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From: Claudio Imbrenda <imbrenda@linux.ibm.com> To: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com> Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org, cohuck@redhat.com, frankja@linux.ibm.com, thuth@redhat.com, pasic@linux.ibm.com, david@redhat.com, linux-s390@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, Ulrich.Weigand@de.ibm.com Subject: Re: [PATCH v4 06/14] KVM: s390: pv: properly handle page flags for protected guests Date: Mon, 6 Sep 2021 17:56:18 +0200 [thread overview] Message-ID: <20210906175618.4ce0323f@p-imbrenda> (raw) In-Reply-To: <1a44ff5c-f59f-2f37-2585-084294ed5e11@de.ibm.com> On Mon, 6 Sep 2021 17:46:40 +0200 Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com> wrote: > On 18.08.21 15:26, Claudio Imbrenda wrote: > > Introduce variants of the convert and destroy page functions that also > > clear the PG_arch_1 bit used to mark them as secure pages. > > > > These new functions can only be called on pages for which a reference > > is already being held. > > > > Signed-off-by: Claudio Imbrenda <imbrenda@linux.ibm.com> > > Acked-by: Janosch Frank <frankja@linux.ibm.com> > > Can you refresh my mind? We do have over-indication of PG_arch_1 and this > might result in spending some unneeded cycles but in the end this will be > correct. Right? > And this patch will fix some unnecessary places that add overindication. correct, PG_arch_1 will still overindicate, but with this patch it will happen less. And PG_arch_1 overindication is perfectly fine from a correctness point of view. > > --- > > arch/s390/include/asm/pgtable.h | 9 ++++++--- > > arch/s390/include/asm/uv.h | 10 ++++++++-- > > arch/s390/kernel/uv.c | 34 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- > > arch/s390/mm/gmap.c | 4 +++- > > 4 files changed, 50 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) > > > > diff --git a/arch/s390/include/asm/pgtable.h b/arch/s390/include/asm/pgtable.h > > index dcac7b2df72c..0f1af2232ebe 100644 > > --- a/arch/s390/include/asm/pgtable.h > > +++ b/arch/s390/include/asm/pgtable.h > > @@ -1074,8 +1074,9 @@ static inline pte_t ptep_get_and_clear(struct mm_struct *mm, > > pte_t res; > > > > res = ptep_xchg_lazy(mm, addr, ptep, __pte(_PAGE_INVALID)); > > + /* At this point the reference through the mapping is still present */ > > if (mm_is_protected(mm) && pte_present(res)) > > - uv_convert_from_secure(pte_val(res) & PAGE_MASK); > > + uv_convert_owned_from_secure(pte_val(res) & PAGE_MASK); > > return res; > > } > > > > @@ -1091,8 +1092,9 @@ static inline pte_t ptep_clear_flush(struct vm_area_struct *vma, > > pte_t res; > > > > res = ptep_xchg_direct(vma->vm_mm, addr, ptep, __pte(_PAGE_INVALID)); > > + /* At this point the reference through the mapping is still present */ > > if (mm_is_protected(vma->vm_mm) && pte_present(res)) > > - uv_convert_from_secure(pte_val(res) & PAGE_MASK); > > + uv_convert_owned_from_secure(pte_val(res) & PAGE_MASK); > > return res; > > } > > > > @@ -1116,8 +1118,9 @@ static inline pte_t ptep_get_and_clear_full(struct mm_struct *mm, > > } else { > > res = ptep_xchg_lazy(mm, addr, ptep, __pte(_PAGE_INVALID)); > > } > > + /* At this point the reference through the mapping is still present */ > > if (mm_is_protected(mm) && pte_present(res)) > > - uv_convert_from_secure(pte_val(res) & PAGE_MASK); > > + uv_convert_owned_from_secure(pte_val(res) & PAGE_MASK); > > return res; > > } > > > > diff --git a/arch/s390/include/asm/uv.h b/arch/s390/include/asm/uv.h > > index b35add51b967..3236293d5a31 100644 > > --- a/arch/s390/include/asm/uv.h > > +++ b/arch/s390/include/asm/uv.h > > @@ -356,8 +356,9 @@ static inline int is_prot_virt_host(void) > > } > > > > int gmap_make_secure(struct gmap *gmap, unsigned long gaddr, void *uvcb); > > -int uv_destroy_page(unsigned long paddr); > > +int uv_destroy_owned_page(unsigned long paddr); > > int uv_convert_from_secure(unsigned long paddr); > > +int uv_convert_owned_from_secure(unsigned long paddr); > > int gmap_convert_to_secure(struct gmap *gmap, unsigned long gaddr); > > > > void setup_uv(void); > > @@ -367,7 +368,7 @@ void adjust_to_uv_max(unsigned long *vmax); > > static inline void setup_uv(void) {} > > static inline void adjust_to_uv_max(unsigned long *vmax) {} > > > > -static inline int uv_destroy_page(unsigned long paddr) > > +static inline int uv_destroy_owned_page(unsigned long paddr) > > { > > return 0; > > } > > @@ -376,6 +377,11 @@ static inline int uv_convert_from_secure(unsigned long paddr) > > { > > return 0; > > } > > + > > +static inline int uv_convert_owned_from_secure(unsigned long paddr) > > +{ > > + return 0; > > +} > > #endif > > > > #if