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From: "Ahmed S. Darwish" <darwish.07@gmail.com>
To: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Cc: Lennart Poettering <mzxreary@0pointer.de>,
"Theodore Y. Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>,
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
"Alexander E. Patrakov" <patrakov@gmail.com>,
Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>,
Andreas Dilger <adilger.kernel@dilger.ca>,
Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>, Ray Strode <rstrode@redhat.com>,
William Jon McCann <mccann@jhu.edu>,
zhangjs <zachary@baishancloud.com>,
linux-ext4@vger.kernel.org, lkml <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH RFC v3] random: getrandom(2): optionally block when CRNG is uninitialized
Date: Sun, 15 Sep 2019 12:02:01 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20190915100201.GA2663@darwi-home-pc> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20190915093057.GF20811@1wt.eu>
On Sun, Sep 15, 2019 at 11:30:57AM +0200, Willy Tarreau wrote:
> On Sun, Sep 15, 2019 at 10:59:07AM +0200, Lennart Poettering wrote:
> > We live in a world where people run HTTPS, SSH, and all that stuff in
> > the initrd already. It's where SSH host keys are generated, and plenty
> > session keys.
>
> It is exactly the type of crap that create this situation : making
> people developing such scripts believe that any random source was OK
> to generate these, and as such forcing urandom to produce crypto-solid
> randoms!
Willy, let's tone it down please... the thread is already getting a
bit toxic.
> No, distro developers must know that it's not acceptable to
> generate lifetime crypto keys from the early boot when no entropy is
> available. At least with this change they will get an error returned
> from getrandom() and will be able to ask the user to feed entropy, or
> be able to say "it was impossible to generate the SSH key right now,
> the daemon will only be started once it's possible", or "the SSH key
> we produced will not be saved because it's not safe and is only usable
> for this recovery session".
>
> > If Linux lets all that stuff run with awful entropy then
> > you pretend things where secure while they actually aren't. It's much
> > better to fail loudly in that case, I am sure.
>
> This is precisely what this change permits : fail instead of block
> by default, and let applications decide based on the use case.
>
Unfortunately, not exactly.
Linus didn't want getrandom to return an error code / "to fail" in
that case, but to silently return CRNG-uninitialized /dev/urandom
data, to avoid user-space even working around the error code through
busy-loops.
I understand the rationale behind that, of course, and this is what
I've done so far in the V3 RFC.
Nonetheless, this _will_, for example, make systemd-random-seed(8)
save week seeds under /var/lib/systemd/random-seed, since the kernel
didn't inform it about such weakness at all..
The situation is so bad now, that it's more of "some user-space are
more equal than others".. Let's just at least admit this while
discussing the RFC patch in question.
thanks,
> > Quite frankly, I don't think this is something to fix in the
> > kernel.
>
> As long as it offers a single API to return randoms, and that it is
> not possible not to block for low-quality randoms, it needs to be
> at least addressed there. Then userspace can adapt. For now userspace
> does not have this option just due to the kernel's way of exposing
> randoms.
