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From: Waiman Long <longman9394@gmail.com>
To: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>,
	Jiri Kosina <jikos@kernel.org>,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
	Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
	Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>,
	Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>,
	David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>,
	Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>,
	Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>,
	Casey Schaufler <casey.schaufler@intel.com>,
	Asit Mallick <asit.k.mallick@intel.com>,
	Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>,
	Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com>,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org
Subject: Re: [Patch v3 04/13] x86/speculation: Disable STIBP when enhanced IBRS is in use
Date: Fri, 26 Oct 2018 13:00:52 -0400	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <43c23fc3-ebaa-fe7c-f7b7-54a5166b6b49@gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <a96456805e51e234d1bae30837366243e24a4b83.1539798901.git.tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>

On 10/17/2018 01:59 PM, Tim Chen wrote:
> With enhanced IBRS in use, the application running on sibling CPU will not
> be able to launch Spectre v2 attack to the application on current CPU.
> There is no need to use STIBP for this case.  Disable the STIBP code
> when enhanced IBRS is used.
>
> Signed-off-by: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
> ---
>  arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 12 +++++++++++-
>  1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
>
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
> index 2fc7b4e..6ed82ea 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
> @@ -327,6 +327,14 @@ static enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd __init spectre_v2_parse_cmdline(void)
>  
>  static bool stibp_needed(void)
>  {
> +	/*
> +	 * Determine if we want to leave STIBP always on.
> +	 * Using enhanced IBRS makes using STIBP unnecessary.
> +	 */
> +
> +	if (static_branch_unlikely(&spectre_v2_enhanced_ibrs))
> +		return false;
> +
>  	if (spectre_v2_enabled == SPECTRE_V2_NONE)
>  		return false;
>  
> @@ -881,7 +889,9 @@ static ssize_t cpu_show_common(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr
>  				   ", IBPB" : "",
>  			boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_USE_IBRS_FW) ?
>  				   ", IBRS_FW" : "",
> -			(x86_spec_ctrl_base & SPEC_CTRL_STIBP) ?
> +			spectre_v2_enabled == SPECTRE_V2_IBRS_ENHANCED ?
> +				   ", Enhanced IBRS" :
> +			    (x86_spec_ctrl_base & SPEC_CTRL_STIBP) ?
>  				   ", STIBP" : "",
>  			boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RSB_CTXSW) ?
>  				   ", RSB filling" : "",

The "Enhanced IBRS" is one of the states of spectre_v2_enabled. So you
don't need to print that out one more time.

Cheers,
Longman


  parent reply	other threads:[~2018-10-26 17:11 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 47+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2018-10-17 17:59 [Patch v3 00/13] Provide process property based options to enable Spectre v2 userspace-userspace protection Tim Chen
2018-10-17 17:59 ` [Patch v3 01/13] x86/speculation: Clean up spectre_v2_parse_cmdline Tim Chen
2018-10-18 12:43   ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-10-17 17:59 ` [Patch v3 02/13] x86/speculation: Remove unnecessary ret variable in cpu_show_common Tim Chen
2018-10-18 12:46   ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-10-17 17:59 ` [Patch v3 03/13] x86/speculation: Add static key for Enhanced IBRS Tim Chen
2018-10-18 12:50   ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-10-26 16:58   ` Waiman Long
2018-10-26 18:15     ` Tim Chen
2018-10-28  9:32       ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-10-17 17:59 ` [Patch v3 04/13] x86/speculation: Disable STIBP when enhanced IBRS is in use Tim Chen
2018-10-18 12:58   ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-10-26 17:00   ` Waiman Long [this message]
2018-10-26 18:18     ` Tim Chen
2018-10-26 18:29       ` Tim Chen
2018-10-17 17:59 ` [Patch v3 05/13] x86/smt: Create cpu_smt_enabled static key for SMT specific code Tim Chen
2018-10-18 13:03   ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-10-19  7:51   ` Peter Zijlstra
2018-10-17 17:59 ` [Patch v3 06/13] mm: Pass task instead of task->mm as argument to set_dumpable Tim Chen
2018-10-18 13:22   ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-10-19 20:02   ` Peter Zijlstra
2018-10-17 17:59 ` [Patch v3 07/13] x86/process Add arch_set_dumpable Tim Chen
2018-10-18 13:28   ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-10-18 18:46     ` Tim Chen
2018-10-19 19:12       ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-10-19 20:16         ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-10-22 23:55           ` Tim Chen
2018-10-17 17:59 ` [Patch v3 08/13] x86/speculation: Rename SSBD update functions Tim Chen
2018-10-18 13:37   ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-10-17 17:59 ` [Patch v3 09/13] x86/speculation: Reorganize SPEC_CTRL MSR update Tim Chen
2018-10-18 13:47   ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-10-26 17:21   ` Waiman Long
2018-10-26 18:25     ` Tim Chen
2018-10-17 17:59 ` [Patch v3 10/13] x86/speculation: Add per thread STIBP flag Tim Chen
2018-10-18 13:53   ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-10-17 17:59 ` [Patch v3 11/13] x86/speculation: Add Spectre v2 lite app to app protection mode Tim Chen
2018-10-18 15:12   ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-10-17 17:59 ` [Patch v3 12/13] x86/speculation: Protect non-dumpable processes against Spectre v2 attack Tim Chen
2018-10-18 15:17   ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-10-26 17:46   ` Waiman Long
2018-10-26 18:10     ` Tim Chen
2018-10-17 17:59 ` [Patch v3 13/13] x86/speculation: Create PRCTL interface to restrict indirect branch speculation Tim Chen
2018-10-17 19:12   ` Randy Dunlap
2018-10-18 15:31   ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-10-19  7:57 ` [Patch v3 00/13] Provide process property based options to enable Spectre v2 userspace-userspace protection Peter Zijlstra
2018-10-19 16:43   ` Tim Chen
2018-10-19 18:38     ` Peter Zijlstra

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