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From: "Andrew G. Morgan" <morgan@kernel.org>
To: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-audit@redhat.com,
	viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk, sgrubb@redhat.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH 3/4] AUDIT: audit when fcaps increase the permitted or inheritable capabilities
Date: Wed, 22 Oct 2008 21:13:59 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <48FFFA07.3060707@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20081022141430.GB21612@us.ibm.com>

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Serge E. Hallyn wrote:
>>> ... except if (!issecure(SECURE_NOROOT) && uid==0) I guess?
>>>
>>> And then it also might be interesting in the case where
>>> (!issecure(SECURE_NOROOT) && uid==0) and pP is not full.
>> I guess so, although this seems like a case of being interested in a
>> (unusual) non-privileged execve().
> 
> I'm not sure what you mean - but this can only happen if bits are taken
> out of the capability bounding set, right?

Yes, it can happen as you say.

This is a case of an unprivileged uid==0 execution. Since we don't
appear to want to audit other non-privileged execve()s, its not clear to
me that this one deserves attention.

>>>>>  	rc = bprm_caps_from_vfs_caps(&vcaps, bprm);
>>>>>  
>>>>> +	audit_log_bprm_fcaps(bprm, &vcaps);
>>>>> +
>>>> When rc != 0, the execve() will fail. Is it appropriate to log in this case?
>>> It might fail because fP contains bits not in pP', right?  That's
>>> probably interesting to auditors.
>> In which case, how is the fact it didn't execute captured in the audit log?
> 
> I assume as a FAIL?  (Not sure of the exact wording in the logs)

OK. As long as its clearly identified as a failure and the logs are not
misleading - making it look like the execve() succeeded with privilege -
then I'm not as concerned.

Cheers

Andrew
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  reply	other threads:[~2008-10-23  4:15 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 14+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2008-10-20 22:25 [PATCH 0/4] Audit support for file capabilities Eric Paris
2008-10-20 22:26 ` [PATCH 1/4] CAPABILITIES: add cpu endian vfs caps structure Eric Paris
2008-10-21  5:50   ` Andrew G. Morgan
2008-10-21 13:22     ` Eric Paris
2008-10-20 22:26 ` [PATCH 2/4] AUDIT: output permitted and inheritable fcaps in PATH records Eric Paris
2008-10-20 22:26 ` [PATCH 3/4] AUDIT: audit when fcaps increase the permitted or inheritable capabilities Eric Paris
2008-10-21  5:53   ` Andrew G. Morgan
2008-10-21 19:16     ` Serge E. Hallyn
2008-10-22 12:51       ` Andrew G. Morgan
2008-10-22 14:14         ` Serge E. Hallyn
2008-10-23  4:13           ` Andrew G. Morgan [this message]
2008-10-29 21:58             ` Eric Paris
2008-10-30 13:35               ` Serge E. Hallyn
2008-10-20 22:26 ` [PATCH 4/4] AUDIT: emit new record type showing all capset information Eric Paris

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