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From: "Michael S. Tsirkin" <mst@redhat.com>
To: Dongli Zhang <dongli.zhang@oracle.com>
Cc: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com>,
"Paul E . McKenney" <paulmck@kernel.org>,
david.kaplan@amd.com, konrad.wilk@oracle.com,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
f.hetzelt@tu-berlin.de, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
virtualization@lists.linux-foundation.org,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Subject: Re: [PATCH V2 06/12] virtio_pci: harden MSI-X interrupts
Date: Fri, 15 Oct 2021 13:27:26 -0400 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20211015132639-mutt-send-email-mst@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <c6641b6a-6204-2b41-e775-ad329314711c@oracle.com>
On Fri, Oct 15, 2021 at 05:09:38AM -0700, Dongli Zhang wrote:
> Hi Jason,
>
> On 10/11/21 11:52 PM, Jason Wang wrote:
> > We used to synchronize pending MSI-X irq handlers via
> > synchronize_irq(), this may not work for the untrusted device which
> > may keep sending interrupts after reset which may lead unexpected
> > results. Similarly, we should not enable MSI-X interrupt until the
>
> About "unexpected results", while you mentioned below in v1 ...
>
> "My understanding is that e.g in the case of SEV/TDX we don't trust the
> hypervisor. So the hypervisor can keep sending interrupts even if the
> device is reset. The guest can only trust its own software interrupt
> management logic to avoid call virtio callback in this case."
>
> .. and you also mentioned to avoid the panic (due to untrusted device) in as
> many scenarios as possible.
>
>
> Here is my understanding.
>
> The reason we do not trust hypervisor is to protect (1) data/code privacy for
> most of times and sometimes (2) program execution integrity.
>
> The bad thing is: the hypervisor is able to panic/destroy the VM in the worst case.
>
> It is reasonable to re-configure/recover if we assume there is BUG at
> hypervisor/device side. That is, the hypervisor/device is buggy, but not malicious.
>
> However, how about to just detect and report the hypervisor/device is malicious
> and shutdown/panic the VM immediately? If we have detected the malicious
> hypervisor, we should avoid running VMs on the malicious hypervisor further. At
> least how about to print error message to reminder users that the hypervisor is
> malicious?
>
>
> About "unexpected results", it should not be hang/panic. I suggest ...
>
> Assuming SEV/TDX is involved, the hypervisor should never be able to derive the
> VM privacy (at least secure memory data) by providing malicious configuration,
> e.g., num_queues=0. If we detect hypervisor is malicious, the VM is
> panic/shutdown immediately. At least how about to print error message to
> reminder users.
>
>
> BTW, while I always do care about the loss of interrupt issue, the malicious
> device is able to hang a VM by dropping a single interrupt on purpose for
> virtio-scsi :)
>
>
> Thank you very much!
Can't say I understand what it's about. TDX does not protect against
hypervisor DoS attacks.
> Dongli Zhang
>
> > device is ready. So this patch fixes those two issues by:
> >
> > 1) switching to use disable_irq() to prevent the virtio interrupt
> > handlers to be called after the device is reset.
> > 2) using IRQF_NO_AUTOEN and enable the MSI-X irq during .ready()
> >
> > This can make sure the virtio interrupt handler won't be called before
> > virtio_device_ready() and after reset.