defined(CONFIG_PROTECTED_VIRTUALIZATION_GUEST) || IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KVM) > > diff --git a/arch/s390/kernel/uv.c b/arch/s390/kernel/uv.c > > index 68a8fbafcb9c..05f8bf61d20a 100644 > > --- a/arch/s390/kernel/uv.c > > +++ b/arch/s390/kernel/uv.c > > @@ -115,7 +115,7 @@ static int uv_pin_shared(unsigned long paddr) > > * > > * @paddr: Absolute host address of page to be destroyed > > */ > > -int uv_destroy_page(unsigned long paddr) > > +static int uv_destroy_page(unsigned long paddr) > > { > > struct uv_cb_cfs uvcb = { > > .header.cmd = UVC_CMD_DESTR_SEC_STOR, > > @@ -135,6 +135,22 @@ int uv_destroy_page(unsigned long paddr) > > return 0; > > } > > > > +/* > > + * The caller must already hold a reference to the page > > + */ > > +int uv_destroy_owned_page(unsigned long paddr) > > +{ > > + struct page *page = phys_to_page(paddr); > > + int rc; > > + > > + get_page(page); > > + rc = uv_destroy_page(paddr); > > + if (!rc) > > + clear_bit(PG_arch_1, &page->flags); > > + put_page(page); > > + return rc; > > +} > > + > > /* > > * Requests the Ultravisor to encrypt a guest page and make it > > * accessible to the host for paging (export). > > @@ -154,6 +170,22 @@ int uv_convert_from_secure(unsigned long paddr) > > return 0; > > } > > > > +/* > > + * The caller must already hold a reference to the page > > + */ > > +int uv_convert_owned_from_secure(unsigned long paddr) > > +{ > > + struct page *page = phys_to_page(paddr); > > + int rc; > > + > > + get_page(page); > > + rc = uv_convert_from_secure(paddr); > > + if (!rc) > > + clear_bit(PG_arch_1, &page->flags); > > + put_page(page); > > + return rc; > > +} > > + > > /* > > * Calculate the expected ref_count for a page that would otherwise have no > > * further pins. This was cribbed from similar functions in other places in > > diff --git a/arch/s390/mm/gmap.c b/arch/s390/mm/gmap.c > > index 5a138f6220c4..38b792ab57f7 100644 > > --- a/arch/s390/mm/gmap.c > > +++ b/arch/s390/mm/gmap.c > > @@ -2678,8 +2678,10 @@ static int __s390_reset_acc(pte_t *ptep, unsigned long addr, > > { > > pte_t pte = READ_ONCE(*ptep); > > > > + /* There is a reference through the mapping */ > > if (pte_present(pte)) > > - WARN_ON_ONCE(uv_destroy_page(pte_val(pte) & PAGE_MASK)); > > + WARN_ON_ONCE(uv_destroy_owned_page(pte_val(pte) & PAGE_MASK)); > > + > > return 0; > > } > > > >
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2021-09-06 15:56 UTC|newest] Thread overview: 31+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top 2021-08-18 13:26 [PATCH v4 00/14] KVM: s390: pv: implement lazy destroy for reboot Claudio Imbrenda 2021-08-18 13:26 ` [PATCH v4 01/14] KVM: s390: pv: add macros for UVC CC values Claudio Imbrenda 2021-08-31 13:43 ` Christian Borntraeger 2021-08-18 13:26 ` [PATCH v4 02/14] KVM: s390: pv: avoid double free of sida page Claudio Imbrenda 2021-08-31 13:55 ` Christian Borntraeger 2021-09-08 18:50 ` Claudio Imbrenda 2021-08-31 13:59 ` Janosch Frank 2021-08-18 13:26 ` [PATCH v4 03/14] KVM: s390: pv: avoid stalls for kvm_s390_pv_init_vm Claudio Imbrenda 2021-08-31 14:10 ` Christian Borntraeger 2021-08-18 13:26 ` [PATCH v4 04/14] KVM: s390: pv: avoid stalls when making pages secure Claudio Imbrenda 2021-08-31 14:32 ` Christian Borntraeger 2021-08-31 15:00 ` Claudio Imbrenda 2021-08-31 15:11 ` Christian Borntraeger 2021-08-18 13:26 ` [PATCH v4 05/14] KVM: s390: pv: leak the ASCE page when destroy fails Claudio Imbrenda 2021-09-06 15:32 ` Christian Borntraeger 2021-09-06 15:54 ` Claudio Imbrenda 2021-08-18 13:26 ` [PATCH v4 06/14] KVM: s390: pv: properly handle page flags for protected guests Claudio Imbrenda 2021-09-06 15:46 ` Christian Borntraeger 2021-09-06 15:56 ` Claudio Imbrenda [this message] 2021-09-06 16:16 ` Christian Borntraeger 2021-09-17 14:57 ` Claudio Imbrenda 2021-08-18 13:26 ` [PATCH v4 07/14] KVM: s390: pv: handle secure storage violations " Claudio Imbrenda 2021-08-18 13:26 ` [PATCH v4 08/14] KVM: s390: pv: handle secure storage exceptions for normal guests Claudio Imbrenda 2021-08-18 13:26 ` [PATCH v4 09/14] KVM: s390: pv: refactor s390_reset_acc Claudio Imbrenda 2021-08-18 13:26 ` [PATCH v4 10/14] KVM: s390: pv: usage counter instead of flag Claudio Imbrenda 2021-08-26 7:58 ` Janis Schoetterl-Glausch 2021-08-18 13:26 ` [PATCH v4 11/14] KVM: s390: pv: add export before import Claudio Imbrenda 2021-08-18 13:26 ` [PATCH v4 12/14] KVM: s390: pv: module parameter to fence lazy destroy Claudio Imbrenda 2021-08-18 13:26 ` [PATCH v4 13/14] KVM: s390: pv: lazy destroy for reboot Claudio Imbrenda 2021-08-26 8:33 ` Janis Schoetterl-Glausch 2021-08-18 13:26 ` [PATCH v4 14/14] KVM: s390: pv: avoid export before import if possible Claudio Imbrenda
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