LKML Archive on lore.kernel.org help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> To: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>, linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>, "Luis R . Rodriguez" <mcgrof@kernel.org>, Eric Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>, kexec@lists.infradead.org, Andres Rodriguez <andresx7@gmail.com>, Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>, Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>, Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 3/9] security: define security_kernel_read_blob() wrapper Date: Thu, 17 May 2018 17:24:36 -0700 [thread overview] Message-ID: <74c096ca-1ad1-799e-df3d-7b1b099333a7@schaufler-ca.com> (raw) In-Reply-To: <1526568530-9144-4-git-send-email-zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> On 5/17/2018 7:48 AM, Mimi Zohar wrote: > In order for LSMs and IMA-appraisal to differentiate between the original > and new syscalls (eg. kexec, kernel modules, firmware), both the original > and new syscalls must call an LSM hook. > > Commit 2e72d51b4ac3 ("security: introduce kernel_module_from_file hook") > introduced calling security_kernel_module_from_file() in both the original > and new syscalls. Commit a1db74209483 ("module: replace > copy_module_from_fd with kernel version") replaced these LSM calls with > security_kernel_read_file(). > > Commit e40ba6d56b41 ("firmware: replace call to fw_read_file_contents() > with kernel version") and commit b804defe4297 ("kexec: replace call to > copy_file_from_fd() with kernel version") replaced their own version of > reading a file from the kernel with the generic > kernel_read_file_from_path/fd() versions, which call the pre and post > security_kernel_read_file LSM hooks. > > Missing are LSM calls in the original kexec syscall and firmware sysfs > fallback method. From a technical perspective there is no justification > for defining a new LSM hook, as the existing security_kernel_read_file() > works just fine. The original syscalls, however, do not read a file, so > the security hook name is inappropriate. Instead of defining a new LSM > hook, this patch defines security_kernel_read_blob() as a wrapper for > the existing LSM security_kernel_file_read() hook. What a marvelous opportunity to bikeshed! I really dislike adding another security_ interface just because the name isn't quite right. Especially a wrapper, which is just code and execution overhead. Why not change security_kernel_read_file() to security_kernel_read_blob() everywhere and be done? > > Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> > Cc: Eric Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com> > Cc: Luis R. Rodriguez <mcgrof@kernel.org> > Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> > Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> > Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> > > Changelog v2: > - Define a generic wrapper named security_kernel_read_blob() for > security_kernel_read_file(). > > Changelog v1: > - Define and call security_kexec_load(), a wrapper for > security_kernel_read_file(). > --- > include/linux/security.h | 6 ++++++ > security/security.c | 6 ++++++ > 2 files changed, 12 insertions(+) > > diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h > index 63030c85ee19..4db1967a688b 100644 > --- a/include/linux/security.h > +++ b/include/linux/security.h > @@ -323,6 +323,7 @@ int security_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name); > int security_kernel_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id id); > int security_kernel_post_read_file(struct file *file, char *buf, loff_t size, > enum kernel_read_file_id id); > +int security_kernel_read_blob(enum kernel_read_file_id id); > int security_task_fix_setuid(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old, > int flags); > int security_task_setpgid(struct task_struct *p, pid_t pgid); > @@ -922,6 +923,11 @@ static inline int security_kernel_post_read_file(struct file *file, > return 0; > } > > +static inline int security_kernel_read_blob(enum kernel_read_file_id id) > +{ > + return 0; > +} > + > static inline int security_task_fix_setuid(struct cred *new, > const struct cred *old, > int flags) > diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c > index 68f46d849abe..8f199b2bf4a2 100644 > --- a/security/security.c > +++ b/security/security.c > @@ -1044,6 +1044,12 @@ int security_kernel_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id id) > } > EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(security_kernel_read_file); > > +int security_kernel_read_blob(enum kernel_read_file_id id) > +{ > + return security_kernel_read_file(NULL, id); > +} > +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(security_kernel_read_blob); > + > int security_kernel_post_read_file(struct file *file, char *buf, loff_t size, > enum kernel_read_file_id id) > {
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2018-05-18 0:24 UTC|newest] Thread overview: 17+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top 2018-05-17 14:48 [PATCH v2 0/9] kexec/firmware: support system wide policy requiring signatures Mimi Zohar 2018-05-17 14:48 ` [PATCH v2 1/9] ima: based on policy verify firmware signatures (pre-allocated buffer) Mimi Zohar 2018-05-17 14:48 ` [PATCH v2 2/9] ima: fix updating the ima_appraise flag Mimi Zohar 2018-05-17 14:48 ` [PATCH v2 3/9] security: define security_kernel_read_blob() wrapper Mimi Zohar 2018-05-18 0:24 ` Casey Schaufler [this message] 2018-05-18 3:37 ` Eric W. Biederman 2018-05-18 11:30 ` Mimi Zohar 2018-05-18 14:58 ` Casey Schaufler 2018-05-18 15:29 ` Mimi Zohar 2018-05-18 17:13 ` James Morris 2018-05-18 17:55 ` Mimi Zohar 2018-05-17 14:48 ` [PATCH v2 4/9] kexec: add call to LSM hook in original kexec_load syscall Mimi Zohar 2018-05-17 14:48 ` [PATCH v2 5/9] ima: based on policy require signed kexec kernel images Mimi Zohar 2018-05-17 14:48 ` [PATCH v2 6/9] firmware: add call to LSM hook before firmware sysfs fallback Mimi Zohar 2018-05-17 14:48 ` [PATCH v2 7/9] ima: based on policy require signed firmware (sysfs fallback) Mimi Zohar 2018-05-17 14:48 ` [PATCH v2 8/9] ima: add build time policy Mimi Zohar 2018-05-17 14:48 ` [PATCH v2 9/9] ima: based on policy prevent loading firmware (pre-allocated buffer) Mimi Zohar
Reply instructions: You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email using any one of the following methods: * Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client, and reply-to-all from there: mbox Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style * Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to switches of git-send-email(1): git send-email \ --in-reply-to=74c096ca-1ad1-799e-df3d-7b1b099333a7@schaufler-ca.com \ --to=casey@schaufler-ca.com \ --cc=andresx7@gmail.com \ --cc=ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org \ --cc=dhowells@redhat.com \ --cc=ebiederm@xmission.com \ --cc=gregkh@linuxfoundation.org \ --cc=keescook@chromium.org \ --cc=kexec@lists.infradead.org \ --cc=linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org \ --cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \ --cc=linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org \ --cc=mcgrof@kernel.org \ --cc=zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com \ /path/to/YOUR_REPLY https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html * If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header via mailto: links, try the mailto: linkBe sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox; as well as URLs for NNTP newsgroup(s).