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From: Claudio Imbrenda <imbrenda@linux.ibm.com>
To: kvm@vger.kernel.org
Cc: cohuck@redhat.com, borntraeger@de.ibm.com, frankja@linux.ibm.com,
	thuth@redhat.com, pasic@linux.ibm.com, david@redhat.com,
	linux-s390@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	Ulrich.Weigand@de.ibm.com
Subject: [PATCH v3 05/14] KVM: s390: pv: handle secure storage violations for protected guests
Date: Wed,  4 Aug 2021 17:40:37 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20210804154046.88552-6-imbrenda@linux.ibm.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20210804154046.88552-1-imbrenda@linux.ibm.com>

With upcoming patches, protected guests will be able to trigger secure
storage violations in normal operation.

This patch adds handling of secure storage violations for protected
guests.

Pages that trigger the exception will be made non-secure before
attempting to use them again.

Signed-off-by: Claudio Imbrenda <imbrenda@linux.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Janosch Frank <frankja@linux.ibm.com>
---
 arch/s390/include/asm/uv.h |  1 +
 arch/s390/kernel/uv.c      | 43 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 arch/s390/mm/fault.c       | 10 +++++++++
 3 files changed, 54 insertions(+)

diff --git a/arch/s390/include/asm/uv.h b/arch/s390/include/asm/uv.h
index 3236293d5a31..c8bd72be8974 100644
--- a/arch/s390/include/asm/uv.h
+++ b/arch/s390/include/asm/uv.h
@@ -356,6 +356,7 @@ static inline int is_prot_virt_host(void)
 }
 
 int gmap_make_secure(struct gmap *gmap, unsigned long gaddr, void *uvcb);
+int gmap_destroy_page(struct gmap *gmap, unsigned long gaddr);
 int uv_destroy_owned_page(unsigned long paddr);
 int uv_convert_from_secure(unsigned long paddr);
 int uv_convert_owned_from_secure(unsigned long paddr);
diff --git a/arch/s390/kernel/uv.c b/arch/s390/kernel/uv.c
index 05f8bf61d20a..89ba36a5b4bb 100644
--- a/arch/s390/kernel/uv.c
+++ b/arch/s390/kernel/uv.c
@@ -349,6 +349,49 @@ int gmap_convert_to_secure(struct gmap *gmap, unsigned long gaddr)
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(gmap_convert_to_secure);
 
+int gmap_destroy_page(struct gmap *gmap, unsigned long gaddr)
+{
+	struct vm_area_struct *vma;
+	unsigned long uaddr;
+	struct page *page;
+	int rc;
+
+	rc = -EFAULT;
+	mmap_read_lock(gmap->mm);
+
+	uaddr = __gmap_translate(gmap, gaddr);
+	if (IS_ERR_VALUE(uaddr))
+		goto out;
+	vma = find_vma(gmap->mm, uaddr);
+	if (!vma)
+		goto out;
+	/*
+	 * Huge pages should not be able to become secure
+	 */
+	if (is_vm_hugetlb_page(vma))
+		goto out;
+
+	rc = 0;
+	/* we take an extra reference here */
+	page = follow_page(vma, uaddr, FOLL_WRITE | FOLL_GET);
+	if (IS_ERR_OR_NULL(page))
+		goto out;
+	rc = uv_destroy_owned_page(page_to_phys(page));
+	/*
+	 * Fault handlers can race; it is possible that one CPU will destroy
+	 * and import the page, at which point the second CPU handling the
+	 * same fault will not be able to destroy. In that case we do not
+	 * want to terminate the process, we instead try to export the page.
+	 */
+	if (rc)
+		rc = uv_convert_owned_from_secure(page_to_phys(page));
+	put_page(page);
+out:
+	mmap_read_unlock(gmap->mm);
+	return rc;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(gmap_destroy_page);
+
 /*
  * To be called with the page locked or with an extra reference! This will
  * prevent gmap_make_secure from touching the page concurrently. Having 2
diff --git a/arch/s390/mm/fault.c b/arch/s390/mm/fault.c
index e33c43b38afe..eb68b4f36927 100644
--- a/arch/s390/mm/fault.c
+++ b/arch/s390/mm/fault.c
@@ -850,6 +850,16 @@ NOKPROBE_SYMBOL(do_non_secure_storage_access);
 
