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From: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: "David Hildenbrand" <david@redhat.com>,
	"Linus Torvalds" <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
	"Andrew Morton" <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
	"Thomas Gleixner" <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	"Ingo Molnar" <mingo@redhat.com>,
	"Borislav Petkov" <bp@alien8.de>,
	"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
	"Alexander Viro" <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>,
	"Alexey Dobriyan" <adobriyan@gmail.com>,
	"Steven Rostedt" <rostedt@goodmis.org>,
	"Peter Zijlstra" <peterz@infradead.org>,
	"Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo" <acme@kernel.org>,
	"Mark Rutland" <mark.rutland@arm.com>,
	"Alexander Shishkin" <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>,
	"Jiri Olsa" <jolsa@redhat.com>,
	"Namhyung Kim" <namhyung@kernel.org>,
	"Petr Mladek" <pmladek@suse.com>,
	"Sergey Senozhatsky" <sergey.senozhatsky@gmail.com>,
	"Andy Shevchenko" <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com>,
	"Rasmus Villemoes" <linux@rasmusvillemoes.dk>,
	"Kees Cook" <keescook@chromium.org>,
	"Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>,
	"Greg Ungerer" <gerg@linux-m68k.org>,
	"Geert Uytterhoeven" <geert@linux-m68k.org>,
	"Mike Rapoport" <rppt@kernel.org>,
	"Vlastimil Babka" <vbabka@suse.cz>,
	"Vincenzo Frascino" <vincenzo.frascino@arm.com>,
	"Chinwen Chang" <chinwen.chang@mediatek.com>,
	"Catalin Marinas" <catalin.marinas@arm.com>,
	"Matthew Wilcox (Oracle)" <willy@infradead.org>,
	"Huang Ying" <ying.huang@intel.com>,
	"Jann Horn" <jannh@google.com>, "Feng Tang" <feng.tang@intel.com>,
	"Kevin Brodsky" <Kevin.Brodsky@arm.com>,
	"Michael Ellerman" <mpe@ellerman.id.au>,
	"Shawn Anastasio" <shawn@anastas.io>,
	"Steven Price" <steven.price@arm.com>,
	"Nicholas Piggin" <npiggin@gmail.com>,
	"Christian Brauner" <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>,
	"Jens Axboe" <axboe@kernel.dk>,
	"Gabriel Krisman Bertazi" <krisman@collabora.com>,
	"Peter Xu" <peterx@redhat.com>,
	"Suren Baghdasaryan" <surenb@google.com>,
	"Shakeel Butt" <shakeelb@google.com>,
	"Marco Elver" <elver@google.com>,
	"Daniel Jordan" <daniel.m.jordan@oracle.com>,
	"Nicolas Viennot" <Nicolas.Viennot@twosigma.com>,
	"Thomas Cedeno" <thomascedeno@google.com>,
	"Michal Hocko" <mhocko@suse.com>,
	"Miklos Szeredi" <miklos@szeredi.hu>,
	"Chengguang Xu" <cgxu519@mykernel.net>,
	"Christian König" <ckoenig.leichtzumerken@gmail.com>,
	"Florian Weimer" <fweimer@redhat.com>,
	"David Laight" <David.Laight@ACULAB.COM>,
	linux-unionfs@vger.kernel.org, linux-api@vger.kernel.org,
	x86@kernel.org, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-mm@kvack.org
Subject: [PATCH v2 3/7] kernel/fork: always deny write access to current MM exe_file
Date: Mon, 16 Aug 2021 21:48:36 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20210816194840.42769-4-david@redhat.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20210816194840.42769-1-david@redhat.com>

We want to remove VM_DENYWRITE only currently only used when mapping the
executable during exec. During exec, we already deny_write_access() the
executable, however, after exec completes the VMAs mapped
with VM_DENYWRITE effectively keeps write access denied via
deny_write_access().

Let's deny write access when setting or replacing the MM exe_file. With
this change, we can remove VM_DENYWRITE for mapping executables.

