LKML Archive on lore.kernel.org
help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
To: Waiman Long <longman9394@gmail.com>,
Jiri Kosina <jikos@kernel.org>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>,
Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>,
David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>,
Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>,
Casey Schaufler <casey.schaufler@intel.com>,
Asit Mallick <asit.k.mallick@intel.com>,
Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>,
Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com>,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org
Subject: Re: [Patch v3 09/13] x86/speculation: Reorganize SPEC_CTRL MSR update
Date: Fri, 26 Oct 2018 11:25:09 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <2349aa0d-f751-2e79-b0bc-f1d6acae13ef@linux.intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <63856b8d-0b53-7103-db7e-315330e2ee48@gmail.com>
On 10/26/2018 10:21 AM, Waiman Long wrote:
> On 10/17/2018 01:59 PM, Tim Chen wrote:
>> Reorganize the spculation control MSR update code. Currently it is limited
>> to only dynamic update of the Speculative Store Bypass Disable bit.
>> This patch consolidates the logic to check for AMD CPUs that may or may
>> not use this MSR to control SSBD. This prepares us to add logic to update
>> other bits in the SPEC_CTRL MSR cleanly.
>>
>> Originally-by: Thomas Lendacky <Thomas.Lendacky@amd.com>
>> Signed-off-by: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
>> ---
>> arch/x86/kernel/process.c | 39 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----------
>> 1 file changed, 29 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
>>
>> diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/process.c b/arch/x86/kernel/process.c
>> index 8aa4960..789f1bada 100644
>> --- a/arch/x86/kernel/process.c
>> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/process.c
>> @@ -397,25 +397,45 @@ static __always_inline void amd_set_ssb_virt_state(unsigned long tifn)
>>
>> static __always_inline void spec_ctrl_update_msr(unsigned long tifn)
>> {
>> - u64 msr = x86_spec_ctrl_base | ssbd_tif_to_spec_ctrl(tifn);
>> + u64 msr = x86_spec_ctrl_base;
>> +
>> + /*
>> + * If X86_FEATURE_SSBD is not set, the SSBD
>> + * bit is not to be touched.
>> + */
>> + if (static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SSBD))
>> + msr |= ssbd_tif_to_spec_ctrl(tifn);
>>
>> wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, msr);
>> }
>>
>> -static __always_inline void __speculation_ctrl_update(unsigned long tifn)
>> +static __always_inline void __speculation_ctrl_update(unsigned long tifp,
>> + unsigned long tifn)
>
> I think it will be more intuitive to pass in (tifp ^ tifn) as bitmask of
> changed TIF bits than tifp alone as you are only interested in the
> changed bits anyway.
I will need to then pass the bitmask plus tifn. I still need to
pass two parameters and it is a bit more work for the caller
to generate the bit mask. It is not obvious to me that it is better.
Please also document the input parameters as it is
> hard to know what they are by reading the function alone.
Sure.
>
> Cheers,
> Longman
>> {
>> - if (static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_VIRT_SSBD))
>> - amd_set_ssb_virt_state(tifn);
>> - else if (static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_LS_CFG_SSBD))
>> - amd_set_core_ssb_state(tifn);
>> - else
>> + bool updmsr = false;
>> +
>> + /* Check for AMD cpu to see if it uses SPEC_CTRL MSR for SSBD */
>> + if ((tifp ^ tifn) & _TIF_SSBD) {
>> + if (static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_VIRT_SSBD))
>> + amd_set_ssb_virt_state(tifn);
>> + else if (static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_LS_CFG_SSBD))
>> + amd_set_core_ssb_state(tifn);
>> + else if (static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SSBD))
>> + updmsr = true;
>> + }
>> +
>> + if (updmsr)
>> spec_ctrl_update_msr(tifn);
>> }
>>
>> void speculation_ctrl_update(unsigned long tif)
>> {
>> + /*
>> + * On this path we're forcing the update, so use ~tif as the
>> + * previous flags.
