LKML Archive on lore.kernel.org help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com> To: x86@kernel.org, "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>, Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>, Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, linux-api@vger.kernel.org, Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>, Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>, Balbir Singh <bsingharora@gmail.com>, Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>, Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@gmail.com>, Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>, Eugene Syromiatnikov <esyr@redhat.com>, Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com>, "H.J. Lu" <hjl.tools@gmail.com>, Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>, Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>, Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>, Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com>, Nadav Amit <nadav.amit@gmail.com>, Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>, Pavel Machek <pavel@ucw.cz>, Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>, Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>, "Ravi V. Shankar" <ravi.v.shankar@intel.com>, Dave Martin <Dave.Martin@arm.com>, Weijiang Yang <weijiang.yang@intel.com>, Pengfei Xu <pengfei.xu@intel.com>, Haitao Huang <haitao.huang@intel.com>, Rick P Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com> Cc: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com> Subject: [PATCH v30 02/32] x86/cet/shstk: Add Kconfig option for Shadow Stack Date: Mon, 30 Aug 2021 11:14:58 -0700 [thread overview] Message-ID: <20210830181528.1569-3-yu-cheng.yu@intel.com> (raw) In-Reply-To: <20210830181528.1569-1-yu-cheng.yu@intel.com> Shadow Stack provides protection against function return address corruption. It is active when the processor supports it, the kernel has CONFIG_X86_SHADOW_STACK enabled, and the application is built for the feature. This is only implemented for the 64-bit kernel. When it is enabled, legacy non-Shadow Stack applications continue to work, but without protection. Signed-off-by: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> --- v25: - Remove X86_CET and use X86_SHADOW_STACK directly. v24: - Update for the splitting X86_CET to X86_SHADOW_STACK and X86_IBT. --- arch/x86/Kconfig | 22 ++++++++++++++++++++++ arch/x86/Kconfig.assembler | 5 +++++ 2 files changed, 27 insertions(+) diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig b/arch/x86/Kconfig index 88fb922c23a0..cb0405ccf858 100644 --- a/arch/x86/Kconfig +++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig @@ -26,6 +26,7 @@ config X86_64 depends on 64BIT # Options that are inherently 64-bit kernel only: select ARCH_HAS_GIGANTIC_PAGE + select ARCH_HAS_SHADOW_STACK select ARCH_SUPPORTS_INT128 if CC_HAS_INT128 select ARCH_USE_CMPXCHG_LOCKREF select HAVE_ARCH_SOFT_DIRTY @@ -1908,6 +1909,27 @@ config X86_SGX If unsure, say N. +config ARCH_HAS_SHADOW_STACK + def_bool n + +config X86_SHADOW_STACK + prompt "Intel Shadow Stack" + def_bool n + depends on AS_WRUSS + depends on ARCH_HAS_SHADOW_STACK + select ARCH_USES_HIGH_VMA_FLAGS + help + Shadow Stack protection is a hardware feature that detects function + return address corruption. This helps mitigate ROP attacks. + Applications must be enabled to use it, and old userspace does not + get protection "for free". + Support for this feature is present on Tiger Lake family of + processors released in 2020 or later. Enabling this feature + increases kernel text size by 3.7 KB. + See Documentation/x86/intel_cet.rst for more information. + + If unsure, say N. + config EFI bool "EFI runtime service support" depends on ACPI diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig.assembler b/arch/x86/Kconfig.assembler index 26b8c08e2fc4..00c79dd93651 100644 --- a/arch/x86/Kconfig.assembler +++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig.assembler @@ -19,3 +19,8 @@ config AS_TPAUSE def_bool $(as-instr,tpause %ecx) help Supported by binutils >= 2.31.1 and LLVM integrated assembler >= V7 + +config AS_WRUSS + def_bool $(as-instr,wrussq %rax$(comma)(%rbx)) + help + Supported by binutils >= 2.31 and LLVM integrated assembler -- 2.21.0
