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From: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
To: x86@kernel.org, "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org,
linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-arch@vger.kernel.org,
linux-api@vger.kernel.org, Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
Balbir Singh <bsingharora@gmail.com>,
Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@gmail.com>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
Eugene Syromiatnikov <esyr@redhat.com>,
Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com>,
"H.J. Lu" <hjl.tools@gmail.com>, Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>,
Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>,
Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com>,
Nadav Amit <nadav.amit@gmail.com>,
Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>, Pavel Machek <pavel@ucw.cz>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>,
"Ravi V. Shankar" <ravi.v.shankar@intel.com>,
Dave Martin <Dave.Martin@arm.com>,
Weijiang Yang <weijiang.yang@intel.com>,
Pengfei Xu <pengfei.xu@intel.com>,
Haitao Huang <haitao.huang@intel.com>,
Rick P Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>
Cc: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>,
"Kirill A . Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Subject: [PATCH v30 32/32] mm: Introduce PROT_SHADOW_STACK for shadow stack
Date: Mon, 30 Aug 2021 11:15:28 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20210830181528.1569-33-yu-cheng.yu@intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20210830181528.1569-1-yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
There are three possible options to create a shadow stack allocation API:
an arch_prctl, a new syscall, or adding PROT_SHADOW_STACK to mmap() and
mprotect(). Each has its advantages and compromises.
An arch_prctl() is the least intrusive. However, the existing x86
arch_prctl() takes only two parameters. Multiple parameters must be
passed in a memory buffer. There is a proposal to pass more parameters in
registers [1], but no active discussion on that.
A new syscall minimizes compatibility issues and offers an extensible frame
work to other architectures, but this will likely result in some overlap of
mmap()/mprotect().
The introduction of PROT_SHADOW_STACK to mmap()/mprotect() takes advantage
of existing APIs. The x86-specific PROT_SHADOW_STACK is translated to
VM_SHADOW_STACK and a shadow stack mapping is created without reinventing
the wheel. There are potential pitfalls though. The most obvious one
would be using this as a bypass to shadow stack protection. However, the
attacker would have to get to the syscall first.
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20200828121624.108243-1-hjl.tools@gmail.com/
Signed-off-by: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
---
arch/x86/include/asm/mman.h | 60 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/mman.h | 2 ++
include/linux/mm.h | 1 +
3 files changed, 62 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/mman.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/mman.h
index 629f6c81263a..b77933923b9a 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/mman.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/mman.h
@@ -20,11 +20,69 @@
((vm_flags) & VM_PKEY_BIT2 ? _PAGE_PKEY_BIT2 : 0) | \
((vm_flags) & VM_PKEY_BIT3 ? _PAGE_PKEY_BIT3 : 0))
-#define arch_calc_vm_prot_bits(prot, key) ( \
+#define pkey_vm_prot_bits(prot, key) ( \
((key) & 0x1 ? VM_PKEY_BIT0 : 0) | \
((key) & 0x2 ? VM_PKEY_BIT1 : 0) | \
((key) & 0x4 ? VM_PKEY_BIT2 : 0) | \
((key) & 0x8 ? VM_PKEY_BIT3 : 0))
+#else
+#define pkey_vm_prot_bits(prot, key) (0)
#endif
+static inline unsigned long arch_calc_vm_prot_bits(unsigned long prot,
+ unsigned long pkey)
+{
+ unsigned long vm_prot_bits = pkey_vm_prot_bits(prot, pkey);
+
+ if (prot & PROT_SHADOW_STACK)
+ vm_prot_bits |= VM_SHADOW_STACK;
+
+ return vm_prot_bits;
+}
+
+#define arch_calc_vm_prot_bits(prot, pkey) arch_calc_vm_prot_bits(prot, pkey)
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_SHADOW_STACK
+static inline bool arch_validate_prot(unsigned long prot, unsigned long addr)
+{
+ unsigned long valid = PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE | PROT_EXEC | PROT_SEM |
+ PROT_SHADOW_STACK;
+
+ if (prot & ~valid)
+ return false;
+
+ if (prot & PROT_SHADOW_STACK) {
+ if (!current->thread.shstk.size)
+ return false;
+
+ /*
+ * A shadow stack mapping is indirectly writable by only
+ * the CALL and WRUSS instructions, but not other write
+ * instructions). PROT_SHADOW_STACK and PROT_WRITE are
+ * mutually exclusive.
+ */
+ if (prot & PROT_WRITE)
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ return true;
+}
+
+#define arch_validate_prot arch_validate_prot
+
+static inline bool arch_validate_flags(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long vm_flags)
+{
+ /*
+ * Shadow stack must be anonymous and not shared.
