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From: "Michael S. Tsirkin" <mst@redhat.com>
To: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com>
Cc: Dongli Zhang <dongli.zhang@oracle.com>,
	"Paul E . McKenney" <paulmck@kernel.org>,
	"kaplan, david" <david.kaplan@amd.com>,
	Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>,
	Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
	"Hetzelt, Felicitas" <f.hetzelt@tu-berlin.de>,
	linux-kernel <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	virtualization <virtualization@lists.linux-foundation.org>,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Subject: Re: [PATCH V2 06/12] virtio_pci: harden MSI-X interrupts
Date: Wed, 20 Oct 2021 02:56:27 -0400	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20211020022529-mutt-send-email-mst@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CACGkMEvSVA=qx6m7BvM-P9mm=KpPihWhVWUycj2WGnwxfa+HAA@mail.gmail.com>

On Wed, Oct 20, 2021 at 09:33:49AM +0800, Jason Wang wrote:
> > In my own opinion, the threat model is:
> >
> > Attacker: 'malicious' hypervisor
> >
> > Victim: VM with SEV/TDX/SGX
> >
> > The attacker should not be able to steal secure/private data from VM, when the
> > hypervisor's action is unexpected. DoS is out of the scope.
> >
> > My concern is: it is very hard to clearly explain in the patchset how the
> > hypervisor is able to steal VM's data, by setting queue=0 or injecting unwanted
> > interrupts to VM.
> 
> Yes, it's a hard question but instead of trying to answer that, we can
> just fix the case of e.g unexpected interrupts.
> 
> Thanks

I think this it's still early days for TDX. So it's a bit early to talk
about threat models, start opening CVEs and distinguishing between
security and non-security bugs.

-- 
MST


  reply	other threads:[~2021-10-20  6:56 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 43+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2021-10-12  6:52 [PATCH V2 00/12] More virtio hardening Jason Wang
2021-10-12  6:52 ` [PATCH V2 01/12] virtio-blk: validate num_queues during probe Jason Wang
2021-10-13 10:04   ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2021-10-14  2:32     ` Jason Wang
2021-10-14  5:45       ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2021-10-14  6:23         ` Jason Wang
2021-10-12  6:52 ` [PATCH V2 02/12] virtio: add doc for validate() method Jason Wang
2021-10-13 10:09   ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2021-10-14  2:32     ` Jason Wang
2021-10-12  6:52 ` [PATCH V2 03/12] virtio-console: switch to use .validate() Jason Wang
2021-10-13  9:50   ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2021-10-14  2:28     ` Jason Wang
2021-10-14  5:58       ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2021-10-12  6:52 ` [PATCH V2 04/12] virtio_console: validate max_nr_ports before trying to use it Jason Wang
2021-10-12  6:52 ` [PATCH V2 05/12] virtio_config: introduce a new ready method Jason Wang
2021-10-13  9:57   ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2021-10-12  6:52 ` [PATCH V2 06/12] virtio_pci: harden MSI-X interrupts Jason Wang
2021-10-13  9:59   ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2021-10-14  2:29     ` Jason Wang
2021-10-15 12:09   ` Dongli Zhang
2021-10-15 17:27     ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2021-10-19  1:33       ` Jason Wang
2021-10-19 17:01         ` Dongli Zhang
2021-10-20  1:33           ` Jason Wang
2021-10-20  6:56             ` Michael S. Tsirkin [this message]
2021-10-12  6:52 ` [PATCH V2 07/12] virtio-pci: harden INTX interrupts Jason Wang
2021-10-13  9:42   ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2021-10-14  2:35     ` Jason Wang
2021-10-14  5:49       ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2021-10-14  6:20         ` Jason Wang
2021-10-14  6:26           ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2021-10-14  6:32             ` Jason Wang
2021-10-14  7:04               ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2021-10-14  7:12                 ` Jason Wang
2021-10-14  9:25                   ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2021-10-14 10:03                     ` Jason Wang
2021-10-12  6:52 ` [PATCH V2 08/12] virtio_ring: fix typos in vring_desc_extra Jason Wang
2021-10-12  6:52 ` [PATCH V2 09/12] virtio_ring: validate used buffer length Jason Wang
2021-10-13 10:02   ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2021-10-14  2:30     ` Jason Wang
2021-10-12  6:52 ` [PATCH V2 10/12] virtio-net: don't let virtio core to validate used length Jason Wang
2021-10-12  6:52 ` [PATCH V2 11/12] virtio-blk: " Jason Wang
2021-10-12  6:52 ` [PATCH V2 12/12] virtio-scsi: don't let virtio core to validate used buffer length Jason Wang

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