> >
> > Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
> > Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
> > Cc: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@kernel.org>
> > Signed-off-by: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com>
> > ---
> > drivers/virtio/virtio_pci_common.c | 27 +++++++++++++++++++++------
> > drivers/virtio/virtio_pci_common.h | 6 ++++--
> > drivers/virtio/virtio_pci_legacy.c | 5 +++--
> > drivers/virtio/virtio_pci_modern.c | 6 ++++--
> > 4 files changed, 32 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
> >
> > diff --git a/drivers/virtio/virtio_pci_common.c b/drivers/virtio/virtio_pci_common.c
> > index b35bb2d57f62..0b9523e6dd39 100644
> > --- a/drivers/virtio/virtio_pci_common.c
> > +++ b/drivers/virtio/virtio_pci_common.c
> > @@ -24,8 +24,8 @@ MODULE_PARM_DESC(force_legacy,
> > "Force legacy mode for transitional virtio 1 devices");
> > #endif
> >
> > -/* wait for pending irq handlers */
> > -void vp_synchronize_vectors(struct virtio_device *vdev)
> > +/* disable irq handlers */
> > +void vp_disable_vectors(struct virtio_device *vdev)
> > {
> > struct virtio_pci_device *vp_dev = to_vp_device(vdev);
> > int i;
> > @@ -34,7 +34,20 @@ void vp_synchronize_vectors(struct virtio_device *vdev)
> > synchronize_irq(vp_dev->pci_dev->irq);
> >
> > for (i = 0; i < vp_dev->msix_vectors; ++i)
> > - synchronize_irq(pci_irq_vector(vp_dev->pci_dev, i));
> > + disable_irq(pci_irq_vector(vp_dev->pci_dev, i));
> > +}
> > +
> > +/* enable irq handlers */
> > +void vp_enable_vectors(struct virtio_device *vdev)
> > +{
> > + struct virtio_pci_device *vp_dev = to_vp_device(vdev);
> > + int i;
> > +
> > + if (vp_dev->intx_enabled)
> > + return;
> > +
> > + for (i = 0; i < vp_dev->msix_vectors; ++i)
> > + enable_irq(pci_irq_vector(vp_dev->pci_dev, i));
> > }
> >
> > /* the notify function used when creating a virt queue */
> > @@ -141,7 +154,8 @@ static int vp_request_msix_vectors(struct virtio_device *vdev, int nvectors,
> > snprintf(vp_dev->msix_names[v], sizeof *vp_dev->msix_names,
> > "%s-config", name);
> > err = request_irq(pci_irq_vector(vp_dev->pci_dev, v),
> > - vp_config_changed, 0, vp_dev->msix_names[v],
> > + vp_config_changed, IRQF_NO_AUTOEN,
> > + vp_dev->msix_names[v],
> > vp_dev);
> > if (err)
> > goto error;
> > @@ -160,7 +174,8 @@ static int vp_request_msix_vectors(struct virtio_device *vdev, int nvectors,
> > snprintf(vp_dev->msix_names[v], sizeof *vp_dev->msix_names,
> > "%s-virtqueues", name);
> > err = request_irq(pci_irq_vector(vp_dev->pci_dev, v),
> > - vp_vring_interrupt, 0, vp_dev->msix_names[v],
> > + vp_vring_interrupt, IRQF_NO_AUTOEN,
> > + vp_dev->msix_names[v],
> > vp_dev);
> > if (err)
> > goto error;
> > @@ -337,7 +352,7 @@ static int vp_find_vqs_msix(struct virtio_device *vdev, unsigned nvqs,
> > "%s-%s",
> > dev_name(&vp_dev->vdev.dev), names[i]);
> > err = request_irq(pci_irq_vector(vp_dev->pci_dev, msix_vec),
> > - vring_interrupt, 0,
> > + vring_interrupt, IRQF_NO_AUTOEN,
> > vp_dev->msix_names[msix_vec],
> > vqs[i]);
> > if (err)
> > diff --git a/drivers/virtio/virtio_pci_common.h b/drivers/virtio/virtio_pci_common.h
> > index beec047a8f8d..a235ce9ff6a5 100644
> > --- a/drivers/virtio/virtio_pci_common.h
> > +++ b/drivers/virtio/virtio_pci_common.h
> > @@ -102,8 +102,10 @@ static struct virtio_pci_device *to_vp_device(struct virtio_device *vdev)
> > return container_of(vdev, struct virtio_pci_device, vdev);
> > }
> >
> > -/* wait for pending irq handlers */
> > -void vp_synchronize_vectors(struct virtio_device *vdev);
> > +/* disable irq handlers */
> > +void vp_disable_vectors(struct virtio_device *vdev);
> > +/* enable irq handlers */
> > +void vp_enable_vectors(struct virtio_device *vdev);
> > /* the notify function used when creating a virt queue */
> > bool vp_notify(struct virtqueue *vq);
> > /* the config->del_vqs() implementation */
> > diff --git a/drivers/virtio/virtio_pci_legacy.c b/drivers/virtio/virtio_pci_legacy.c
> > index d62e9835aeec..bdf6bc667ab5 100644
> > --- a/drivers/virtio/virtio_pci_legacy.c
> > +++ b/drivers/virtio/virtio_pci_legacy.c
> > @@ -97,8 +97,8 @@ static void vp_reset(struct virtio_device *vdev)
> > /* Flush out the status write, and flush in device writes,
> > * including MSi-X interrupts, if any. */
> > ioread8(vp_dev->ioaddr + VIRTIO_PCI_STATUS);
> > - /* Flush pending VQ/configuration callbacks. */
> > - vp_synchronize_vectors(vdev);