+ */
+ if ((vm_flags & VM_SHADOW_STACK) && !vma_is_anonymous(vma))
+ return false;
+
+ return true;
+}
+
+#define arch_validate_flags(vma, vm_flags) arch_validate_flags(vma, vm_flags)
+
+#endif /* CONFIG_X86_SHADOW_STACK */
+
#endif /* _ASM_X86_MMAN_H */
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/mman.h b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/mman.h
index f28fa4acaeaf..4c36b263cf0a 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/mman.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/mman.h
@@ -4,6 +4,8 @@
#define MAP_32BIT 0x40 /* only give out 32bit addresses */
+#define PROT_SHADOW_STACK 0x10 /* shadow stack pages */
+
#include <asm-generic/mman.h>
#endif /* _UAPI_ASM_X86_MMAN_H */
diff --git a/include/linux/mm.h b/include/linux/mm.h
index 07e642af59d3..041e7e8ff702 100644
--- a/include/linux/mm.h
+++ b/include/linux/mm.h
@@ -349,6 +349,7 @@ extern unsigned int kobjsize(const void *objp);
#if defined(CONFIG_X86)
# define VM_PAT VM_ARCH_1 /* PAT reserves whole VMA at once (x86) */
+# define VM_ARCH_CLEAR VM_SHADOW_STACK
#elif defined(CONFIG_PPC)
# define VM_SAO VM_ARCH_1 /* Strong Access Ordering (powerpc) */
#elif defined(CONFIG_PARISC)
--
2.21.0
prev parent reply other threads:[~2021-08-30 18:19 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 34+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2021-08-30 18:14 [PATCH v30 00/32] Control-flow Enforcement: Shadow Stack Yu-cheng Yu
2021-08-30 18:14 ` [PATCH v30 01/32] Documentation/x86: Add CET description Yu-cheng Yu
2021-10-05 14:26 ` Dave Hansen
2021-08-30 18:14 ` [PATCH v30 02/32] x86/cet/shstk: Add Kconfig option for Shadow Stack Yu-cheng Yu
2021-08-30 18:14 ` [PATCH v30 03/32] x86/cpufeatures: Add CET CPU feature flags for Control-flow Enforcement Technology (CET) Yu-cheng Yu
2021-08-30 18:15 ` [PATCH v30 04/32] x86/cpufeatures: Introduce CPU setup and option parsing for CET Yu-cheng Yu
2021-08-30 18:15 ` [PATCH v30 05/32] x86/fpu/xstate: Introduce CET MSR and XSAVES supervisor states Yu-cheng Yu
2021-08-30 18:15 ` [PATCH v30 06/32] x86/cet: Add control-protection fault handler Yu-cheng Yu
2021-08-30 18:15 ` [PATCH v30 07/32] x86/mm: Remove _PAGE_DIRTY from kernel RO pages Yu-cheng Yu
2021-08-30 18:15 ` [PATCH v30 08/32] x86/mm: Move pmd_write(), pud_write() up in the file Yu-cheng Yu
2021-08-30 18:15 ` [PATCH v30 09/32] x86/mm: Introduce _PAGE_COW Yu-cheng Yu
2021-08-30 18:15 ` [PATCH v30 10/32] drm/i915/gvt: Change _PAGE_DIRTY to _PAGE_DIRTY_BITS Yu-cheng Yu
2021-08-30 18:15 ` [PATCH v30 11/32] x86/mm: Update pte_modify for _PAGE_COW Yu-cheng Yu
2021-08-30 18:15 ` [PATCH v30 12/32] x86/mm: Update ptep_set_wrprotect() and pmdp_set_wrprotect() for transition from _PAGE_DIRTY to _PAGE_COW Yu-cheng Yu
2021-08-30 18:15 ` [PATCH v30 13/32] mm: Move VM_UFFD_MINOR_BIT from 37 to 38 Yu-cheng Yu
2021-08-30 18:15 ` [PATCH v30 14/32] mm: Introduce VM_SHADOW_STACK for shadow stack memory Yu-cheng Yu
2021-08-30 18:15 ` [PATCH v30 15/32] x86/mm: Check Shadow Stack page fault errors Yu-cheng Yu
2021-08-30 18:15 ` [PATCH v30 16/32] x86/mm: Update maybe_mkwrite() for shadow stack Yu-cheng Yu
2021-08-30 18:15 ` [PATCH v30 17/32] mm: Fixup places that call pte_mkwrite() directly Yu-cheng Yu
2021-08-30 18:15 ` [PATCH v30 18/32] mm: Add guard pages around a shadow stack Yu-cheng Yu
2021-08-30 18:15 ` [PATCH v30 19/32] mm/mmap: Add shadow stack pages to memory accounting Yu-cheng Yu
2021-08-30 18:15 ` [PATCH v30 20/32] mm: Update can_follow_write_pte() for shadow stack Yu-cheng Yu
2021-08-30 18:15 ` [PATCH v30 21/32] mm/mprotect: Exclude shadow stack from preserve_write Yu-cheng Yu
2021-08-30 18:15 ` [PATCH v30 22/32] mm: Re-introduce vm_flags to do_mmap() Yu-cheng Yu
2021-08-30 18:15 ` [PATCH v30 23/32] x86/cet/shstk: Add user-mode shadow stack support Yu-cheng Yu
2021-08-30 18:15 ` [PATCH v30 24/32] x86/process: Change copy_thread() argument 'arg' to 'stack_size' Yu-cheng Yu
2021-08-30 18:15 ` [PATCH v30 25/32] x86/cet/shstk: Handle thread shadow stack Yu-cheng Yu
2021-08-30 18:15 ` [PATCH v30 26/32] x86/cet/shstk: Introduce shadow stack token setup/verify routines Yu-cheng Yu
2021-08-30 18:15 ` [PATCH v30 27/32] x86/cet/shstk: Handle signals for shadow stack Yu-cheng Yu
2021-08-30 18:15 ` [PATCH v30 28/32] ELF: Introduce arch_setup_elf_property() Yu-cheng Yu
2021-08-30 18:15 ` [PATCH v30 29/32] x86/cet/shstk: Add arch_prctl functions for shadow stack Yu-cheng Yu
2021-08-30 18:15 ` [PATCH v30 30/32] mm: Move arch_calc_vm_prot_bits() to arch/x86/include/asm/mman.h Yu-cheng Yu
2021-08-30 18:15 ` [PATCH v30 31/32] mm: Update arch_validate_flags() to test vma anonymous Yu-cheng Yu
2021-08-30 18:15 ` Yu-cheng Yu [this message]
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