Make set_mm_exe_file() return an error in case deny_write_access()
fails; note that this should never happen, because exec code does a
deny_write_access() early and keeps write access denied when calling
set_mm_exe_file. However, it makes the code easier to read and makes
set_mm_exe_file() and replace_mm_exe_file() look more similar.

This represents a minor user space visible change:
sys_prctl(PR_SET_MM_MAP/EXE_FILE) can now fail if the file is already
opened writable. Also, after sys_prctl(PR_SET_MM_MAP/EXE_FILE) the file
cannot be opened writable. Note that we can already fail with -EACCES if
the file doesn't have execute permissions.

Acked-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
---
 fs/exec.c          |  4 +++-
 include/linux/mm.h |  2 +-
 kernel/fork.c      | 50 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------
 3 files changed, 48 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)

diff --git a/fs/exec.c b/fs/exec.c
index 38f63451b928..9294049f5487 100644
--- a/fs/exec.c
+++ b/fs/exec.c
@@ -1270,7 +1270,9 @@ int begin_new_exec(struct linux_binprm * bprm)
 	 * not visibile until then. This also enables the update
 	 * to be lockless.
 	 */
-	set_mm_exe_file(bprm->mm, bprm->file);
+	retval = set_mm_exe_file(bprm->mm, bprm->file);
+	if (retval)
+		goto out;
 
 	/* If the binary is not readable then enforce mm->dumpable=0 */
 	would_dump(bprm, bprm->file);
diff --git a/include/linux/mm.h b/include/linux/mm.h
index 48c6fa9ab792..56b1cd41db61 100644
--- a/include/linux/mm.h
+++ b/include/linux/mm.h
@@ -2580,7 +2580,7 @@ static inline int check_data_rlimit(unsigned long rlim,
 extern int mm_take_all_locks(struct mm_struct *mm);
 extern void mm_drop_all_locks(struct mm_struct *mm);
 
-extern void set_mm_exe_file(struct mm_struct *mm, struct file *new_exe_file);
+extern int set_mm_exe_file(struct mm_struct *mm, struct file *new_exe_file);
 extern int replace_mm_exe_file(struct mm_struct *mm, struct file *new_exe_file);
 extern struct file *get_mm_exe_file(struct mm_struct *mm);
 extern struct file *get_task_exe_file(struct task_struct *task);
diff --git a/kernel/fork.c b/kernel/fork.c
index eedce5c77041..543541764865 100644
--- a/kernel/fork.c
+++ b/kernel/fork.c
@@ -470,6 +470,20 @@ void free_task(struct task_struct *tsk)
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(free_task);
 
+static void dup_mm_exe_file(struct mm_struct *mm, struct mm_struct *oldmm)
+{
+	struct file *exe_file;
+
+	exe_file = get_mm_exe_file(oldmm);
+	RCU_INIT_POINTER(mm->exe_file, exe_file);
+	/*
+	 * We depend on the oldmm having properly denied write access to the
+	 * exe_file already.
+	 */
+	if (exe_file && deny_write_access(exe_file))
+		pr_warn_once("deny_write_access() failed in %s\n", __func__);
+}
+
 #ifdef CONFIG_MMU
 static __latent_entropy int dup_mmap(struct mm_struct *mm,
 					struct mm_struct *oldmm)
@@ -493,7 +507,7 @@ static __latent_entropy int dup_mmap(struct mm_struct *mm,
 	mmap_write_lock_nested(mm, SINGLE_DEPTH_NESTING);
 
 	/* No ordering required: file already has been exposed. */
-	RCU_INIT_POINTER(mm->exe_file, get_mm_exe_file(oldmm));
+	dup_mm_exe_file(mm, oldmm);
 