> > + /* Disable VQ/configuration callbacks. */
> > + vp_disable_vectors(vdev);
> > }
> >
> > static u16 vp_config_vector(struct virtio_pci_device *vp_dev, u16 vector)
> > @@ -194,6 +194,7 @@ static void del_vq(struct virtio_pci_vq_info *info)
> > }
> >
> > static const struct virtio_config_ops virtio_pci_config_ops = {
> > + .ready = vp_enable_vectors,
> > .get = vp_get,
> > .set = vp_set,
> > .get_status = vp_get_status,
> > diff --git a/drivers/virtio/virtio_pci_modern.c b/drivers/virtio/virtio_pci_modern.c
> > index 30654d3a0b41..acf0f6b6381d 100644
> > --- a/drivers/virtio/virtio_pci_modern.c
> > +++ b/drivers/virtio/virtio_pci_modern.c
> > @@ -172,8 +172,8 @@ static void vp_reset(struct virtio_device *vdev)
> > */
> > while (vp_modern_get_status(mdev))
> > msleep(1);
> > - /* Flush pending VQ/configuration callbacks. */
> > - vp_synchronize_vectors(vdev);
> > + /* Disable VQ/configuration callbacks. */
> > + vp_disable_vectors(vdev);
> > }
> >
> > static u16 vp_config_vector(struct virtio_pci_device *vp_dev, u16 vector)
> > @@ -380,6 +380,7 @@ static bool vp_get_shm_region(struct virtio_device *vdev,
> > }
> >
> > static const struct virtio_config_ops virtio_pci_config_nodev_ops = {
> > + .ready = vp_enable_vectors,
> > .get = NULL,
> > .set = NULL,
> > .generation = vp_generation,
> > @@ -397,6 +398,7 @@ static const struct virtio_config_ops virtio_pci_config_nodev_ops = {
> > };
> >
> > static const struct virtio_config_ops virtio_pci_config_ops = {
> > + .ready = vp_enable_vectors,
> > .get = vp_get,
> > .set = vp_set,
> > .generation = vp_generation,
> >
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2021-10-15 17:27 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 43+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2021-10-12 6:52 [PATCH V2 00/12] More virtio hardening Jason Wang
2021-10-12 6:52 ` [PATCH V2 01/12] virtio-blk: validate num_queues during probe Jason Wang
2021-10-13 10:04 ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2021-10-14 2:32 ` Jason Wang
2021-10-14 5:45 ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2021-10-14 6:23 ` Jason Wang
2021-10-12 6:52 ` [PATCH V2 02/12] virtio: add doc for validate() method Jason Wang
2021-10-13 10:09 ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2021-10-14 2:32 ` Jason Wang
2021-10-12 6:52 ` [PATCH V2 03/12] virtio-console: switch to use .validate() Jason Wang
2021-10-13 9:50 ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2021-10-14 2:28 ` Jason Wang
2021-10-14 5:58 ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2021-10-12 6:52 ` [PATCH V2 04/12] virtio_console: validate max_nr_ports before trying to use it Jason Wang
2021-10-12 6:52 ` [PATCH V2 05/12] virtio_config: introduce a new ready method Jason Wang
2021-10-13 9:57 ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2021-10-12 6:52 ` [PATCH V2 06/12] virtio_pci: harden MSI-X interrupts Jason Wang
2021-10-13 9:59 ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2021-10-14 2:29 ` Jason Wang
2021-10-15 12:09 ` Dongli Zhang
2021-10-15 17:27 ` Michael S. Tsirkin [this message]
2021-10-19 1:33 ` Jason Wang
2021-10-19 17:01 ` Dongli Zhang
2021-10-20 1:33 ` Jason Wang
2021-10-20 6:56 ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2021-10-12 6:52 ` [PATCH V2 07/12] virtio-pci: harden INTX interrupts Jason Wang
2021-10-13 9:42 ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2021-10-14 2:35 ` Jason Wang
2021-10-14 5:49 ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2021-10-14 6:20 ` Jason Wang
2021-10-14 6:26 ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2021-10-14 6:32 ` Jason Wang
2021-10-14 7:04 ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2021-10-14 7:12 ` Jason Wang
2021-10-14 9:25 ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2021-10-14 10:03 ` Jason Wang
2021-10-12 6:52 ` [PATCH V2 08/12] virtio_ring: fix typos in vring_desc_extra Jason Wang
2021-10-12 6:52 ` [PATCH V2 09/12] virtio_ring: validate used buffer length Jason Wang
2021-10-13 10:02 ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2021-10-14 2:30 ` Jason Wang
2021-10-12 6:52 ` [PATCH V2 10/12] virtio-net: don't let virtio core to validate used length Jason Wang
2021-10-12 6:52 ` [PATCH V2 11/12] virtio-blk: " Jason Wang
2021-10-12 6:52 ` [PATCH V2 12/12] virtio-scsi: don't let virtio core to validate used buffer length Jason Wang
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