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From: Samium Gromoff <_deepfire@feelingofgreen.ru>
To: David Wagner <daw@cs.berkeley.edu>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH] Undo some of the pseudo-security madness
Date: Mon, 22 Jan 2007 02:23:30 +0300	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <87r6toufpp.wl@betelheise.deep.net> (raw)

David Wagner wrote:
> Samium Gromoff  wrote:
> >the core of the problem are the cores which are customarily
> >dumped by lisps during the environment generation (or modification) stage,
> >and then mapped back, every time the environment is invoked.
> >
> >at the current step of evolution, those core files are not relocatable
> >in certain natively compiling lisp systems.
> >
> >in an even smaller subset of them, these cores are placed after
> >the shared libraries and the executable.
> >
> >which obviously breaks when the latter are placed unpredictably.
> >(yes, i know, currently mmap_base() varies over a 1MB range, but who
> >says it will last indefinitely -- probably one day these people
> >from full-disclosure will prevail and it will become, like, 256MB ;-)
> >
> >so, what do you propose?
> 
> The obvious solution is: Don't make them setuid root.
> Then this issue disappears.
> 
> If there is some strong reason why they need to be setuid root, then
> you'll need to explain that reason and your requirements in more detail.
> But, based on your explanation so far, I have serious doubts about
> whether it is a good idea to make such core-dumps setuid root in the
> first place.

not "core-dumps" but "core files", in the lispspeak, but anyway.

the reason is trivial -- if i can write programs enjoying setuid
privileges in C, i want to be able to do the same in Lisp.

the only way to achieve this i see, is to directly setuid root
the lisp system executable itself -- because the lisp code
is read, compiled and executed in the process of the lisp
system executable.

there is such a thing as suid-perl -- for precise same reasons.

regards, Samium Gromoff

             reply	other threads:[~2007-01-21 23:23 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 38+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2007-01-21 23:23 Samium Gromoff [this message]
2007-01-21 23:34 ` David Wagner
2007-01-22  0:36   ` Kyle Moffett
2007-01-22  1:53     ` Samium Gromoff
2007-02-24  9:40       ` Florian Weimer
2007-02-24 13:33         ` Samium Gromoff
2007-02-24 13:49           ` Florian Weimer
2007-01-22 15:20 ` Valdis.Kletnieks
2007-01-22 17:39   ` Samium Gromoff
2007-01-23  8:48     ` Pavel Machek
2007-01-23 14:03       ` Samium Gromoff
2007-01-23 15:41         ` Alan
2007-01-23 20:21           ` [PATCH 0/2] Mechanism to turn of ASR on a per-ELF binary basis Samium Gromoff
2007-01-23 20:28           ` [PATCH 1/2] Define the EF_AS_NO_RANDOM e_flag bit Samium Gromoff
2007-01-23 20:50             ` Jakub Jelinek
2007-01-23 21:06               ` Samium Gromoff
2007-01-23 21:16                 ` Jakub Jelinek
2007-01-23 21:54                   ` Samium Gromoff
2007-01-23 23:21                   ` Samium Gromoff
2007-01-24 17:08                     ` Pavel Machek
2007-01-29  1:18             ` Arjan van de Ven
2007-01-23 20:31           ` [PATCH 2/2] Make the EF_AS_NO_RANDOM e_flag bit disable PF_RANDOMIZE Samium Gromoff
2007-02-24  9:51           ` [PATCH] Undo some of the pseudo-security madness Florian Weimer
2007-02-24 13:36             ` Samium Gromoff
2007-01-31  9:59         ` Arjan van de Ven
2007-02-01  8:05           ` Florian Weimer
  -- strict thread matches above, loose matches on Subject: below --
2007-01-22  0:54 Samium Gromoff
2007-01-20 14:37 Samium Gromoff
2007-01-20 16:12 ` Samium Gromoff
2007-01-20 21:58 ` David Wagner
2007-01-21  2:16 ` Arjan van de Ven
2007-01-21 21:38   ` Samium Gromoff
2007-01-21 22:09   ` Samium Gromoff
2007-01-21 22:16     ` David Wagner
2007-01-22  0:35     ` Arjan van de Ven
2007-01-22  1:15       ` Samium Gromoff
2007-01-22 17:52       ` Samium Gromoff
2007-01-23  8:44         ` Pavel Machek

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