 	mm->total_vm = oldmm->total_vm;
 	mm->data_vm = oldmm->data_vm;
@@ -639,7 +653,7 @@ static inline void mm_free_pgd(struct mm_struct *mm)
 static int dup_mmap(struct mm_struct *mm, struct mm_struct *oldmm)
 {
 	mmap_write_lock(oldmm);
-	RCU_INIT_POINTER(mm->exe_file, get_mm_exe_file(oldmm));
+	dup_mm_exe_file(mm, oldmm);
 	mmap_write_unlock(oldmm);
 	return 0;
 }
@@ -1149,8 +1163,10 @@ void mmput_async(struct mm_struct *mm)
  * Main users are mmput() and sys_execve(). Callers prevent concurrent
  * invocations: in mmput() nobody alive left, in execve task is single
  * threaded.
+ *
+ * Can only fail if new_exe_file != NULL.
  */
-void set_mm_exe_file(struct mm_struct *mm, struct file *new_exe_file)
+int set_mm_exe_file(struct mm_struct *mm, struct file *new_exe_file)
 {
 	struct file *old_exe_file;
 
@@ -1161,11 +1177,21 @@ void set_mm_exe_file(struct mm_struct *mm, struct file *new_exe_file)
 	 */
 	old_exe_file = rcu_dereference_raw(mm->exe_file);
 
-	if (new_exe_file)
+	if (new_exe_file) {
+		/*
+		 * We expect the caller (i.e., sys_execve) to already denied
+		 * write access, so this is unlikely to fail.
+		 */
+		if (unlikely(deny_write_access(new_exe_file)))
+			return -EACCES;
 		get_file(new_exe_file);
+	}
 	rcu_assign_pointer(mm->exe_file, new_exe_file);
-	if (old_exe_file)
+	if (old_exe_file) {
+		allow_write_access(old_exe_file);
 		fput(old_exe_file);
+	}
+	return 0;
 }
 
 /**
@@ -1201,10 +1227,22 @@ int replace_mm_exe_file(struct mm_struct *mm, struct file *new_exe_file)
 	}
 
 	/* set the new file, lockless */
+	ret = deny_write_access(new_exe_file);
+	if (ret)
+		return -EACCES;
 	get_file(new_exe_file);
+
 	old_exe_file = xchg(&mm->exe_file, new_exe_file);
-	if (old_exe_file)
+	if (old_exe_file) {
+		/*
+		 * Don't race with dup_mmap() getting the file and disallowing
+		 * write access while someone might open the file writable.
+		 */
+		mmap_read_lock(mm);
+		allow_write_access(old_exe_file);
 		fput(old_exe_file);
+		mmap_read_unlock(mm);
+	}
 	return 0;
 }
 
-- 
2.31.1


  parent reply	other threads:[~2021-08-16 19:50 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 18+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2021-08-16 19:48 [PATCH v2 0/7] Remove in-tree usage of MAP_DENYWRITE David Hildenbrand
2021-08-16 19:48 ` [PATCH v2 1/7] binfmt: don't use MAP_DENYWRITE when loading shared libraries via uselib() David Hildenbrand
2021-09-05 15:32   ` Guenter Roeck
2021-09-05 17:17     ` Linus Torvalds
2021-09-05 19:07       ` David Hildenbrand
2021-08-16 19:48 ` [PATCH v2 2/7] kernel/fork: factor out replacing the current MM exe_file David Hildenbrand
2021-08-19 20:51   ` Linus Torvalds
2021-08-20  8:46     ` David Hildenbrand
2021-08-20 14:36       ` Eric W. Biederman
2021-08-22 17:58         ` Linus Torvalds
2021-08-16 19:48 ` David Hildenbrand [this message]
2021-08-16 19:48 ` [PATCH v2 4/7] binfmt: remove in-tree usage of MAP_DENYWRITE David Hildenbrand
2021-08-16 19:48 ` [PATCH v2 5/7] mm: remove VM_DENYWRITE David Hildenbrand
2021-08-16 19:48 ` [PATCH v2 6/7] mm: ignore MAP_DENYWRITE in ksys_mmap_pgoff() David Hildenbrand
2021-08-16 19:48 ` [PATCH v2 7/7] fs: update documentation of get_write_access() and friends David Hildenbrand
2021-08-17 11:01 ` [PATCH v2 0/7] Remove in-tree usage of MAP_DENYWRITE Christian König
2021-09-03  9:45 ` David Hildenbrand
2021-09-03 16:26   ` Linus Torvalds

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