LKML Archive on lore.kernel.org help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org> To: Rob Herring <robh@kernel.org> Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>, Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>, Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>, Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org, Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org>, Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>, Kan Liang <kan.liang@linux.intel.com>, Ian Rogers <irogers@google.com>, Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>, honnappa.nagarahalli@arm.com, Zachary.Leaf@arm.com, Raphael Gault <raphael.gault@arm.com>, Jonathan Cameron <Jonathan.Cameron@huawei.com>, Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>, Itaru Kitayama <itaru.kitayama@gmail.com>, linux-perf-users@vger.kernel.org Subject: Re: [PATCH v9 2/3] arm64: perf: Enable PMU counter userspace access for perf event Date: Tue, 24 Aug 2021 16:27:20 +0100 [thread overview] Message-ID: <20210824152720.GC23146@willie-the-truck> (raw) In-Reply-To: <20210806225123.1958497-3-robh@kernel.org> On Fri, Aug 06, 2021 at 04:51:22PM -0600, Rob Herring wrote: > Arm PMUs can support direct userspace access of counters which allows for > low overhead (i.e. no syscall) self-monitoring of tasks. The same feature > exists on x86 called 'rdpmc'. Unlike x86, userspace access will only be > enabled for thread bound events. This could be extended if needed, but > simplifies the implementation and reduces the chances for any > information leaks (which the x86 implementation suffers from). > > When an event is capable of userspace access and has been mmapped, userspace > access is enabled when the event is scheduled on a CPU's PMU. There's some > additional overhead clearing counters when disabled in order to prevent > leaking disabled counter data from other tasks. > > Unlike x86, enabling of userspace access must be requested with a new > attr bit: config1:1. If the user requests userspace access and 64-bit > counters, then chaining will be disabled and the user will get the > maximum size counter the underlying h/w can support. The modes for > config1 are as follows: > > config1 = 0 : user access disabled and always 32-bit > config1 = 1 : user access disabled and always 64-bit (using chaining if needed) > config1 = 2 : user access enabled and always 32-bit > config1 = 3 : user access enabled and counter size matches underlying counter. > > Based on work by Raphael Gault <raphael.gault@arm.com>, but has been > completely re-written. > > Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org> > Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> > Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> > Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> > Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org> > Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com> > Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com> > Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org> > Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> > Cc: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org > Cc: linux-perf-users@vger.kernel.org > Signed-off-by: Rob Herring <robh@kernel.org> > > --- > v9: > - Enabling/disabling of user access is now controlled in .start() and > mmap hooks which are now called on CPUs that the event is on. > Depends on rework of perf core and x86 RDPMC code posted here: > https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20210728230230.1911468-1-robh@kernel.org/ > > v8: > - Rework user access tracking and enabling to be done on task > context changes using sched_task() hook. This avoids the need for any > IPIs, mm_switch hooks or undef instr handler. > - Only support user access when explicitly requested on open and > only for a thread bound events. This avoids some of the information > leaks x86 has and simplifies the implementation. > > v7: > - Clear disabled counters when user access is enabled for a task to > avoid leaking other tasks counter data. > - Rework context switch handling utilizing sched_task callback > - Add armv8pmu_event_can_chain() helper > - Rework config1 flags handling structure > - Use ARMV8_IDX_CYCLE_COUNTER_USER define for remapped user cycle > counter index > > v6: > - Add new attr.config1 rdpmc bit for userspace to hint it wants > userspace access when also requesting 64-bit counters. > > v5: > - Only set cap_user_rdpmc if event is on current cpu > - Limit enabling/disabling access to CPUs associated with the PMU > (supported_cpus) and with the mm_struct matching current->active_mm. > > v2: > - Move mapped/unmapped into arm64 code. Fixes arm32. > - Rebase on cap_user_time_short changes > > Changes from Raphael's v4: > - Drop homogeneous check > - Disable access for chained counters > - Set pmc_width in user page > --- > arch/arm64/kernel/perf_event.c | 137 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-- > include/linux/perf/arm_pmu.h | 6 ++ > 2 files changed, 135 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) > > diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/perf_event.