>
> Willy
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2019-09-15 10:02 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 213+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2019-09-08 20:59 Linux 5.3-rc8 Linus Torvalds
2019-09-10 4:21 ` Ahmed S. Darwish
2019-09-10 11:33 ` Linus Torvalds
2019-09-10 12:21 ` Linus Torvalds
2019-09-10 17:33 ` Ahmed S. Darwish
2019-09-10 17:47 ` Reindl Harald
2019-09-10 18:21 ` Linus Torvalds
2019-09-11 16:07 ` Theodore Y. Ts'o
2019-09-11 16:45 ` Linus Torvalds
2019-09-11 17:00 ` Linus Torvalds
2019-09-11 17:36 ` Theodore Y. Ts'o
2019-09-12 3:44 ` Ahmed S. Darwish
2019-09-12 8:25 ` Theodore Y. Ts'o
2019-09-12 11:34 ` Linus Torvalds
2019-09-12 11:58 ` Willy Tarreau
2019-09-14 12:25 ` [PATCH RFC] random: getrandom(2): don't block on non-initialized entropy pool Ahmed S. Darwish
2019-09-14 14:08 ` Alexander E. Patrakov
2019-09-15 5:22 ` [PATCH RFC v2] random: optionally block in getrandom(2) when the CRNG is uninitialized Theodore Y. Ts'o
2019-09-15 8:17 ` [PATCH RFC v3] random: getrandom(2): optionally block when " Ahmed S. Darwish
2019-09-15 8:59 ` Lennart Poettering
2019-09-15 9:30 ` Willy Tarreau
2019-09-15 10:02 ` Ahmed S. Darwish [this message]
2019-09-15 10:40 ` Willy Tarreau
2019-09-15 10:55 ` Ahmed S. Darwish
2019-09-15 11:17 ` Willy Tarreau
2019-09-15 17:32 ` [PATCH RFC v2] random: optionally block in getrandom(2) when the " Linus Torvalds
2019-09-15 18:32 ` Willy Tarreau
2019-09-15 18:36 ` Willy Tarreau
2019-09-15 19:08 ` Linus Torvalds
2019-09-15 19:18 ` Willy Tarreau
2019-09-15 19:31 ` Linus Torvalds
2019-09-15 19:54 ` Willy Tarreau
2019-09-15 18:59 ` Linus Torvalds
2019-09-15 19:12 ` Willy Tarreau
2019-09-16 2:45 ` Ahmed S. Darwish
2019-09-16 18:08 ` Lennart Poettering
2019-09-16 19:16 ` Willy Tarreau
2019-09-18 21:15 ` [PATCH RFC v4 0/1] random: WARN on large getrandom() waits and introduce getrandom2() Ahmed S. Darwish
2019-09-18 21:17 ` [PATCH RFC v4 1/1] " Ahmed S. Darwish
2019-09-18 23:57 ` Linus Torvalds
2019-09-19 14:34 ` Theodore Y. Ts'o
2019-09-19 15:20 ` Linus Torvalds
2019-09-19 15:50 ` Linus Torvalds
2019-09-20 13:13 ` Theodore Y. Ts'o
2019-09-19 20:04 ` Linus Torvalds
2019-09-19 20:45 ` Alexander E. Patrakov
2019-09-19 21:47 ` Linus Torvalds
2019-09-19 22:23 ` Alexander E. Patrakov
2019-09-19 23:44 ` Alexander E. Patrakov
2019-09-20 13:16 ` Theodore Y. Ts'o
2019-09-23 11:55 ` David Laight
2019-09-20 13:08 ` Theodore Y. Ts'o
2019-09-20 13:46 ` Ahmed S. Darwish
2019-09-20 14:33 ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-09-20 16:29 ` Linus Torvalds
2019-09-20 17:52 ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-09-20 18:09 ` Linus Torvalds
2019-09-20 18:16 ` Willy Tarreau
2019-09-20 19:12 ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-09-20 19:51 ` Linus Torvalds
2019-09-20 20:11 ` Alexander E. Patrakov
2019-09-20 20:17 ` Matthew Garrett
