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* [PATCH] admin-guide/hw-vuln: Rephrase a section of core-scheduling.rst
@ 2021-07-21 19:02 Fabio M. De Francesco
  2021-07-23  4:38 ` Joel Fernandes
  2021-07-25 20:39 ` Jonathan Corbet
  0 siblings, 2 replies; 3+ messages in thread
From: Fabio M. De Francesco @ 2021-07-21 19:02 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Jonathan Corbet, Joel Fernandes (Google),
	Vineeth Pillai, Peter Zijlstra (Intel),
	linux-doc, linux-kernel
  Cc: Fabio M. De Francesco

Rephrase the "For MDS" section in core-scheduling.rst for the purpose of
making it clearer what is meant by "kernel memory is still considered
untrusted".

Suggested-by: Vineeth Pillai <Vineeth.Pillai@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Fabio M. De Francesco <fmdefrancesco@gmail.com>
---
 Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/core-scheduling.rst | 9 +++++----
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/core-scheduling.rst b/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/core-scheduling.rst
index 7b410aef9c5c..e6b5ceb219ec 100644
--- a/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/core-scheduling.rst
+++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/core-scheduling.rst
@@ -181,10 +181,11 @@ Open cross-HT issues that core scheduling does not solve
 --------------------------------------------------------
 1. For MDS
 ~~~~~~~~~~
-Core scheduling cannot protect against MDS attacks between an HT running in
-user mode and another running in kernel mode. Even though both HTs run tasks
-which trust each other, kernel memory is still considered untrusted. Such
-attacks are possible for any combination of sibling CPU modes (host or guest mode).
+Core scheduling cannot protect against MDS attacks between the siblings running in
+user mode and the others running in kernel mode. Even though all siblings run tasks
+which trust each other, when the kernel is executing code on behalf of a task, it
+cannot trust the code running in the sibling. Such attacks are possible for any
+combination of sibling CPU modes (host or guest mode).
 
 2. For L1TF
 ~~~~~~~~~~~
-- 
2.32.0


^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 3+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCH] admin-guide/hw-vuln: Rephrase a section of core-scheduling.rst
  2021-07-21 19:02 [PATCH] admin-guide/hw-vuln: Rephrase a section of core-scheduling.rst Fabio M. De Francesco
@ 2021-07-23  4:38 ` Joel Fernandes
  2021-07-25 20:39 ` Jonathan Corbet
  1 sibling, 0 replies; 3+ messages in thread
From: Joel Fernandes @ 2021-07-23  4:38 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Fabio M. De Francesco
  Cc: Jonathan Corbet, Vineeth Pillai, Peter Zijlstra (Intel),
	open list:DOCUMENTATION, LKML

On Wed, Jul 21, 2021 at 3:02 PM Fabio M. De Francesco
<fmdefrancesco@gmail.com> wrote:
>
> Rephrase the "For MDS" section in core-scheduling.rst for the purpose of
> making it clearer what is meant by "kernel memory is still considered
> untrusted".
>
> Suggested-by: Vineeth Pillai <Vineeth.Pillai@microsoft.com>
> Signed-off-by: Fabio M. De Francesco <fmdefrancesco@gmail.com>

Reviewed-by: Joel Fernandes (Google) <joelaf@google.com>

thanks,

 - Joel


> ---
>  Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/core-scheduling.rst | 9 +++++----
>  1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/core-scheduling.rst b/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/core-scheduling.rst
> index 7b410aef9c5c..e6b5ceb219ec 100644
> --- a/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/core-scheduling.rst
> +++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/core-scheduling.rst
> @@ -181,10 +181,11 @@ Open cross-HT issues that core scheduling does not solve
>  --------------------------------------------------------
>  1. For MDS
>  ~~~~~~~~~~
> -Core scheduling cannot protect against MDS attacks between an HT running in
> -user mode and another running in kernel mode. Even though both HTs run tasks
> -which trust each other, kernel memory is still considered untrusted. Such
> -attacks are possible for any combination of sibling CPU modes (host or guest mode).
> +Core scheduling cannot protect against MDS attacks between the siblings running in
> +user mode and the others running in kernel mode. Even though all siblings run tasks
> +which trust each other, when the kernel is executing code on behalf of a task, it
> +cannot trust the code running in the sibling. Such attacks are possible for any
> +combination of sibling CPU modes (host or guest mode).
>
>  2. For L1TF
>  ~~~~~~~~~~~
> --
> 2.32.0
>

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 3+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCH] admin-guide/hw-vuln: Rephrase a section of core-scheduling.rst
  2021-07-21 19:02 [PATCH] admin-guide/hw-vuln: Rephrase a section of core-scheduling.rst Fabio M. De Francesco
  2021-07-23  4:38 ` Joel Fernandes
@ 2021-07-25 20:39 ` Jonathan Corbet
  1 sibling, 0 replies; 3+ messages in thread
From: Jonathan Corbet @ 2021-07-25 20:39 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Fabio M. De Francesco, Joel Fernandes (Google),
	Vineeth Pillai, Peter Zijlstra (Intel),
	linux-doc, linux-kernel
  Cc: Fabio M. De Francesco

"Fabio M. De Francesco" <fmdefrancesco@gmail.com> writes:

> Rephrase the "For MDS" section in core-scheduling.rst for the purpose of
> making it clearer what is meant by "kernel memory is still considered
> untrusted".
>
> Suggested-by: Vineeth Pillai <Vineeth.Pillai@microsoft.com>
> Signed-off-by: Fabio M. De Francesco <fmdefrancesco@gmail.com>
> ---
>  Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/core-scheduling.rst | 9 +++++----
>  1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/core-scheduling.rst b/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/core-scheduling.rst
> index 7b410aef9c5c..e6b5ceb219ec 100644
> --- a/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/core-scheduling.rst
> +++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/core-scheduling.rst
> @@ -181,10 +181,11 @@ Open cross-HT issues that core scheduling does not solve
>  --------------------------------------------------------
>  1. For MDS
>  ~~~~~~~~~~
> -Core scheduling cannot protect against MDS attacks between an HT running in
> -user mode and another running in kernel mode. Even though both HTs run tasks
> -which trust each other, kernel memory is still considered untrusted. Such
> -attacks are possible for any combination of sibling CPU modes (host or guest mode).
> +Core scheduling cannot protect against MDS attacks between the siblings running in
> +user mode and the others running in kernel mode. Even though all siblings run tasks
> +which trust each other, when the kernel is executing code on behalf of a task, it
> +cannot trust the code running in the sibling. Such attacks are possible for any
> +combination of sibling CPU modes (host or guest mode).

Applied, thanks.  I took the liberty of reflowing that paragraph to keep
the line lengths reasonable...

jon

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 3+ messages in thread

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2021-07-21 19:02 [PATCH] admin-guide/hw-vuln: Rephrase a section of core-scheduling.rst Fabio M. De Francesco
2021-07-23  4:38 ` Joel Fernandes
2021-07-25 20:39 ` Jonathan Corbet

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