>> + */
>> preempt_disable();
>> - __speculation_ctrl_update(tif);
>> + __speculation_ctrl_update(~tif, tif);
>> preempt_enable();
>> }
>>
>> @@ -451,8 +471,7 @@ void __switch_to_xtra(struct task_struct *prev_p, struct task_struct *next_p,
>> if ((tifp ^ tifn) & _TIF_NOCPUID)
>> set_cpuid_faulting(!!(tifn & _TIF_NOCPUID));
>>
>> - if ((tifp ^ tifn) & _TIF_SSBD)
>> - __speculation_ctrl_update(tifn);
>> + __speculation_ctrl_update(tifp, tifn);
>> }
>>
>> /*
>
>
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2018-10-26 18:25 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 47+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2018-10-17 17:59 [Patch v3 00/13] Provide process property based options to enable Spectre v2 userspace-userspace protection Tim Chen
2018-10-17 17:59 ` [Patch v3 01/13] x86/speculation: Clean up spectre_v2_parse_cmdline Tim Chen
2018-10-18 12:43 ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-10-17 17:59 ` [Patch v3 02/13] x86/speculation: Remove unnecessary ret variable in cpu_show_common Tim Chen
2018-10-18 12:46 ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-10-17 17:59 ` [Patch v3 03/13] x86/speculation: Add static key for Enhanced IBRS Tim Chen
2018-10-18 12:50 ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-10-26 16:58 ` Waiman Long
2018-10-26 18:15 ` Tim Chen
2018-10-28 9:32 ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-10-17 17:59 ` [Patch v3 04/13] x86/speculation: Disable STIBP when enhanced IBRS is in use Tim Chen
2018-10-18 12:58 ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-10-26 17:00 ` Waiman Long
2018-10-26 18:18 ` Tim Chen
2018-10-26 18:29 ` Tim Chen
2018-10-17 17:59 ` [Patch v3 05/13] x86/smt: Create cpu_smt_enabled static key for SMT specific code Tim Chen
2018-10-18 13:03 ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-10-19 7:51 ` Peter Zijlstra
2018-10-17 17:59 ` [Patch v3 06/13] mm: Pass task instead of task->mm as argument to set_dumpable Tim Chen
2018-10-18 13:22 ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-10-19 20:02 ` Peter Zijlstra
2018-10-17 17:59 ` [Patch v3 07/13] x86/process Add arch_set_dumpable Tim Chen
2018-10-18 13:28 ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-10-18 18:46 ` Tim Chen
2018-10-19 19:12 ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-10-19 20:16 ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-10-22 23:55 ` Tim Chen
2018-10-17 17:59 ` [Patch v3 08/13] x86/speculation: Rename SSBD update functions Tim Chen
2018-10-18 13:37 ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-10-17 17:59 ` [Patch v3 09/13] x86/speculation: Reorganize SPEC_CTRL MSR update Tim Chen
2018-10-18 13:47 ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-10-26 17:21 ` Waiman Long
2018-10-26 18:25 ` Tim Chen [this message]
2018-10-17 17:59 ` [Patch v3 10/13] x86/speculation: Add per thread STIBP flag Tim Chen
2018-10-18 13:53 ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-10-17 17:59 ` [Patch v3 11/13] x86/speculation: Add Spectre v2 lite app to app protection mode Tim Chen
2018-10-18 15:12 ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-10-17 17:59 ` [Patch v3 12/13] x86/speculation: Protect non-dumpable processes against Spectre v2 attack Tim Chen
2018-10-18 15:17 ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-10-26 17:46 ` Waiman Long
2018-10-26 18:10 ` Tim Chen
2018-10-17 17:59 ` [Patch v3 13/13] x86/speculation: Create PRCTL interface to restrict indirect branch speculation Tim Chen
2018-10-17 19:12 ` Randy Dunlap
2018-10-18 15:31 ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-10-19 7:57 ` [Patch v3 00/13] Provide process property based options to enable Spectre v2 userspace-userspace protection Peter Zijlstra
2018-10-19 16:43 ` Tim Chen
2018-10-19 18:38 ` Peter Zijlstra
Reply instructions:
You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:
* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
and reply-to-all from there: mbox
Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style
* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
switches of git-send-email(1):
git send-email \
--in-reply-to=2349aa0d-f751-2e79-b0bc-f1d6acae13ef@linux.intel.com \
--to=tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com \
--cc=aarcange@redhat.com \
--cc=ak@linux.intel.com \
--cc=arjan@linux.intel.com \
--cc=asit.k.mallick@intel.com \
--cc=casey.schaufler@intel.com \
--cc=dave.hansen@intel.com \
--cc=dwmw@amazon.co.uk \
--cc=jcm@redhat.com \
--cc=jikos@kernel.org \
--cc=jpoimboe@redhat.com \
--cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=longman9394@gmail.com \
--cc=mingo@redhat.com \
--cc=peterz@infradead.org \
--cc=tglx@linutronix.de \
--cc=thomas.lendacky@amd.com \
--cc=x86@kernel.org \
--subject='Re: [Patch v3 09/13] x86/speculation: Reorganize SPEC_CTRL MSR update' \
/path/to/YOUR_REPLY
https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html
* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox;
as well as URLs for NNTP newsgroup(s).