LKML Archive on lore.kernel.org
help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
To: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>,
Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>,
Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>,
Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>,
Robin Murphy <robin.murphy@arm.com>,
Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>,
Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>,
James Morse <james.morse@arm.com>,
Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
Bart Van Assche <bart.vanassche@wdc.com>,
Kate Stewart <kstewart@linuxfoundation.org>,
Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
Philippe Ombredanne <pombredanne@nexb.com>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>,
"Kirill A . Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>,
Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>,
"Aneesh Kumar K . V" <aneesh.kumar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>,
Zi Yan <zi.yan@cs.rutgers.edu>,
linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>,
Kostya Serebryany <kcc@google.com>,
Evgeniy Stepanov <eugenis@google.com>,
Lee Smith <Lee.Smith@arm.com>,
Ramana Radhakrishnan <Ramana.Radhakrishnan@arm.com>,
Jacob Bramley <Jacob.Bramley@arm.com>,
Ruben Ayrapetyan <Ruben.Ayrapetyan@arm.com>,
Chintan Pandya <cpandya@codeaurora.org>
Subject: [PATCH v2 3/6] arm64: untag user addresses in access_ok and __uaccess_mask_ptr
Date: Thu, 3 May 2018 16:15:41 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20bddb7a15984ba05eb1d248162a845af246449b.1525356769.git.andreyknvl@google.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <cover.1525356769.git.andreyknvl@google.com>
In-Reply-To: <cover.1525356769.git.andreyknvl@google.com>
copy_from_user (and a few other similar functions) are used to copy data
from user memory into the kernel memory or vice versa. Since a user can
provided a tagged pointer to one of the syscalls that use copy_from_user,
we need to correctly handle such pointers.
Do this by untagging user pointers in access_ok and in __uaccess_mask_ptr,
before performing access validity checks.
Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
---
arch/arm64/include/asm/uaccess.h | 11 +++++++----
1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/uaccess.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/uaccess.h
index 2d6451cbaa86..fa7318d3d7d5 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/uaccess.h
+++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/uaccess.h
@@ -105,7 +105,8 @@ static inline unsigned long __range_ok(const void __user *addr, unsigned long si
#define untagged_addr(addr) \
((__typeof__(addr))sign_extend64((__u64)(addr), 55))
-#define access_ok(type, addr, size) __range_ok(addr, size)
+#define access_ok(type, addr, size) \
+ __range_ok(untagged_addr(addr), size)
#define user_addr_max get_fs
#define _ASM_EXTABLE(from, to) \
@@ -237,7 +238,8 @@ static inline void uaccess_enable_not_uao(void)
/*
* Sanitise a uaccess pointer such that it becomes NULL if above the
- * current addr_limit.
+ * current addr_limit. In case the pointer is tagged (has the top byte set),
+ * untag the pointer before checking.
*/
#define uaccess_mask_ptr(ptr) (__typeof__(ptr))__uaccess_mask_ptr(ptr)
static inline void __user *__uaccess_mask_ptr(const void __user *ptr)
@@ -245,10 +247,11 @@ static inline void __user *__uaccess_mask_ptr(const void __user *ptr)
void __user *safe_ptr;
asm volatile(
- " bics xzr, %1, %2\n"
+ " bics xzr, %3, %2\n"
" csel %0, %1, xzr, eq\n"
: "=&r" (safe_ptr)
- : "r" (ptr), "r" (current_thread_info()->addr_limit)
+ : "r" (ptr), "r" (current_thread_info()->addr_limit),
+ "r" (untagged_addr(ptr))
: "cc");
csdb();
--
2.17.0.441.gb46fe60e1d-goog
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2018-05-03 14:15 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 7+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2018-05-03 14:15 [PATCH v2 0/6] arm64: untag user pointers passed to the kernel Andrey Konovalov
2018-05-03 14:15 ` [PATCH v2 1/6] arm64: add type casts to untagged_addr macro Andrey Konovalov
2018-05-03 14:15 ` [PATCH v2 2/6] uaccess: add untagged_addr definition for other arches Andrey Konovalov
2018-05-03 14:15 ` Andrey Konovalov [this message]
2018-05-03 14:15 ` [PATCH v2 4/6] mm, arm64: untag user addresses in mm/gup.c Andrey Konovalov
2018-05-03 14:15 ` [PATCH v2 5/6] lib, arm64: untag addrs passed to strncpy_from_user and strnlen_user Andrey Konovalov
2018-05-03 14:15 ` [PATCH v2 6/6] arm64: update Documentation/arm64/tagged-pointers.txt Andrey Konovalov
Reply instructions:
You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:
* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
and reply-to-all from there: mbox
Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style
* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
switches of git-send-email(1):
git send-email \
--in-reply-to=20bddb7a15984ba05eb1d248162a845af246449b.1525356769.git.andreyknvl@google.com \
--to=andreyknvl@google.com \
--cc=Jacob.Bramley@arm.com \
--cc=Lee.Smith@arm.com \
--cc=Ramana.Radhakrishnan@arm.com \
--cc=Ruben.Ayrapetyan@arm.com \
--cc=akpm@linux-foundation.org \
--cc=aneesh.kumar@linux.vnet.ibm.com \
--cc=bart.vanassche@wdc.com \
--cc=catalin.marinas@arm.com \
--cc=corbet@lwn.net \
--cc=cpandya@codeaurora.org \
--cc=dan.j.williams@intel.com \
--cc=dvyukov@google.com \
--cc=eugenis@google.com \
--cc=gregkh@linuxfoundation.org \
--cc=james.morse@arm.com \
--cc=kcc@google.com \
--cc=keescook@chromium.org \
--cc=kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com \
--cc=kstewart@linuxfoundation.org \
--cc=linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org \
--cc=linux-doc@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linux-mm@kvack.org \
--cc=mark.rutland@arm.com \
--cc=mingo@kernel.org \
--cc=pombredanne@nexb.com \
--cc=robin.murphy@arm.com \
--cc=tglx@linutronix.de \
--cc=viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk \
--cc=will.deacon@arm.com \
--cc=zi.yan@cs.rutgers.edu \
--subject='Re: [PATCH v2 3/6] arm64: untag user addresses in access_ok and __uaccess_mask_ptr' \
/path/to/YOUR_REPLY
https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html
* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox;
as well as URLs for NNTP newsgroup(s).