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2021-08-30 18:18 UTC|newest] Thread overview: 34+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top 2021-08-30 18:14 [PATCH v30 00/32] Control-flow Enforcement: Shadow Stack Yu-cheng Yu 2021-08-30 18:14 ` [PATCH v30 01/32] Documentation/x86: Add CET description Yu-cheng Yu 2021-10-05 14:26 ` Dave Hansen 2021-08-30 18:14 ` Yu-cheng Yu [this message] 2021-08-30 18:14 ` [PATCH v30 03/32] x86/cpufeatures: Add CET CPU feature flags for Control-flow Enforcement Technology (CET) Yu-cheng Yu 2021-08-30 18:15 ` [PATCH v30 04/32] x86/cpufeatures: Introduce CPU setup and option parsing for CET Yu-cheng Yu 2021-08-30 18:15 ` [PATCH v30 05/32] x86/fpu/xstate: Introduce CET MSR and XSAVES supervisor states Yu-cheng Yu 2021-08-30 18:15 ` [PATCH v30 06/32] x86/cet: Add control-protection fault handler Yu-cheng Yu 2021-08-30 18:15 ` [PATCH v30 07/32] x86/mm: Remove _PAGE_DIRTY from kernel RO pages Yu-cheng Yu 2021-08-30 18:15 ` [PATCH v30 08/32] x86/mm: Move pmd_write(), pud_write() up in the file Yu-cheng Yu 2021-08-30 18:15 ` [PATCH v30 09/32] x86/mm: Introduce _PAGE_COW Yu-cheng Yu 2021-08-30 18:15 ` [PATCH v30 10/32] drm/i915/gvt: Change _PAGE_DIRTY to _PAGE_DIRTY_BITS Yu-cheng Yu 2021-08-30 18:15 ` [PATCH v30 11/32] x86/mm: Update pte_modify for _PAGE_COW Yu-cheng Yu 2021-08-30 18:15 ` [PATCH v30 12/32] x86/mm: Update ptep_set_wrprotect() and pmdp_set_wrprotect() for transition from _PAGE_DIRTY to _PAGE_COW Yu-cheng Yu 2021-08-30 18:15 ` [PATCH v30 13/32] mm: Move VM_UFFD_MINOR_BIT from 37 to 38 Yu-cheng Yu 2021-08-30 18:15 ` [PATCH v30 14/32] mm: Introduce VM_SHADOW_STACK for shadow stack memory Yu-cheng Yu 2021-08-30 18:15 ` [PATCH v30 15/32] x86/mm: Check Shadow Stack page fault errors Yu-cheng Yu 2021-08-30 18:15 ` [PATCH v30 16/32] x86/mm: Update maybe_mkwrite() for shadow stack Yu-cheng Yu 2021-08-30 18:15 ` [PATCH v30 17/32] mm: Fixup places that call pte_mkwrite() directly Yu-cheng Yu 2021-08-30 18:15 ` [PATCH v30 18/32] mm: Add guard pages around a shadow stack Yu-cheng Yu 2021-08-30 18:15 ` [PATCH v30 19/32] mm/mmap: Add shadow stack pages to memory accounting Yu-cheng Yu 2021-08-30 18:15 ` [PATCH v30 20/32] mm: Update can_follow_write_pte() for shadow stack Yu-cheng Yu 2021-08-30 18:15 ` [PATCH v30 21/32] mm/mprotect: Exclude shadow stack from preserve_write Yu-cheng Yu 2021-08-30 18:15 ` [PATCH v30 22/32] mm: Re-introduce vm_flags to do_mmap() Yu-cheng Yu 2021-08-30 18:15 ` [PATCH v30 23/32] x86/cet/shstk: Add user-mode shadow stack support Yu-cheng Yu 2021-08-30 18:15 ` [PATCH v30 24/32] x86/process: Change copy_thread() argument 'arg' to 'stack_size' Yu-cheng Yu 2021-08-30 18:15 ` [PATCH v30 25/32] x86/cet/shstk: Handle thread shadow stack Yu-cheng Yu 2021-08-30 18:15 ` [PATCH v30 26/32] x86/cet/shstk: Introduce shadow stack token setup/verify routines Yu-cheng Yu 2021-08-30 18:15 ` [PATCH v30 27/32] x86/cet/shstk: Handle signals for shadow stack Yu-cheng Yu 2021-08-30 18:15 ` [PATCH v30 28/32] ELF: Introduce arch_setup_elf_property() Yu-cheng Yu 2021-08-30 18:15 ` [PATCH v30 29/32] x86/cet/shstk: Add arch_prctl functions for shadow stack Yu-cheng Yu 2021-08-30 18:15 ` [PATCH v30 30/32] mm: Move arch_calc_vm_prot_bits() to arch/x86/include/asm/mman.h Yu-cheng Yu 2021-08-30 18:15 ` [PATCH v30 31/32] mm: Update arch_validate_flags() to test vma anonymous Yu-cheng Yu 2021-08-30 18:15 ` [PATCH v30 32/32] mm: Introduce PROT_SHADOW_STACK for shadow stack Yu-cheng Yu
Reply instructions: You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email using any one of the following methods: * Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client, and reply-to-all from there: mbox Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style * Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to switches of git-send-email(1): git send-email \ --in-reply-to=20210830181528.1569-3-yu-cheng.yu@intel.com \ --to=yu-cheng.yu@intel.com \ --cc=Dave.Martin@arm.com \ --cc=arnd@arndb.de \ --cc=bp@alien8.de \ --cc=bsingharora@gmail.com \ --cc=corbet@lwn.net \ --cc=dave.hansen@linux.intel.com \ --cc=esyr@redhat.com \ --cc=fweimer@redhat.com \ --cc=gorcunov@gmail.com \ --cc=haitao.huang@intel.com \ --cc=hjl.tools@gmail.com \ --cc=hpa@zytor.com \ --cc=jannh@google.com \ --cc=keescook@chromium.org \ --cc=linux-api@vger.kernel.org \ --cc=linux-arch@vger.kernel.org \ --cc=linux-doc@vger.kernel.org \ --cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \ --cc=linux-mm@kvack.org \ --cc=luto@kernel.org \ --cc=mike.kravetz@oracle.com \ --cc=mingo@redhat.com \ --cc=nadav.amit@gmail.com \ --cc=oleg@redhat.com \ --cc=pavel@ucw.cz \ --cc=pengfei.xu@intel.com \ --cc=peterz@infradead.org \ --cc=ravi.v.shankar@intel.com \ --cc=rdunlap@infradead.org \ --cc=rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com \ --cc=tglx@linutronix.de \ --cc=weijiang.yang@intel.com \ --cc=x86@kernel.org \ /path/to/YOUR_REPLY https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html * If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header via mailto: links, try the mailto: linkBe sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox; as well as URLs for NNTP newsgroup(s).