2019-09-20 20:51 ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-09-20 22:44 ` Linus Torvalds
2019-09-20 23:30 ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-09-21 3:05 ` Willy Tarreau
2019-09-21 6:07 ` Florian Weimer
2019-09-23 18:33 ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-09-26 21:11 ` Ahmed S. Darwish
2019-09-20 18:12 ` Willy Tarreau
2019-09-20 19:22 ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-09-20 19:37 ` Willy Tarreau
2019-09-20 19:52 ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-09-20 20:02 ` Linus Torvalds
2019-09-20 18:15 ` Alexander E. Patrakov
2019-09-20 18:29 ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-09-20 17:26 ` Willy Tarreau
2019-09-20 17:56 ` Ahmed S. Darwish
2019-09-26 20:42 ` [PATCH v5 0/1] random: getrandom(2): warn on large CRNG waits, introduce new flags Ahmed S. Darwish
2019-09-26 20:44 ` [PATCH v5 1/1] " Ahmed S. Darwish
2019-09-26 21:39 ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-09-28 9:30 ` Ahmed S. Darwish
2019-09-20 0:51 ` [random] ec47a799bf: WARNING:at_drivers/char/random.c:#getrandom_wait kernel test robot
2019-09-14 15:02 ` Linux 5.3-rc8 Ahmed S. Darwish
2019-09-14 16:30 ` Linus Torvalds
2019-09-14 16:35 ` Alexander E. Patrakov
2019-09-14 16:52 ` Linus Torvalds
2019-09-14 17:09 ` Alexander E. Patrakov
2019-09-14 19:19 ` Linus Torvalds
2019-09-15 6:56 ` Lennart Poettering
2019-09-15 7:01 ` Willy Tarreau
2019-09-15 7:05 ` Lennart Poettering
2019-09-15 7:07 ` Willy Tarreau
2019-09-15 8:34 ` Lennart Poettering
2019-09-15 17:02 ` Linus Torvalds
2019-09-16 3:23 ` Theodore Y. Ts'o
2019-09-16 3:40 ` Linus Torvalds
2019-09-16 3:56 ` Linus Torvalds
2019-09-16 17:00 ` Theodore Y. Ts'o
2019-09-16 17:07 ` Linus Torvalds
2019-09-14 21:11 ` Ahmed S. Darwish
2019-09-14 22:05 ` Martin Steigerwald
2019-09-14 22:24 ` Theodore Y. Ts'o
2019-09-14 22:32 ` Linus Torvalds
2019-09-15 1:00 ` Theodore Y. Ts'o
2019-09-15 1:10 ` Linus Torvalds
2019-09-15 2:05 ` Theodore Y. Ts'o
2019-09-15 2:11 ` Linus Torvalds
2019-09-15 6:33 ` Willy Tarreau
2019-09-15 6:53 ` Willy Tarreau
2019-09-15 6:51 ` Lennart Poettering
2019-09-15 7:27 ` Ahmed S. Darwish
2019-09-15 8:48 ` Lennart Poettering
2019-09-15 16:29 ` Linus Torvalds
2019-09-16 1:40 ` Ahmed S. Darwish
2019-09-16 1:48 ` Vito Caputo
2019-09-16 2:49 ` Theodore Y. Ts'o
2019-09-16 4:29 ` Willy Tarreau
2019-09-16 5:02 ` Linus Torvalds
2019-09-16 6:12 ` Willy Tarreau
2019-09-16 16:17 ` Linus Torvalds
2019-09-16 17:21 ` Theodore Y. Ts'o
2019-09-16 17:44 ` Linus Torvalds
2019-09-16 17:55 ` Serge Belyshev
2019-09-16 19:08 ` Willy Tarreau
2019-09-16 23:02 ` Matthew Garrett
2019-09-16 23:05 ` Linus Torvalds
2019-09-16 23:11 ` Matthew Garrett
2019-09-16 23:13 ` Alexander E. Patrakov
2019-09-16 23:15 ` Matthew Garrett
2019-09-16 23:18 ` Linus Torvalds
2019-09-16 23:29 ` Ahmed S. Darwish
2019-09-17 1:05 ` Linus Torvalds
2019-09-17 1:23 ` Matthew Garrett
2019-09-17 1:41 ` Linus Torvalds
2019-09-17 1:46 ` Matthew Garrett
