62] x86/mktme: Document the MKTME kernel configuration requirements Kirill A. Shutemov 2019-05-08 14:44 ` [PATCH, RFC 60/62] x86/mktme: Document the MKTME Key Service API Kirill A. Shutemov 2019-05-08 14:44 ` [PATCH, RFC 61/62] x86/mktme: Document the MKTME API for anonymous memory encryption Kirill A. Shutemov 2019-05-08 14:44 ` [PATCH, RFC 62/62] x86/mktme: Demonstration program using the MKTME APIs Kirill A. Shutemov 2019-05-29 7:30 ` [PATCH, RFC 00/62] Intel MKTME enabling Mike Rapoport 2019-05-29 18:20 ` Alison Schofield 2019-06-14 12:15 ` Peter Zijlstra
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