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/perf_event.c > index 74f77b68f5f0..66d8bf62e99c 100644 > --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/perf_event.c > +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/perf_event.c > @@ -285,6 +285,7 @@ static const struct attribute_group armv8_pmuv3_events_attr_group = { > > PMU_FORMAT_ATTR(event, "config:0-15"); > PMU_FORMAT_ATTR(long, "config1:0"); > +PMU_FORMAT_ATTR(rdpmc, "config1:1"); > > static int sysctl_perf_user_access __read_mostly; > > @@ -306,9 +307,15 @@ static inline bool armv8pmu_event_is_64bit(struct perf_event *event) > return event->attr.config1 & 0x1; > } > > +static inline bool armv8pmu_event_want_user_access(struct perf_event *event) > +{ > + return event->attr.config1 & 0x2; > +} > + > static struct attribute *armv8_pmuv3_format_attrs[] = { > &format_attr_event.attr, > &format_attr_long.attr, > + &format_attr_rdpmc.attr, > NULL, > }; > > @@ -377,7 +384,7 @@ static const struct attribute_group armv8_pmuv3_caps_attr_group = { > */ > #define ARMV8_IDX_CYCLE_COUNTER 0 > #define ARMV8_IDX_COUNTER0 1 > - > +#define ARMV8_IDX_CYCLE_COUNTER_USER 32 > > /* > * We unconditionally enable ARMv8.5-PMU long event counter support > @@ -389,6 +396,15 @@ static bool armv8pmu_has_long_event(struct arm_pmu *cpu_pmu) > return (cpu_pmu->pmuver >= ID_AA64DFR0_PMUVER_8_5); > } > > +static inline bool armv8pmu_event_can_chain(struct perf_event *event) > +{ > + struct arm_pmu *cpu_pmu = to_arm_pmu(event->pmu); > + > + return !(event->hw.flags & PERF_EVENT_FLAG_USER_READ_CNT) && > + armv8pmu_event_is_64bit(event) && > + !armv8pmu_has_long_event(cpu_pmu); Could check against ARMV8_IDX_CYCLE_COUNTER here... > +} > + > /* > * We must chain two programmable counters for 64 bit events, > * except when we have allocated the 64bit cycle counter (for CPU > @@ -398,11 +414,9 @@ static bool armv8pmu_has_long_event(struct arm_pmu *cpu_pmu) > static inline bool armv8pmu_event_is_chained(struct perf_event *event) > { > int idx = event->hw.idx; > - struct arm_pmu *cpu_pmu = to_arm_pmu(event->pmu); > > return !WARN_ON(idx < 0) && > - armv8pmu_event_is_64bit(event) && > - !armv8pmu_has_long_event(cpu_pmu) && > + armv8pmu_event_can_chain(event) && > (idx != ARMV8_IDX_CYCLE_COUNTER); ... then we wouldn't need to here. > } > > @@ -733,6 +747,35 @@ static inline u32 armv8pmu_getreset_flags(void) > return value; > } > > +static void armv8pmu_disable_user_access(void) > +{ > + write_sysreg(0, pmuserenr_el0); > +} > + > +static void armv8pmu_enable_user_access(struct arm_pmu *cpu_pmu) > +{ > + struct pmu_hw_events *cpuc = this_cpu_ptr(cpu_pmu->hw_events); > + > + if (!sysctl_perf_user_access) > + return; > + > + if (!bitmap_empty(cpuc->dirty_mask, ARMPMU_MAX_HWEVENTS)) { > + int i; > + /* Don't need to clear assigned counters. */ > + bitmap_xor(cpuc->dirty_mask, cpuc->dirty_mask, cpuc->used_mask, ARMPMU_MAX_HWEVENTS); > + > + for_each_set_bit(i, cpuc->dirty_mask, ARMPMU_MAX_HWEVENTS) { > + if (i == ARMV8_IDX_CYCLE_COUNTER) > + write_sysreg(0, pmccntr_el0); > + else > + armv8pmu_write_evcntr(i, 0); > + } Given that we can't expose individual counters, why isn't this just: for_each_clear_bit(i, cpuc->used_mask, ARMPMU_MAX_HWEVENTS) ... and we could get rid of the dirty_mask altogether? i.e. just zero everything that isn't assigned. > + bitmap_zero(cpuc->dirty_mask, ARMPMU_MAX_HWEVENTS); > + } > + > + write_sysreg(ARMV8_PMU_USERENR_ER | ARMV8_PMU_USERENR_CR, pmuserenr_el0); > +} > + > static void armv8pmu_enable_event(struct perf_event *event) > { > /* > @@ -776,6 +819,16 @@ static void armv8pmu_disable_event(struct perf_event *event) > > static void armv8pmu_start(struct arm_pmu *cpu_pmu) > { > + if (sysctl_perf_user_access) { armv8pmu_enable_user_access() already checks this. > + struct perf_cpu_context *cpuctx = this_cpu_ptr(cpu_pmu->pmu.pmu_cpu_context); > + struct perf_event_context *task_ctx = cpuctx->task_ctx; > + if (atomic_read(&cpuctx->ctx.nr_user) || I thought we only enabled this for per-task events, so not sure why we need this check. But actually, I don't get why we need any extra logic in this function at all; why aren't the ->mapped/->unmapped functions sufficient? Will
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2021-08-24 15:27 UTC|newest] Thread overview: 8+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top 2021-08-06 22:51 [PATCH v9 0/3] arm64 userspace counter support Rob Herring 2021-08-06 22:51 ` [PATCH v9 1/3] arm64: perf: Add userspace counter access disable switch Rob Herring 2021-08-24 15:26 ` Will Deacon 2021-08-06 22:51 ` [PATCH v9 2/3] arm64: perf: Enable PMU counter userspace access for perf event Rob Herring 2021-08-24 15:27 ` Will Deacon [this message] 2021-08-24 21:58 ` Rob Herring 2021-08-25 19:59 ` Rob Herring 2021-08-06 22:51 ` [PATCH v9 3/3] Documentation: arm64: Document PMU counters access from userspace Rob Herring
Reply instructions: You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email using any one of the following methods: * Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client, and reply-to-all from there: mbox Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style * Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to switches of git-send-email(1): git send-email \ --in-reply-to=20210824152720.GC23146@willie-the-truck \ --to=will@kernel.org \ --cc=Jonathan.Cameron@huawei.com \ --cc=Zachary.Leaf@arm.com \ --cc=acme@kernel.org \ --cc=alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com \ --cc=catalin.marinas@arm.com \ --cc=honnappa.nagarahalli@arm.com \ --cc=irogers@google.com \ --cc=itaru.kitayama@gmail.com \ --cc=jolsa@redhat.com \ --cc=kan.liang@linux.intel.com \ --cc=linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org \ --cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \ --cc=linux-perf-users@vger.kernel.org \ --cc=mark.rutland@arm.com \ --cc=mingo@redhat.com \ --cc=namhyung@kernel.org \ --cc=peterz@infradead.org \ --cc=raphael.gault@arm.com \ --cc=robh@kernel.org \ /path/to/YOUR_REPLY https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html * If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header via mailto: links, try the mailto: linkBe sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox; as well as URLs for NNTP newsgroup(s).