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From: Eric Snowberg <eric.snowberg@oracle.com> To: keyrings@vger.kernel.org, linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, zohar@linux.ibm.com, dhowells@redhat.com, dwmw2@infradead.org, herbert@gondor.apana.org.au, davem@davemloft.net, jarkko@kernel.org, jmorris@namei.org, serge@hallyn.com Cc: eric.snowberg@oracle.com, keescook@chromium.org, gregkh@linuxfoundation.org, torvalds@linux-foundation.org, scott.branden@broadcom.com, weiyongjun1@huawei.com, nayna@linux.ibm.com, ebiggers@google.com, ardb@kernel.org, nramas@linux.microsoft.com, lszubowi@redhat.com, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com, pjones@redhat.com, glin@suse.com, konrad.wilk@oracle.com Subject: [PATCH v3 02/14] KEYS: CA link restriction Date: Wed, 11 Aug 2021 22:18:43 -0400 [thread overview] Message-ID: <20210812021855.3083178-3-eric.snowberg@oracle.com> (raw) In-Reply-To: <20210812021855.3083178-1-eric.snowberg@oracle.com> Add a new link restriction. Restrict the addition of keys in a keyring based on the key to be added being a CA (self-signed). Signed-off-by: Eric Snowberg <eric.snowberg@oracle.com> --- v1: Initial version v2: Removed secondary keyring references v3: Removed restrict_link_by_system_trusted_or_ca Simplify restrict_link_by_ca - only see if the key is a CA Did not add __init in front of restrict_link_by_ca in case restriction could be resued in the future --- crypto/asymmetric_keys/restrict.c | 40 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ include/crypto/public_key.h | 5 ++++ 2 files changed, 45 insertions(+) diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/restrict.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/restrict.c index 84cefe3b3585..9ae43d3f862b 100644 --- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/restrict.c +++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/restrict.c @@ -108,6 +108,46 @@ int restrict_link_by_signature(struct key *dest_keyring, return ret; } +/** + * restrict_link_by_ca - Restrict additions to a ring of CA keys + * @dest_keyring: Keyring being linked to. + * @type: The type of key being added. + * @payload: The payload of the new key. + * @trusted: Unused. + * + * Check if the new certificate is a CA. If it is a CA, then mark the new + * certificate as being ok to link. + * + * Returns 0 if the new certificate was accepted, -ENOKEY if we could not find + * a matching parent certificate in the trusted list. -ENOPKG if the signature + * uses unsupported crypto, or some other error if there is a matching + * certificate but the signature check cannot be performed. + */ +int restrict_link_by_ca(struct key *dest_keyring, + const struct key_type *type, + const union key_payload *payload, + struct key *trust_keyring) +{ + const struct public_key_signature *sig; + const struct public_key *pkey; + + if (type != &key_type_asymmetric) + return -EOPNOTSUPP; + + sig = payload->data[asym_auth]; + if (!sig) + return -ENOPKG; + + if (!sig->auth_ids[0] && !sig->auth_ids[1]) + return -ENOKEY; + + pkey = payload->data[asym_crypto]; + if (!pkey) + return -ENOPKG; + + return public_key_verify_signature(pkey, sig); +} + static bool match_either_id(const struct asymmetric_key_ids *pair, const struct asymmetric_key_id *single) { diff --git a/include/crypto/public_key.h b/include/crypto/public_key.h index 47accec68cb0..545af1ea57de 100644 --- a/include/crypto/public_key.h +++ b/include/crypto/public_key.h @@ -71,6 +71,11 @@ extern int restrict_link_by_key_or_keyring_chain(struct key *trust_keyring, const union key_payload *payload, struct key *trusted); +extern int restrict_link_by_ca(struct key *dest_keyring, + const struct key_type *type, + const union key_payload *payload, + struct key *trust_keyring); + extern int query_asymmetric_key(const struct kernel_pkey_params *, struct kernel_pkey_query *); -- 2.18.4
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2021-08-12 2:21 UTC|newest] Thread overview: 26+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top 2021-08-12 2:18 [PATCH v3 00/14] Enroll kernel keys thru MOK Eric Snowberg 2021-08-12 2:18 ` [PATCH v3 01/14] integrity: Introduce a Linux keyring for the Machine Owner Key (MOK) Eric Snowberg 2021-08-12 18:58 ` Jarkko Sakkinen 2021-08-12 22:16 ` Eric Snowberg 2021-08-13 18:26 ` Nayna 2021-08-12 21:31 ` Mimi Zohar 2021-08-12 22:36 ` Eric Snowberg 2021-08-13 0:35 ` Mimi Zohar 2021-08-12 2:18 ` Eric Snowberg [this message] 2021-08-12 2:18 ` [PATCH v3 03/14] integrity: Trust MOK keys if MokListTrustedRT found Eric Snowberg 2021-08-12 2:18 ` [PATCH v3 04/14] integrity: add add_to_mok_keyring Eric Snowberg 2021-08-12 19:32 ` Jarkko Sakkinen 2021-08-12 22:04 ` Eric Snowberg 2021-08-12 2:18 ` [PATCH v3 05/14] integrity: restrict INTEGRITY_KEYRING_MOK to restrict_link_by_ca Eric Snowberg 2021-08-12 2:18 ` [PATCH v3 06/14] integrity: accessor function to get trust_moklist Eric Snowberg 2021-08-12 2:18 ` [PATCH v3 07/14] integrity: add new keyring handler for mok keys Eric Snowberg 2021-08-12 2:18 ` [PATCH v3 08/14] KEYS: add a reference to mok keyring Eric Snowberg 2021-08-12 2:18 ` [PATCH v3 09/14] KEYS: Introduce link restriction to include builtin, secondary and mok keys Eric Snowberg 2021-08-12 2:18 ` [PATCH v3 10/14] KEYS: change link restriction for secondary to also trust mok Eric Snowberg 2021-08-12 19:46 ` Mimi Zohar 2021-08-12 22:10 ` Eric Snowberg 2021-08-12 22:14 ` Mimi Zohar 2021-08-12 2:18 ` [PATCH v3 11/14] KEYS: link secondary_trusted_keys to mok trusted keys Eric Snowberg 2021-08-12 2:18 ` [PATCH v3 12/14] integrity: Do not allow mok keyring updates following init Eric Snowberg 2021-08-12 2:18 ` [PATCH v3 13/14] integrity: store reference to mok keyring Eric Snowberg 2021-08-12 2:18 ` [PATCH v3 14/14] integrity: change ima link restriction to include mok keys Eric Snowberg
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