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From: "Edgecombe, Rick P" <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>
To: "kpsingh@chromium.org" <kpsingh@chromium.org>,
"luto@amacapital.net" <luto@amacapital.net>
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Subject: Re: [PATCH bpf-next] bpf: Make trampolines W^X
Date: Mon, 6 Jan 2020 22:25:27 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <21bf6bb46544eab79e792980f82520f8fbdae9b5.camel@intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <F25C9071-A7A7-4221-BC49-A769E1677EE1@amacapital.net>
On Sat, 2020-01-04 at 09:49 +0900, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
> > On Jan 4, 2020, at 8:47 AM, KP Singh <kpsingh@chromium.org> wrote:
> >
> > From: KP Singh <kpsingh@google.com>
> >
> > The image for the BPF trampolines is allocated with
> > bpf_jit_alloc_exe_page which marks this allocated page executable. This
> > means that the allocated memory is W and X at the same time making it
> > susceptible to WX based attacks.
> >
> > Since the allocated memory is shared between two trampolines (the
> > current and the next), 2 pages must be allocated to adhere to W^X and
> > the following sequence is obeyed where trampolines are modified:
>
> Can we please do better rather than piling garbage on top of garbage?
>
> >
> > - Mark memory as non executable (set_memory_nx). While module_alloc for
> > x86 allocates the memory as PAGE_KERNEL and not PAGE_KERNEL_EXEC, not
> > all implementations of module_alloc do so
>
> How about fixing this instead?
>
> > - Mark the memory as read/write (set_memory_rw)
>
> Probably harmless, but see above about fixing it.
>
> > - Modify the trampoline
>
> Seems reasonable. It’s worth noting that this whole approach is suboptimal:
> the “module” allocator should really be returning a list of pages to be
> written (not at the final address!) with the actual executable mapping to be
> materialized later, but that’s a bigger project that you’re welcome to ignore
> for now. (Concretely, it should produce a vmap address with backing pages but
> with the vmap alias either entirely unmapped or read-only. A subsequent healer
> would, all at once, make the direct map pages RO or not-present and make the
> vmap alias RX.)
> > - Mark the memory as read-only (set_memory_ro)
> > - Mark the memory as executable (set_memory_x)
>
> No, thanks. There’s very little excuse for doing two IPI flushes when one
> would suffice.
>
> As far as I know, all architectures can do this with a single flush without
> races x86 certainly can. The module freeing code gets this sequence right.
> Please reuse its mechanism or, if needed, export the relevant interfaces.
So if I understand this right, some trampolines have been added that are
currently set as RWX at modification time AND left that way during runtime? The
discussion on the order of set_memory_() calls in the commit message made me
think that this was just a modification time thing at first.
Also, is there a reason you couldn't use text_poke() to modify the trampoline
with a single flush?
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2020-01-06 22:25 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 15+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2020-01-03 23:47 [PATCH bpf-next] bpf: Make trampolines W^X KP Singh
2020-01-04 0:49 ` Andy Lutomirski
2020-01-05 1:19 ` Justin Capella
2020-01-06 8:23 ` Peter Zijlstra
2020-01-06 22:25 ` Edgecombe, Rick P [this message]
2020-01-07 1:36 ` Andy Lutomirski
2020-01-07 19:01 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2020-01-08 8:41 ` Andy Lutomirski
2020-01-08 20:52 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2020-01-09 6:48 ` Andy Lutomirski
2020-01-10 1:00 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2020-01-10 18:35 ` Andy Lutomirski
[not found] <CAMrEMU8Vsn8rfULqf1gfuYL_-ybqzit29CLYReskaZ8XUroZww@mail.gmail.com>
[not found] ` <768BAF04-BEBF-489A-8737-B645816B262A@amacapital.net>
2020-01-06 22:13 ` Alexei Starovoitov
2020-01-07 9:11 ` Peter Zijlstra
2020-01-07 18:55 ` Alexei Starovoitov
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