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From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org> To: Eric Snowberg <eric.snowberg@oracle.com> Cc: keyrings@vger.kernel.org, linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, zohar@linux.ibm.com, dhowells@redhat.com, dwmw2@infradead.org, herbert@gondor.apana.org.au, davem@davemloft.net, jmorris@namei.org, serge@hallyn.com, keescook@chromium.org, gregkh@linuxfoundation.org, torvalds@linux-foundation.org, scott.branden@broadcom.com, weiyongjun1@huawei.com, nayna@linux.ibm.com, ebiggers@google.com, ardb@kernel.org, nramas@linux.microsoft.com, lszubowi@redhat.com, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, James.Bottomley@hansenpartnership.com, pjones@redhat.com, glin@suse.com, konrad.wilk@oracle.com Subject: Re: [PATCH v3 04/14] integrity: add add_to_mok_keyring Date: Thu, 12 Aug 2021 22:32:45 +0300 [thread overview] Message-ID: <20210812193245.yev4gyeuxrfwqfty@kernel.org> (raw) In-Reply-To: <20210812021855.3083178-5-eric.snowberg@oracle.com> On Wed, Aug 11, 2021 at 10:18:45PM -0400, Eric Snowberg wrote: > Add the ability to load Machine Owner Key (MOK) keys to the mok keyring. > If the permissions do not allow the key to be added to the mok keyring > this is not an error, add it to the platform keyring instead. Should state why it isn't an error for clarity. /Jarkko > > Signed-off-by: Eric Snowberg <eric.snowberg@oracle.com> > --- > v1: Initial version > v3: Unmodified from v1 > --- > security/integrity/integrity.h | 4 ++++ > .../integrity/platform_certs/mok_keyring.c | 21 +++++++++++++++++++ > 2 files changed, 25 insertions(+) > > diff --git a/security/integrity/integrity.h b/security/integrity/integrity.h > index e0e17ccba2e6..60d5c7ba05b2 100644 > --- a/security/integrity/integrity.h > +++ b/security/integrity/integrity.h > @@ -278,9 +278,13 @@ integrity_audit_log_start(struct audit_context *ctx, gfp_t gfp_mask, int type) > #ifdef CONFIG_INTEGRITY_PLATFORM_KEYRING > void __init add_to_platform_keyring(const char *source, const void *data, > size_t len); > +void __init add_to_mok_keyring(const char *source, const void *data, size_t len); > #else > static inline void __init add_to_platform_keyring(const char *source, > const void *data, size_t len) > { > } > +void __init add_to_mok_keyring(const char *source, const void *data, size_t len) > +{ > +} > #endif > diff --git a/security/integrity/platform_certs/mok_keyring.c b/security/integrity/platform_certs/mok_keyring.c > index fe4f2d336260..f260edac0863 100644 > --- a/security/integrity/platform_certs/mok_keyring.c > +++ b/security/integrity/platform_certs/mok_keyring.c > @@ -21,6 +21,27 @@ static __init int mok_keyring_init(void) > } > device_initcall(mok_keyring_init); > > +void __init add_to_mok_keyring(const char *source, const void *data, size_t len) > +{ > + key_perm_t perm; > + int rc; > + > + perm = (KEY_POS_ALL & ~KEY_POS_SETATTR) | KEY_USR_VIEW; > + rc = integrity_load_cert(INTEGRITY_KEYRING_MOK, source, data, len, perm); > + > + /* > + * If the mok keyring restrictions prevented the cert from loading, > + * this is not an error. Just load it into the platform keyring > + * instead. > + */ > + if (rc) > + rc = integrity_load_cert(INTEGRITY_KEYRING_PLATFORM, source, > + data, len, perm); > + > + if (rc) > + pr_info("Error adding keys to mok keyring %s\n", source); > +} > + > /* > * Try to load the MokListTrustedRT UEFI variable to see if we should trust > * the mok keys within the kernel. It is not an error if this variable > -- > 2.18.4 > >
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2021-08-12 19:32 UTC|newest] Thread overview: 26+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top 2021-08-12 2:18 [PATCH v3 00/14] Enroll kernel keys thru MOK Eric Snowberg 2021-08-12 2:18 ` [PATCH v3 01/14] integrity: Introduce a Linux keyring for the Machine Owner Key (MOK) Eric Snowberg 2021-08-12 18:58 ` Jarkko Sakkinen 2021-08-12 22:16 ` Eric Snowberg 2021-08-13 18:26 ` Nayna 2021-08-12 21:31 ` Mimi Zohar 2021-08-12 22:36 ` Eric Snowberg 2021-08-13 0:35 ` Mimi Zohar 2021-08-12 2:18 ` [PATCH v3 02/14] KEYS: CA link restriction Eric Snowberg 2021-08-12 2:18 ` [PATCH v3 03/14] integrity: Trust MOK keys if MokListTrustedRT found Eric Snowberg 2021-08-12 2:18 ` [PATCH v3 04/14] integrity: add add_to_mok_keyring Eric Snowberg 2021-08-12 19:32 ` Jarkko Sakkinen [this message] 2021-08-12 22:04 ` Eric Snowberg 2021-08-12 2:18 ` [PATCH v3 05/14] integrity: restrict INTEGRITY_KEYRING_MOK to restrict_link_by_ca Eric Snowberg 2021-08-12 2:18 ` [PATCH v3 06/14] integrity: accessor function to get trust_moklist Eric Snowberg 2021-08-12 2:18 ` [PATCH v3 07/14] integrity: add new keyring handler for mok keys Eric Snowberg 2021-08-12 2:18 ` [PATCH v3 08/14] KEYS: add a reference to mok keyring Eric Snowberg 2021-08-12 2:18 ` [PATCH v3 09/14] KEYS: Introduce link restriction to include builtin, secondary and mok keys Eric Snowberg 2021-08-12 2:18 ` [PATCH v3 10/14] KEYS: change link restriction for secondary to also trust mok Eric Snowberg 2021-08-12 19:46 ` Mimi Zohar 2021-08-12 22:10 ` Eric Snowberg 2021-08-12 22:14 ` Mimi Zohar 2021-08-12 2:18 ` [PATCH v3 11/14] KEYS: link secondary_trusted_keys to mok trusted keys Eric Snowberg 2021-08-12 2:18 ` [PATCH v3 12/14] integrity: Do not allow mok keyring updates following init Eric Snowberg 2021-08-12 2:18 ` [PATCH v3 13/14] integrity: store reference to mok keyring Eric Snowberg 2021-08-12 2:18 ` [PATCH v3 14/14] integrity: change ima link restriction to include mok keys Eric Snowberg
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