 void do_secure_storage_violation(struct pt_regs *regs)
 {
+	unsigned long gaddr = regs->int_parm_long & __FAIL_ADDR_MASK;
+	struct gmap *gmap = (struct gmap *)S390_lowcore.gmap;
+
+	/*
+	 * If the VM has been rebooted, its address space might still contain
+	 * secure pages from the previous boot.
+	 * Clear the page so it can be reused.
+	 */
+	if (!gmap_destroy_page(gmap, gaddr))
+		return;
 	/*
 	 * Either KVM messed up the secure guest mapping or the same
 	 * page is mapped into multiple secure guests.
-- 
2.31.1


  parent reply	other threads:[~2021-08-04 15:41 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 28+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2021-08-04 15:40 [PATCH v3 00/14] KVM: s390: pv: implement lazy destroy Claudio Imbrenda
2021-08-04 15:40 ` [PATCH v3 01/14] KVM: s390: pv: add macros for UVC CC values Claudio Imbrenda
2021-08-06  7:26   ` David Hildenbrand
2021-08-06  9:34     ` Claudio Imbrenda
2021-08-06 15:15     ` Janosch Frank
2021-08-04 15:40 ` [PATCH v3 02/14] KVM: s390: pv: avoid stall notifications for some UVCs Claudio Imbrenda
2021-08-06  7:30   ` David Hildenbrand
2021-08-06  9:33     ` Claudio Imbrenda
2021-08-04 15:40 ` [PATCH v3 03/14] KVM: s390: pv: leak the ASCE page when destroy fails Claudio Imbrenda
2021-08-06  7:31   ` David Hildenbrand
2021-08-06  9:32     ` Claudio Imbrenda
2021-08-06 11:39       ` David Hildenbrand
2021-08-04 15:40 ` [PATCH v3 04/14] KVM: s390: pv: properly handle page flags for protected guests Claudio Imbrenda
2021-08-04 15:40 ` Claudio Imbrenda [this message]
2021-08-04 15:40 ` [PATCH v3 06/14] KVM: s390: pv: handle secure storage exceptions for normal guests Claudio Imbrenda
2021-08-04 15:40 ` [PATCH v3 07/14] KVM: s390: pv: refactor s390_reset_acc Claudio Imbrenda
2021-08-04 15:40 ` [PATCH v3 08/14] KVM: s390: pv: usage counter instead of flag Claudio Imbrenda
2021-08-04 15:40 ` [PATCH v3 09/14] KVM: s390: pv: add export before import Claudio Imbrenda
2021-08-04 15:40 ` [PATCH v3 10/14] KVM: s390: pv: lazy destroy for reboot Claudio Imbrenda
2021-08-04 15:40 ` [PATCH v3 11/14] KVM: s390: pv: extend lazy destroy to handle shutdown Claudio Imbrenda
2021-08-04 15:40 ` [PATCH v3 12/14] KVM: s390: pv: module parameter to fence lazy destroy Claudio Imbrenda
2021-08-04 15:40 ` [PATCH v3 13/14] KVM: s390: pv: add OOM notifier for " Claudio Imbrenda
2021-08-04 15:40 ` [PATCH v3 14/14] KVM: s390: pv: avoid export before import if possible Claudio Imbrenda
2021-08-06  7:10 ` [PATCH v3 00/14] KVM: s390: pv: implement lazy destroy David Hildenbrand
2021-08-06  9:30   ` Claudio Imbrenda
2021-08-06 11:30     ` David Hildenbrand
2021-08-06 13:44       ` Claudio Imbrenda
2021-08-09  8:50         ` David Hildenbrand

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