2019-09-17 5:24 ` Willy Tarreau
2019-09-17 7:33 ` Martin Steigerwald
2019-09-17 8:35 ` Willy Tarreau
2019-09-17 8:44 ` Martin Steigerwald
2019-09-17 12:11 ` Theodore Y. Ts'o
2019-09-17 12:30 ` Ahmed S. Darwish
2019-09-17 12:46 ` Alexander E. Patrakov
2019-09-17 12:47 ` Willy Tarreau
2019-09-17 16:08 ` Lennart Poettering
2019-09-17 16:23 ` Linus Torvalds
2019-09-17 16:34 ` Reindl Harald
2019-09-17 17:42 ` Lennart Poettering
2019-09-17 18:01 ` Linus Torvalds
2019-09-17 20:28 ` Martin Steigerwald
2019-09-17 20:52 ` Ahmed S. Darwish
2019-09-17 21:38 ` Martin Steigerwald
2019-09-17 21:52 ` Matthew Garrett
2019-09-17 22:10 ` Martin Steigerwald
2019-09-18 13:53 ` Lennart Poettering
2019-09-19 7:28 ` Martin Steigerwald
2019-09-17 23:08 ` Linus Torvalds
2019-09-18 13:40 ` Lennart Poettering
2019-09-17 20:58 ` Linus Torvalds
2019-09-18 9:33 ` Rasmus Villemoes
2019-09-18 10:16 ` Willy Tarreau
2019-09-18 10:25 ` Alexander E. Patrakov
2019-09-18 10:42 ` Willy Tarreau
2019-09-18 19:31 ` Linus Torvalds
2019-09-18 19:56 ` Eric W. Biederman
2019-09-18 20:13 ` Linus Torvalds
2019-09-18 20:15 ` Alexander E. Patrakov
2019-09-18 20:26 ` Linus Torvalds
2019-09-18 22:12 ` Willy Tarreau
2019-09-27 13:57 ` Lennart Poettering
2019-09-27 15:58 ` Linus Torvalds
2019-09-29 9:05 ` Lennart Poettering
2019-09-17 13:11 ` Alexander E. Patrakov
2019-09-17 13:37 ` Alexander E. Patrakov
2019-09-17 15:57 ` Lennart Poettering
2019-09-17 16:21 ` Willy Tarreau
2019-09-17 17:13 ` Lennart Poettering
2019-09-17 17:29 ` Willy Tarreau
2019-09-17 20:42 ` Martin Steigerwald
2019-09-18 13:38 ` Lennart Poettering
2019-09-18 13:59 ` Alexander E. Patrakov
2019-09-18 14:50 ` Alexander E. Patrakov
2019-09-17 20:36 ` Martin Steigerwald
2019-09-17 16:27 ` Linus Torvalds
2019-09-17 16:34 ` Matthew Garrett
2019-09-17 17:16 ` Willy Tarreau
2019-09-17 17:20 ` Matthew Garrett
2019-09-17 17:23 ` Matthew Garrett
2019-09-17 17:57 ` Willy Tarreau
2019-09-17 16:58 ` Alexander E. Patrakov
2019-09-17 17:30 ` Lennart Poettering
2019-09-17 17:32 ` Willy Tarreau
2019-09-17 17:41 ` Alexander E. Patrakov
2019-09-17 17:28 ` Lennart Poettering
2019-09-17 0:03 ` Matthew Garrett
2019-09-17 0:40 ` Matthew Garrett
2019-09-17 7:15 ` a sane approach to random numbers (was: Re: Linux 5.3-rc8) Martin Steigerwald
2019-09-16 18:00 ` Linux 5.3-rc8 Alexander E. Patrakov
2019-09-16 19:53 ` Ahmed S. Darwish
2019-09-17 15:32 ` Lennart Poettering
2019-09-16 3:31 ` Linus Torvalds
2019-09-23 20:49 ` chaos generating driver was " Pavel Machek
2019-09-14 9:25 ` Ahmed S. Darwish
2019-09-14 16:27 ` Theodore Y. Ts'o
2019-09-11 21:41 ` Ahmed S. Darwish
2019-09-11 22:37 ` Ahmed S. Darwish
2019-09-16 3:52 ` Herbert Xu
2019-09-16 4:21 ` Linus Torvalds
2019-09-16 4:53 ` Willy Tarreau
2019-09-10 11:56 ` Theodore Y. Ts'o
2019-09-16 10:33 ` Christoph Hellwig
2019-10-03 21:10 ` Jon Masters
2019-10-03 21:31 ` Jon Masters
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